v.
Fla. Unemployment Appeals Com'n
Carolyn D. Cummings of Cummings, Hobbs & Wallace, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Helena Tetzeli and Steven M. Weinger of Kurzban, Kurzban, Weinger and Tetzeli, P.A., Miami, for Appellee Sunrise Community, Inc.
PER CURIAM.
The appellant challenges the order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission, which affirmed the decision of the appeals referee, denying her unemployment compensation benefits on the ground that her actions constituted misconduct as defined in section 443.036(26), Florida Statutes (1995).[1] We do not question the employer's discharge of appellant, which is not the subject of this appeal, but only reiterate that "[w]hether an employer has the right to terminate an employee's employment and whether a terminated employee meets the disqualification criteria set out in the unemployment compensation statute are separate issues." Lusby v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 697 So.2d 567, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).[2] As to the [*108] second considerationwhether appellant met the disqualification criteria in section 443.036(26)we conclude as a matter of law that the finding of "negligence and carelessness" in the Notice of Decision of Appeals Referee did not rise to the level of misconduct as contemplated in the statute. We are constrained to reach this conclusion by prior decisions interpreting "misconduct" under this section,[3] and by section 443.031, Florida [*109] Statutes (1995), which provides in pertinent part:
This chapter shall be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose to promote employment security ... and to provide through the accumulation of reserves for the payment of compensation to individuals with respect to their unemployment.
See Webb v. Rice, 693 So.2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)(stating that courts should liberally construe the statute in favor of the claimant in determining whether a claimant's actions constitute misconduct, and that misconduct regarding company policies usually involves repeated violation of explicit policies after several warnings). We, therefore, reverse the order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission and its affirmance of the denial of unemployment compensation benefits.
ERVIN and BENTON, JJ., concur.
DAVIS, J., dissents with opinion.
DAVIS, Judge, dissenting.
For the reasons expressed in dissent in Lusby v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 697 So.2d 567, 568-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), I would affirm in this case. Indeed, this is an even more compelling case for affirmance than was Lusby. In Lusby, the majority chose to construe the facts as proving only a single incident of misconduct and then invoked the line of cases in which a single incident of misconduct was held to be insufficient as a matter of law to disqualify the terminated employee from receipt of unemployment benefits. Compare Easton v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 693 So.2d 712 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)(single incident of poor judgment with which employee was charged, pouring a glass of juice in a room other than the employee cafeteria in contravention of employer's policy, held insufficient as a matter of law to disqualify the claimant from benefits) and Grossman v. J.C. Penney Co., 689 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)(citing cases involving single instances of poor judgment in holding that employee's unknowing violation of policy against making store purchases while on a break was insufficient as a matter of law to constitute disqualifying misconduct) with Freddo v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 685 So.2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)(employee was discharged for multiple acts of improper conduct, but appeals referee found as a matter of fact that those acts were insufficient to justify the denial of unemployment benefits; the district court reversed the ruling of the UAC, because the Commission improperly reweighed the evidence and concluded that Freddo's acts constituted disqualifying misconduct) and Lewis v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 498 So.2d 608 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)(Lewis was terminated for four listed acts, but the appeals referee determined he was not guilty of disqualifying misconduct; the UAC reversed, finding Lewis committed "acts or omissions that constitute misconduct within the meaning of the law ...". The district court reversed, because the referee's factual finding was supported by the record and should not have [*110] been disturbed by the UAC.). Lusby cannot justify the result reached by the majority in the instant case because it is undisputed that this employee was charged with several acts of negligence in the performance of her duties.
The question whether these multiple acts of negligence were so culpable as to amount to disqualifying misconduct appears to me to be a question of fact. See, e.g., Folden v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 696 So.2d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). In Folden the appeals referee, the finder of fact, found that the discharged nurse's negligence was not egregious enough to constitute disqualifying misconduct. The unemployment appeals commission rejected that finding of fact, and denied benefits. The district court reversed the order of the UAC, because the original factual determination that the conduct was not egregious enough to disqualify the claimant from receiving benefits was supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore the UAC erred in rejecting the finding.
There was competent substantial evidence to support the finding of the appeals referee in the instant case that Nurse Hall's actions were so egregious as to rise to the level of disqualifying misconduct.[4] Therefore, the UAC acted properly in affirming that finding, and this court should also be required to affirm the finding of fact by the appeals referee that the claimant's actions constituted disqualifying misconduct. See Scholastic Book Fairs, Inc. v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 671 So.2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). In Scholastic, the court stated that "the factfinder is the appeals referee. The appellate court, as well as the Commission, must accept those findings unless they are not based on competent substantial evidence." Id. at 288. Therefore, the court ruled, in view of the conflicting evidence on the question whether the employee's acts constituted disqualifying misconduct, the court was required to affirm the factual finding that the employee's actions were not so egregious as to disqualify him from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.
This court's opinions in Lusby v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 697 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and Smith v. Krugman-Kadi, 547 So.2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), appear to authorize the majority's analysis, permitting this court to reweigh the facts and determine as a matter of law whether or not the appellant's actions constituted disqualifying misconduct. However, even if that is the appropriate standard of review, I must dissent from the result reached by the majority. In my opinion, the appeals referee was eminently correct in deciding that the acts with which Nurse Hall was charged, which she did not dispute took place, were sufficient to constitute the sort of culpable level of negligence which justifies the denial of unemployment compensation benefits.[5] Accordingly, I dissent.
(26) MISCONDUCT."Misconduct" includes, but is not limited to, the following, which shall not be construed in pari materia with each other:
(a) Conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interests as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee; or
(b) Carelessness or negligence of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligation to his employer.
At oral argument appellees' attorney cited Ford v. Southeast Atlantic Corp., 588 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) for the proposition that repeated actions in direct violation of company policy are not necessary to constitute misconduct within the meaning of the unemployment compensation statute. However, appellant's attorney argued in her rebuttal that Ford was distinguishable, because in that case appellant was discharged solely because he tested positive for cocaine, a result which implied willfulness and intentional disregard of employer's policies, whereas in the instant case, appellant had not manifested any intent to disobey policies, nor had the appeals referee found any such intentional disregard. We agree with appellant's attorney that Ford does not control the instant appeal.