20 C.F.R. § 404.1520

Evaluation of disability in general

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(a) General—(1) Purpose of this section. This section explains the five-step sequential evaluation process we use to decide whether you are disabled, as defined in § 404.1505.

(2) Applicability of these rules. These rules apply to you if you file an application for a period of disability or disability insurance benefits (or both) or for child's insurance benefits based on disability. They also apply if you file an application for widow's or widower's benefits based on disability for months after December 1990. (See § 404.1505(a).)

(3) Evidence considered. We will consider all evidence in your case record when we make a determination or decision whether you are disabled. See § 404.1520b.

(4) The five-step sequential evaluation process. The sequential evaluation process is a series of five “steps” that we follow in a set order. See paragraph (h) of this section for an exception to this rule. If we can find that you are disabled or not disabled at a step, we make our determination or decision and we do not go on to the next step. If we cannot find that you are disabled or not disabled at a step, we go on to the next step. Before we go from step three to step four, we assess your residual functional capacity. (See paragraph (e) of this section.) We use this residual functional capacity assessment at both step four and step five when we evaluate your claim at these steps. These are the five steps we follow:

(i) At the first step, we consider your work activity, if any. If you are doing substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled. (See paragraph (b) of this section.)

(ii) At the second step, we consider the medical severity of your impairment(s). If you do not have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement in § 404.1509, or a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement, we will find that you are not disabled. (See paragraph (c) of this section.)

(iii) At the third step, we also consider the medical severity of your impairment(s). If you have an impairment(s) that meets or equals one of our listings in appendix 1 of this subpart and meets the duration requirement, we will find that you are disabled. (See paragraph (d) of this section.)

(iv) At the fourth step, we consider our assessment of your residual functional capacity and your past relevant work. If you can still do your past relevant work, we will find that you are not disabled. See paragraphs (f) and (h) of this section and § 404.1560(b).

(v) At the fifth and last step, we consider our assessment of your residual functional capacity and your age, education, and work experience to see if you can make an adjustment to other work. If you can make an adjustment to other work, we will find that you are not disabled. If you cannot make an adjustment to other work, we will find that you are disabled. See paragraphs (g) and (h) of this section and § 404.1560(c).

(5) When you are already receiving disability benefits. If you are already receiving disability benefits, we will use a different sequential evaluation process to decide whether you continue to be disabled. We explain this process in § 404.1594(f).

(b) If you are working. If you are working and the work you are doing is substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled regardless of your medical condition or your age, education, and work experience.

(c) You must have a severe impairment. If you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your age, education, and work experience. However, it is possible for you to have a period of disability for a time in the past even though you do not now have a severe impairment.

(d) When your impairment(s) meets or equals a listed impairment in appendix 1. If you have an impairment(s) which meets the duration requirement and is listed in appendix 1 or is equal to a listed impairment(s), we will find you disabled without considering your age, education, and work experience.

(e) When your impairment(s) does not meet or equal a listed impairment. If your impairment(s) does not meet or equal a listed impairment, we will assess and make a finding about your residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in your case record, as explained in § 404.1545. (See paragraph (g)(2) of this section and § 404.1562 for an exception to this rule.) We use our residual functional capacity assessment at the fourth step of the sequential evaluation process to determine if you can do your past relevant work (paragraph (f) of this section) and at the fifth step of the sequential evaluation process (if the evaluation proceeds to this step) to determine if you can adjust to other work (paragraph (g) of this section).

(f) Your impairment(s) must prevent you from doing your past relevant work. If we cannot make a determination or decision at the first three steps of the sequential evaluation process, we will compare our residual functional capacity assessment, which we made under paragraph (e) of this section, with the physical and mental demands of your past relevant work. See paragraph (h) of this section and § 404.1560(b). If you can still do this kind of work, we will find that you are not disabled.

(g) Your impairment(s) must prevent you from making an adjustment to any other work. (1) If we find that you cannot do your past relevant work because you have a severe impairment(s) (or you do not have any past relevant work), we will consider the same residual functional capacity assessment we made under paragraph (e) of this section, together with your vocational factors (your age, education, and work experience) to determine if you can make an adjustment to other work. (See § 404.1560(c).) If you can make an adjustment to other work, we will find you not disabled. If you cannot, we will find you disabled.

(2) We use different rules if you meet one of the two special medical-vocational profiles described in § 404.1562. If you meet one of those profiles, we will find that you cannot make an adjustment to other work, and that you are disabled.

(h) Expedited process. If we do not find you disabled at the third step, and we do not have sufficient evidence about your past relevant work to make a finding at the fourth step, we may proceed to the fifth step of the sequential evaluation process. If we find that you can adjust to other work based solely on your age, education, and the same residual functional capacity assessment we made under paragraph (e) of this section, we will find that you are not disabled and will not make a finding about whether you can do your past relevant work at the fourth step. If we find that you may be unable to adjust to other work or if § 404.1562 may apply, we will assess your claim at the fourth step and make a finding about whether you can perform your past relevant work. See paragraph (g) of this section and § 404.1560(c).

[50 FR 8727, Mar. 5, 1985; 50 FR 19164, May 7, 1985, as amended at 56 FR 36960, Aug. 1, 1991; 65 FR 80308, Dec. 21, 2000; 68 FR 51161, Aug. 26, 2003; 77 FR 10655, Feb. 23, 2012; 77 FR 43494, July 25, 2012]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 34,310 cases (20,278 in the last 5 years), 1972–2026 · leading case: Renee S. Phillips v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
Renee S. Phillips v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004). · cites it 14× “In evaluating a claim for disability benefits, an ALJ must evaluate the claimant’s case with respect to the following five criteria, as set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 : 1. Is the individual performing .”
Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). · cites it 14× “20 CFR §§ 404.1520 , 416.920 (1986). Step one determines whether the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity.”
Tommaso Fargnoli v. Larry G. Massanari, Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 247 F.3d 34 (3rd Cir. 2001). · cites it 10× “See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520. In Plummer, this Court set out the relevant steps as follows: 14 In step one, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity.”
Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2009). · cites it 8× “2d 119 (1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 , 416.920. The burden of proof is on the claimant at steps one through four, but shifts to the Commissioner at step five.”
James L. Batson, Sr. v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2004). · cites it 7× “See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 . First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity.”
Russell Hess, III v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2019). · cites it 6× “The matter before us involves the part of that structure controlling disability determinations. The Social Security Administration, working through ALJs, decides whether a claimant is disabled by following a now familiar five-step analysis.”
Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1999). · cites it 9× “See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 . The burden of proof is on the claimant as to steps one to four.”
Evon Hudson, Appellant, v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 364 F.3d 501 (3rd Cir. 2004). · cites it 7× “See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 . 1 At step four, the ALJ concluded that Hudson retained the residual functional capacity to perform “light work,” with the additional restrictions that she should not work around heights or hazardous machinery.”
Sutherland v. Barnhart, 322 F. Supp. 2d 282 (E.D.N.Y 2004). · cites it 16× “” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(4); see Williams v.”
Bradley Lewis v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 236 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 2001). · cites it 6× “20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 & 416.920. The ALJ first considers whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; if not, the ALJ asks in the second step whether the claimant has a severe impairment (i.”
Robert J. Lauer v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2001). · cites it 8× “See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.”
Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935 (8th Cir. 2009). · cites it 8× “Applying the five-step evaluation process set out in the SSA regulations, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a) & 416.920(a), the ALJ concluded Pate-Fires was not disabled.”
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(1) — 15 cases
Ford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 143 F. Supp. 3d 714 (S.D. Ohio 2015).
Johnson v. Astrue, 816 F. Supp. 2d 752 (W.D. Mo. 2011).
Chong Vang v. Colvin, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (D. Minnesota 2013).
Chambers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. (W.D. Mich. 2020).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(11) — 2 cases
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(3) — 2 cases
Sutherland v. Barnhart, 322 F. Supp. 2d 282 (E.D.N.Y 2004). “” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(4); see Williams v.”
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(5) — 1 case
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(A) — 1 case
Carrico v. Saul (S.D. Ind. 2019).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(C) — 1 case
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(D) — 2 cases
Grasty v. Kijakazi (E.D. Pa. 2024).
Gardner v. SSA (D.N.H. 1996).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(E) — 2 cases
Flint v. Sullivan, 743 F. Supp. 777 (D. Kan. 1990).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(F) — 1 case
Sisk v. Soc. Sec. Admin. (M.D. Tenn. 2020).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(H) — 1 case
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) — 150 cases
Donna Jarnutowski v. Kilolo Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769 (7th Cir. 2022).
Hancock v. Barnhart, 206 F. Supp. 2d 757 (W.D. Va. 2002).
Williams v. Barnhart, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (M.D. Ala. 2002).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(2) — 5 cases
Irby v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. (W.D.N.Y. 2019).
Segerstrom v. Colvin (N.D. Ill. 2017).
Edler v. Soc. Sec. Admin. (W.D.N.Y. 2019).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3) — 5 cases
Melendez v. Astrue, 630 F. Supp. 2d 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Young v. Kijakazi (N.D. Ill. 2022).
Seibert v. Berryhill (M.D. Penn. 2019).
Pendergast v. Kijakazi (M.D. Penn. 2023).
McGhan v. Saul (E.D. Wash. 2020).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) — 120 cases
Barbara Combs v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2006).
Balodis v. Leavitt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 255 (E.D.N.Y 2010).
Susan H. Brown v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 680 F. App'x 822 (11th Cir. 2017).
Hatmaker v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 965 F. Supp. 2d 917 (E.D. Tenn. 2013).
Hey v. Colvin, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1021 (D. Minnesota 2015).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(1) — 1 case
Brock v. Saul (W.D. Mo. 2019).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(h) — 1 case
Diakogiannis v. Astrue, 975 F. Supp. 2d 299 (W.D.N.Y. 2013).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i) — 61 cases
Bowman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 683 F. App'x 367 (6th Cir. 2017).
Lemieux v. Berryhill, 323 F. Supp. 3d 224 (D.D.C. 2018).
Rosa H. Prince v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 551 F. App'x 967 (11th Cir. 2014).
Magwood v. Astrue, 594 F. Supp. 2d 557 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
Phillips v. Colvin, 61 F. Supp. 3d 925 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)(v) — 1 case
Green v. Astrue, 588 F. Supp. 2d 147 (D. Mass. 2008).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) — 12 cases
Tiffany Poole v. Kilolo Kijakazi, 28 F.4th 792 (7th Cir. 2022).
Tincher v. O'Malley (N.D. Ill. 2022).
Evans v. Soc. Sec. (D. Nev. 2023).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) — 33 cases
Cruz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 244 F. App'x 475 (3rd Cir. 2007).
Edna Napier v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.4th 1000 (6th Cir. 2025).
Seney v. Colvin, 185 F. Supp. 3d 475 (D. Del. 2016).
Barbara Combs v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 400 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2005).
Berry v. O'Malley (CONSENT) (M.D. Ala. 2022).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iit) — 1 case
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) — 22 cases
Cruz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 244 F. App'x 475 (3rd Cir. 2007).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) — 17 cases
Teresa A. Mace v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 605 F. App'x 837 (11th Cir. 2015).
Osborne v. Colvin, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1147 (D. Neb. 2015).
Ostuni v. Berryhill (D. Conn. 2019).
Shiwbodh v. Berryhill (D. Conn. 2020).
Gass v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. (N.D. Ind. 2021).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(A)(iv) — 1 case
Smith v. Kijakazi (D. Maryland 2023).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(D)(1) — 1 case
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(c) — 1 case
Murphy v. Soc. Sec. Admin. (M.D. Tenn. 2024).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(d) — 1 case
Bauza-lopez v. Kijakazi (E.D. Pa. 2022).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(v) — 1 case
Leiter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 377 F. App'x 944 (11th Cir. 2010).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b) — 163 cases
Kich v. Colvin, 218 F. Supp. 3d 342 (M.D. Penn. 2016).
Bruce v. Berryhill, 294 F. Supp. 3d 346 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
Smith v. Astrue, 639 F. Supp. 2d 836 (W.D. Mich. 2009).
Kokal v. Massanari, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)(1) — 1 case
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)(2) — 5 cases
Jones v. Soc. Sec. Admin. (E.D. Ark. 2023).
Rose v. Soc. Sec. Admin. (E.D. Ark. 2023).
Purvis v. Soc. Sec. Admin. (E.D. Ark. 2023).
Smith v. Soc. Sec. Admin. (E.D. Ark. 2023).
Andrews v. Saul (S.D. Tex. 2021).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)(c) — 4 cases
Bloom v. Soc. Sec. Admin. (E.D. Ark. 2020).
Hague v. Comm'r for Soc. Sec. (S.D. Ohio 2023).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) — 1994 cases
Eaton v. Colvin, 180 F. Supp. 3d 1037 (S.D. Ala. 2016).
Tommaso Fargnoli v. Larry G. Massanari, Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 247 F.3d 34 (3rd Cir. 2001). “See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520. In Plummer, this Court set out the relevant steps as follows: 14 In step one, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity.”
Robert J. Lauer v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2001). “See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.”
Jones v. Berryhill, 392 F. Supp. 3d 831 (M.D. Tenn. 2019).
Biller v. Colvin, 962 F. Supp. 2d 761 (W.D. Pa. 2013).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)(1) — 6 cases
Smitherman v. Massanari, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
Jameson v. Saul (D. Maryland 2021).
Andrews v. Saul (S.D. Tex. 2021).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)(2) — 2 cases
Chung v. Kijakazi (D.N.J. 2024).
Steuernagel v. Kijakazi (E.D. Wis. 2023).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)(3) — 1 case
Margis v. Kijakazi (D. Del. 2023).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)(a) — 1 case
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)(b)(1) — 1 case
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) — 2011 cases
Tommaso Fargnoli v. Larry G. Massanari, Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 247 F.3d 34 (3rd Cir. 2001). “See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520. In Plummer, this Court set out the relevant steps as follows: 14 In step one, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity.”
Bradley Lewis v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 236 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 2001). “20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 & 416.920. The ALJ first considers whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; if not, the ALJ asks in the second step whether the claimant has a severe impairment (i.”
Kich v. Colvin, 218 F. Supp. 3d 342 (M.D. Penn. 2016).
Robert J. Lauer v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2001). “See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.”
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) — 276 cases
Patterson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 846 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2017).
Robert J. Lauer v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2001). “See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.”
Greg Oliver v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 613 F. App'x 892 (11th Cir. 2015).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) — 439 cases
Tommaso Fargnoli v. Larry G. Massanari, Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 247 F.3d 34 (3rd Cir. 2001). “See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520. In Plummer, this Court set out the relevant steps as follows: 14 In step one, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity.”
Kenneth Scrogham v. Carolyn Colvin, 765 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2014).
Kich v. Colvin, 218 F. Supp. 3d 342 (M.D. Penn. 2016).
Woodcock v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 201 F. Supp. 3d 912 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
Daniels v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 1998).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)(1) — 2 cases
Kokal v. Massanari, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
Dilworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. (N.D. Miss. 2019).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g) — 1121 cases
Eaton v. Colvin, 180 F. Supp. 3d 1037 (S.D. Ala. 2016).
Marks v. Colvin, 201 F. Supp. 3d 870 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
Hudson-Kane v. Berryhill, 247 F. Supp. 3d 908 (M.D. Tenn. 2017).
Ray v. Astrue, 649 F. Supp. 2d 391 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. Astrue, 854 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.P.R. 2012).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1) — 7 cases
Reid v. Soc. Sec. (M.D. La. 2021).
Owens v. Saul (M.D. La. 2023).
Abrams, Jeff v. Saul, Andrew (W.D. Wis. 2021).
Carlson, Mark v. Saul, Andrew (W.D. Wis. 2021).
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(h) — 6 cases
Wade v. Berryhill (E.D. Tex. 2019).
Davis v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. (N.D.N.Y. 2024).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.