sentence that fulfills principle in Michigan

2020A sentence that fulfills the principle of proportionality under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636 ; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), is reasonable under People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 ; 870 NW2d 502 (2015).

2020A sentence that fulfills the principle of proportionality under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636 ; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), is reasonable under People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 ; 870 NW2d 502 (2015).

2020A sentence that fulfills the principle of proportionality under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636 ; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), is reasonable under People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 ; 870 NW2d 502 (2015).

2020A sentence that fulfills the principle of proportionality under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636 ; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), is reasonable under People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 ; 870 NW2d 502 (2015).

2017In this case, however, defendant only alleges improper judicial fact-finding with regard to the scoring of OVs 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, and 11, and does not contend that the scoring of the OVs was unsupported by the evidence. 2 Moreover, in People v Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 47-48 ; 880 NW2d 297 (2015), lv gtd 499 Mich 934 (2016), this Court held “that a sentence that fulfills the principle of proportionality under [People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630 ; 461 NW2d 1 (1990)], and its progeny, constitutes a reasonable sentence under Lockridge.” Under Milbourn and its progeny, a sentence that falls within the

2017In this case, however, defendant only alleges improper judicial fact-finding with regard to the scoring of OVs 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, and 11, and does not contend that the scoring of the OVs was unsupported by the evidence. 2 Moreover, in People v Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 47-48 ; 880 NW2d 297 (2015), lv gtd 499 Mich 934 (2016), this Court held “that a sentence that fulfills the principle of proportionality under [People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630 ; 461 NW2d 1 (1990)], and its progeny, constitutes a reasonable sentence under Lockridge.” Under Milbourn and its progeny, a sentence that falls within the

2016People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 609 ; 560 NW2d 354 (1996) (“As a general rule, a sentence that falls within the guidelines’ range is presumed to be neither excessive nor disparate.”); People v Dukes, 189 Mich App 262, 266 ; 471 NW2d 651 (1991) (“Milbourn left intact the Court’s prior observation, in People v Broden, 428 Mich 343, 354 ; 408 NW2d 789 (1987), that sentences falling within the recommended guidelines range are presumptively not excessively severe or unfairly disparate.”).

2016People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 609 ; 560 NW2d 354 (1996) (“As a general rule, a sentence that falls within the guidelines’ range is presumed to be neither excessive nor disparate.”); People v Dukes, 189 Mich App 262, 266 ; 471 NW2d 651 (1991) (“Milbourn left intact the Court’s prior observation, in People v Broden, 428 Mich 343, 354 ; 408 NW2d 789 (1987), that sentences falling within the recommended guidelines range are presumptively not excessively severe or unfairly disparate.”).

2017People v Dukes, 189 Mich App 262, 266 ; 471 NW2d 651 (1991). 3 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -3- must first objectively determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.

2017People v Dukes, 189 Mich App 262, 266 ; 471 NW2d 651 (1991). 3 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -3- must first objectively determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.

2017In People v Masroor, 313 Mich App 358, 374 ; 880 NW2d 812 (2015), this Court summarized the reasonableness standard of review to be applied to departure sentences: In a nutshell, Milbourn’s “principle of proportionality” requires a sentence “to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636 .

2017In People v Masroor, 313 Mich App 358, 374 ; 880 NW2d 812 (2015), this Court summarized the reasonableness standard of review to be applied to departure sentences: In a nutshell, Milbourn’s “principle of proportionality” requires a sentence “to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636 .

2020In Babcock, 469 Mich at 263 , our Supreme Court held that the Legislature had incorporated the principle of proportionality into the sentencing guidelines.

2016As recently stated by this Court in People v Stokes, 312 Mich App 181, 200-201 , 877 NW2d 752 (2015), [appeal held in abeyance ___ Mich ___; 878 NW2d 886 (2016),] “the purpose of a Crosby remand is to determine what effect Lockridge would have on the defendant’s sentence so that it may be determined whether any prejudice resulted from the error.” While the Lockridge Court did not explicitly hold that the Crosby procedure applies under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that this is the proper remedy when, as in this case, the trial court was unaware of, and not expressly bound by, a r

2016As recently stated by this Court in People v Stokes, 312 Mich App 181, 200-201 , 877 NW2d 752 (2015), [appeal held in abeyance ___ Mich ___; 878 NW2d 886 (2016),] “the purpose of a Crosby remand is to determine what effect Lockridge would have on the defendant’s sentence so that it may be determined whether any prejudice resulted from the error.” While the Lockridge Court did not explicitly hold that the Crosby procedure applies under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that this is the proper remedy when, as in this case, the trial court was unaware of, and not expressly bound by, a r

2016Additionally, in People v Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 47-48 ; 880 NW2d 297 (2015), lv gtd 499 Mich 934 (2016), this Court held that “a sentence that fulfills the principle of proportionality under Milbourn , and its progeny, constitutes a reasonable sentence under Lockridge.” 10 In responding to the dissent, the Milbourn majority stated that “[t]he gravamen of the dissent is that the enormous sentencing discretion which the Legislature left to the judiciary is ... in sharp contrast to every other discretionary sphere of judicial activity” and that, under the dissent’s rationale, a sentencing c

2016The Court held that the “first-in-time sentencing court lacked discretionary consecutive sentencing authority.” Id. at 231-232 . 12 In addition to his Lockridge challenge, defendant argues on appeal that the trial court’s assignment of 10 points for OV 12 was not supported by the record. 13 This evidence is sufficient to defeat defendant’s argument on appeal that the trial court erred by assessing 10 points for OV 12.