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20 canonical passages across 19 cases, quoted by 1,073 opinions in total. These passages cluster together because the same opinions keep quoting them side by side: they state parts of one doctrine. The anchor passage is from State Ex Rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc..
| # | Case | Flag | Canonical passage | Citers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | State Ex Rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc. Anchor | green | “appellate review of a circuit court's order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is de novo.” | 156 |
| 2 | State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548 | green | “when a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute.” | 141 |
| 3 | State v. Elder | green | “where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation.” | 135 |
| 4 | Crockett v. Andrews | green | “where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and applied without resort to interpretation.” | 117 |
| 5 | Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | green | “the appellate standard of review of questions of law answered and certified by a circuit court is de novo.” | 106 |
| 6 | Farley v. Buckalew | green | “a statute that is ambiguous must be construed before it can be applied.” | 100 |
| 7 | Newhart v. Pennybacker | green | “where a particular construction of a statute would result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction, which will not produce such absurdity, will be made.” | 37 |
| 8 | Ohio County Commission v. Manchin | green | “judicial interpretation of a statute is warranted only if the statute is ambiguous and the initial step in such interpretative inquiry is to ascertain the legislative intent.” | 33 |
| 9 | Hereford v. Meek | green | “a statute is open to construction only where the language used requires interpretation because of ambiguity which renders it susceptible of two or more constructions or of such doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning.” | 33 |
| 10 | State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548 | green | “generally the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and familiar significance and meaning, and regard is to be had for their general and proper use.” | 29 |
| 11 | Consumer Advocate Division of the Public Service Commission ex rel. Residential and Small Commercial Customers of Hope Gas, Inc. v. Public Service Commission | green | “a statute, or an administrative rule, may not, under the guise of 'interpretation,' be modified, revised, amended or rewritten.” | 27 |
| 12 | State ex rel. Hardesty v. Aracoma—Chief Logan No. 4523 | green | “it is always presumed that the legislature will not enact a meaningless or useless statute.” | 25 |
| 13 | State Ex Rel. Johnson v. Robinson | green | “it is a well known rule of statutory construction that the legislature is presumed to intend that every word used in a statute has a specific purpose and meaning.” | 24 |
| 14 | Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Department | green | “we look first to the statute's language. if the text, given its plain meaning, answers the interpretive question, the language must prevail and further inquiry is foreclosed.” | 23 |
| 15 | State Ex Rel. Frazier v. Meadows | green | “courts are not free to read into the language what is not there, but rather should apply the statute as written.” | 21 |
| 16 | Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner | green | “in ascertaining legislative intent, effect must be given to each part of the statute and to the statute as a whole so as to accomplish the general purpose of the legislation.” | 20 |
| 17 | State Ex Rel. Cohen v. Manchin | green | “undefined words and terms used in a legislative enactment will be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning.” | 15 |
| 18 | State v. Allen | green | “generally, 'shall' commands a mandatory connotation and denotes that the described behavior is directory, rather than discretionary.” | 13 |
| 19 | State Ex Rel. Arrow Concrete Co. v. Hill | green | “ordinarily the denial of a motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted made pursuant to west virginia rules of civil procedure 12(b)(6) is interlocutory and is, therefore, not immediately appealable.” | 9 |
| 20 | State v. Jarvis | green | “a statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect.' syl. pt. 2, state v. epperly, 135 w.va. 877 , 65 s.e.2d 488 (1951).” | 9 |
A red or yellow flag on a member means the underlying case has negative treatment: for those, check the case page before relying on the passage.