20 C.F.R. § 404.316

When entitlement to disability benefits begins and ends

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(a) You are entitled to disability benefits beginning with the first month covered by your application in which you meet all the other requirements for entitlement. If a waiting period is required, your benefits cannot begin earlier than the first month following that period.

(b) Your entitlement to disability benefits ends with the earliest of these months:

(1) The month before the month of your death;

(2) The month before the month you attain full retirement age as defined in § 404.409 (at full retirement age your disability benefits will be automatically changed to old-age benefits);

(3) The second month after the month in which your disability ends as provided in § 404.1594(b)(1), unless continued subject to paragraph (c); or (4) subject to the provisions of paragraph (d) of this section, the month before your termination month (§ 404.325).

(c)(1) Your benefits, and those of your dependents, may be continued after your impairment is no longer disabling if—

(i) You are participating in an appropriate program of vocational rehabilitation services, employment services, or other support services, as described in § 404.327(a) and (b);

(ii) You began participating in the program before the date your disability ended; and

(iii) We have determined under § 404.328 that your completion of the program, or your continuation in the program for a specified period of time, will increase the likelihood that you will not have to return to the disability benefit rolls.

(2) We generally will stop your benefits with the earliest of these months—

(i) The month in which you complete the program; or

(ii) The month in which you stop participating in the program for any reason (see § 404.327(b) for what we mean by “participating” in the program); or

(iii) The month in which we determine under § 404.328 that your continuing participation in the program will no longer increase the likelihood that you will not have to return to the disability benefit rolls.

Exception to paragraph (c): In no case will we stop your benefits with a month earlier than the second month after the month your disability ends, provided that you meet all other requirements for entitlement to and payment of benefits through such month.

(d) If, after November 1980, you have a disabling impairment (§ 404.1511), you will be paid benefits for all months in which you do not do substantial gainful activity during the reentitlement period (§ 404.1592a) following the end of your trial work period (§ 404.1592). If you are unable to do substantial gainful activity in the first month following the reentitlement period, we will pay you benefits until you are able to do substantial gainful activity. (Earnings during your trial work period do not affect the payment of your benefit.) You will also be paid benefits for the first month after the trial work period in which you do substantial gainful activity and the two succeeding months, whether or not you do substantial gainful activity during those succeeding months. After those three months, you cannot be paid benefits for any months in which you do substantial gainful activity.

[44 FR 34481, June 15, 1979, as amended at 47 FR 31542, July 21, 1982; 47 FR 52693, Nov. 23, 1982; 49 FR 22270, May 29, 1984; 51 FR 17617, May 14, 1986; 60 FR 8145, Feb. 10, 1995; 68 FR 4704, Jan. 30, 2003; 70 FR 36505, June 24, 2005; 91 FR 16829, Apr. 3, 2026]

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 32 cases (10 in the last 5 years), 1980–2024 · leading case: Dianne Harris v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1992).

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Dianne Harris v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1992). · cites it 3× “We reverse and remand with directions to the Secretary to award benefits to Harris from February 6, 1989 to May 14,1990, and to hold a hearing to determine whether Harris is entitled to benefits after the latter date.”

Rubin v. O'Malley, 116 F.4th 145 (2d Cir. 2024). “” 20 C.F.R. § 404.316 (a). 8 A. The Evidence Before the ALJ 1.”

Hershel PAYTON, Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Appellee, 25 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 1994). · cites it 2× “See 20 C.F.R. § 404.316 ; Harris v. Secretary of DHHS, 959 F.”

Constance DION, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Sec'y OF HEALTH & HUMAN Servs., Defendant, Appellant, 823 F.2d 669 (1st Cir. 1987). “20 C.F.R. § 404.316 (a) (1986). 4 . Like the district court, we have decided this case on the grounds that § 1320a-6 should not be applied retrospectively; thus, like the district court, we do not reach the issue of whether § 1320a-6 applies generally to concurrent SSDI and SSI…”

Gregory VAN HORN, Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Sec'y, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Appellee, 717 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1983). “20 C.F.R. § 404.316 (1983). We read these regulations to provide that, for purposes of review, we may divide the benefit claim period considered by the ALJ.”

Pina v. Commonwealth, 510 N.E.2d 253 (Mass. 1987). “20 C.F.R. § 404.316 (b) (1986). 5 Administrative appeals from DDS determinations go to a Federal administrative law judge; judicial appeals from the Secretary’s decision go to a Federal District Court.”

Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019 (2d Cir. 1995). “Awarding such “full reopening” of claims, the Secretary contends, would be inconsistent with SSA’s regulations, which limit relief for Title II benefits to the 12 months prior to the date of application, and relief for Title XVI benefits to the month of application.”

Huff v. Astrue, 275 F. App'x 713 (9th Cir. 2008). “Similarly, because Huff is not entitled to benefits, we need not reach the applicability of 20 C.F.R. § 404.316 nor his request for assignment to a different ALJ on remand.”

Dion v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 872 (D. Mass. 1984). · cites it 2× “These officials based their refusal to apply § 301 to plaintiff on 20 C.F.R. § 404.316 , which says that to qualify under § 301(a) for continuation of benefits, the recipient must not have been “expected to recover medically before the scheduled completion date of the program.”

Rosetti v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 1216 (3rd Cir. 1993). “20 C.F.R. §§ 404.316 , 404.620, 404.-621, 416.”

Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Greater Baltimore Med. Ctr., Inc., 477 F. App'x 68 (4th Cir. 2012). “1597 ; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.316 (b)(3), 404.1594(b)(1) (2012).”

Frazier v. Chater, 903 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Tex. 1995). · cites it 3× “It is, further Ordered the legal reasoning of the Administration Law Judge was not proper because the application of 20 C.F.R. § 404.316 (c) was on the basis of requiring the likelihood under the statute to be significant, and the statute does not require a significant…”

Show all 32 citing cases →

— 20 C.F.R. § 404.316(c)(l)(iv) — 1 case

Dion v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 872 (D. Mass. 1984). “These officials based their refusal to apply § 301 to plaintiff on 20 C.F.R. § 404.316 , which says that to qualify under § 301(a) for continuation of benefits, the recipient must not have been “expected to recover medically before the scheduled completion date of the program.”

— 20 C.F.R. § 404.316(d) — 1 case

United States v. Hall (In re Hall), 515 B.R. 515 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 2014).

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