(a) The right to appear and present evidence. Any party to a hearing has a right to appear before the administrative law judge, in the manner set forth in § 404.936, to present evidence and to state their position. A party may also make their appearance by means of a designated representative, who may make their appearance in the manner set forth in § 404.936.
(b) Waiver of the right to appear. You may send the administrative law judge a waiver or a written statement indicating that you do not wish to appear at the hearing. You may withdraw this waiver any time before a notice of the hearing decision is mailed to you. Even if all of the parties waive their right to appear at a hearing, we may notify them of a time and a place for an oral hearing, if the administrative law judge believes that a personal appearance and testimony by you or any other party is necessary to decide the case.
(c) Admissible evidence. Subject to the provisions of § 404.935, the administrative law judge may receive any evidence at the hearing that he or she believes is material to the issues, even though the evidence would not be admissible in court under the rules of evidence used by the court.
(d) Subpoenas. (1) When it is reasonably necessary for the full presentation of a case, an administrative law judge or a member of the Appeals Council may, on his or her own initiative or at the request of a party, issue subpoenas for the appearance and testimony of witnesses and for the production of books, records, correspondence, papers, or other documents that are material to an issue at the hearing.
(2) Parties to a hearing who wish to subpoena documents or witnesses must file a written request for the issuance of a subpoena with the administrative law judge or at one of our offices at least 10 business days before the hearing date, unless you show that your circumstances meet the conditions described in § 404.935(b). The written request must give the names of the witnesses or documents to be produced; describe the address or location of the witnesses or documents with sufficient detail to find them; state the important facts that the witness or document is expected to prove; and indicate why these facts could not be proven without issuing a subpoena.
(3) We will pay the cost of issuing the subpoena.
(4) We will pay subpoenaed witnesses the same fees and mileage they would receive if they had been subpoenaed by a Federal district court.
(e) Witnesses at a hearing. Witnesses you call may appear at a hearing with you in the same manner in which you are scheduled to appear. If they are unable to appear with you in the same manner as you, they may appear as prescribed in § 404.936(c)(2). Witnesses called by the administrative law judge will appear in the manner prescribed in § 404.936(c)(2). They will testify under oath or affirmation unless the administrative law judge finds an important reason to excuse them from taking an oath or affirmation. The administrative law judge may ask the witness any questions material to the issues and will allow the parties or their designated representatives to do so.
(f) Collateral estoppel—issues previously decided. An issue at your hearing may be a fact that has already been decided in one of our previous determinations or decisions in a claim involving the same parties, but arising under a different title of the Act or under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. If this happens, the administrative law judge will not consider the issue again, but will accept the factual finding made in the previous determination or decision unless there are reasons to believe that it was wrong.
[45 FR 52081, Aug. 5, 1980, as amended at 51 FR 303, Jan. 3, 1986; 68 FR 5219, Feb. 3, 2003; 75 FR 39160, July 8, 2010; 78 FR 29627, May 21, 2013; 81 FR 90993, Dec. 16, 2016; 84 FR 69306, Dec. 18, 2019; 89 FR 68362, Aug. 26, 2024]
Notes of Decisions
Michelle Ford v. Andrew Saul, 950 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2020).
· cites it 3× “20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (d)(2) (2013).11 Here, Ford made her request for a subpoena a week after the hearing.”
Joseph Krell v. Andrew M. Saul, 931 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2019).
· cites it 3× “" See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (d) (describing how to obtain a subpoena).”
Passmore v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 2008).
· cites it 5× “20 C.F.R. §§ 404.950 (d)(1), 416.1450(d)(1) (emphasis added).”
Jana M. Bayliss v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 427 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2005).
“§ 405 (b)(1); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.950 (c), 416.1450(c) ("The administrative law judge may receive evidence at the hearing even though the evidence would not be admissible in court under the rules of evidence used by the court.”
Purdy v. Berryhill, 887 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2018).
“Admissibility of evidence before an ALJ presiding over Social Security proceedings is not subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence, and an ALJ is given express authority to assess the reliability of evidence offered. See 42 U.S.C. § 405 (b)(1) ("Evidence may be received at any…”
Andrew Cirko v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 948 F.3d 148 (3rd Cir. 2020).
“And while the ALJ plays a starring role— authorized even to subpoena witnesses of their own accord, 12 20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (d)—the claimant may choose to play a bit part and still have his claim determined.”
Bandimere v. United States Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016).
· cites it 2× “” 20 C.F.R. § 404.950 . Like SEC ALJs, though, SSA ALJs cannot enforce or seek enforcement of a subpoena; the SSA itself would have to get an order from a federal district court to compel compliance.”
James R. Butera v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 173 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir. 1999).
· cites it 3× “The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly denied Butera’s subpoena requests because Butera failed to satisfy the regulatory requirements that he demonstrate that the subpoenas were “reasonably necessary to the full presentation of the case” or that the physicians would…”
Delker v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
· cites it 2× “2008); 20 CFR § 404.950 (e)). 8 Claimant asserts that the ALJ violated her due process rights for three reasons.”
Herbert Carroll v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983).
“§ 405 (d) (ALJ’s subpoena power); 20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (d) (same). Moreover, absent a showing by the Secretary of good cause for a remand, the present case would be an appropriate one in which to carry out Congress’ mandate to foreshorten the often painfully slow process by which…”
Drake v. Astrue, 443 F. App'x 653 (2d Cir. 2011).
· cites it 2× “See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.950 (a), 404.1705; see also Lamay v.”
Hepp v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. 2008).
“We conclude that due process under the Fifth Amendment does not require in-person cross-examination in social security disability hearings, and the ALJ did not violate Hepp’s due process rights by refusing to require Dr.”
Anderson v. Colvin, 223 F. Supp. 3d 1108 (D. Or. 2016).
· cites it 2× “A claimant requesting a subpoena must “state the important facts that the witness or document is expected to prove; and indicate why these facts could not be proven without issuing a subpoena.”
Bari E. Martz v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 649 F. App'x 948 (11th Cir. 2016).
“” 20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (d)(1). 13 Moreover, though the Social Security Administration’s Hearing, Litigation, and Appeals Manual (“HALLEX”) states that the preferred method for obtaining the opinion of a medical expert is through live testimo *963 ny, it also states that the ALJ…”
Salena Glenn v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 763 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2014).
“2007); and failing to advise the pro se Glenn of her right to cross-examine the vocational expert (VE), whom the record shows did not understand or take into account the evidence that Glenn is moderately limited in her ability to interact with the public, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.950…”
Stieberger v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
· cites it 2× “SSA regulations 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.950 (d), 416.-1450(d) (1989) provide that a written request to subpoena a witness must be filed at least five days before the AU hearing in a case and that a subpoena will be issued when the AU or the Appeals Council concludes that it is…”
Freda R. VAUGHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna SHALALA, Defendant-Appellee, 58 F.3d 129 (5th Cir. 1995).
“Vaughan finally contends that she was denied a full and fair hearing because the ALJ asked leading questions of the vocational expert, misstated her disabling conditions in a hypothetical question, refused to let counsel fully cross-examine the vocational expert, and refused to…”
Lopez v. Chater, 8 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.P.R. 1998).
“Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs due process rights were restricted, such error was harmless.”
Feliciano v. Chater, 901 F. Supp. 50 (D.P.R. 1995).
· cites it 4× “20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (d)(1) & (2). The discretion granted the ALJ in this regard is entirely proper.”
Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 1996).
“Hoeflich’s opinions, the ALJ could not then reject those opinions — which were uncontroverted and corroborated — because they were given in response to leading, hypothetical questions.”
Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
“2d 18 (1976); 20 C.F.R. § 404.950 . Whether or not the claimant is represented by counsel or other representative, the AU has an affirmative duty to inquire into all the matters at issue, so as to fully develop the record.”
Baker v. Barnhart, 84 F. App'x 10 (10th Cir. 2003).
“1989); 20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (d)(1). If additional records either do not exist or are insufficient to clarify the inconclusive evidence already in the record, then the ALJ should order a consultative examination.”
Perkins v. Apfel, 14 F. App'x 593 (6th Cir. 2001).
“20 C.F.R. §§ 404.950 (d), 416.1450(d) (1999); See Calvin v.”
Clark v. Colvin, 187 F. Supp. 3d 76 (D.D.C. 2016).
· cites it 2× “Relying on 20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (f), ALJ Ray concluded that he was not required to apply collateral estop-pel unless the applications arose under different titles of the Social Security Act.”
Garcia v. Colvin, 622 F. App'x 405 (5th Cir. 2015).
“See 20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (d)(2) (providing that parties may request that the AU issue subpoenas to witnesses, if a request is filed at least 5 days before the hearing).”
Goan v. Shalala, 853 F. Supp. 218 (S.D.W. Va 1994).
· cites it 5× “See 20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (d)(1). The Taylor decision clearly establishes that, when a timely request for the issuance of a subpoena is denied, and the ALJ or Appeals Council relies upon the information contained in a report or statement issued by the individual for which the…”
Jesse v. Barnhart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (D. Kan. 2004).
· cites it 2× “20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (d)(1); see also Glenn v.”
Bush v. Apfel, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D. Okla. 1999).
· cites it 4× “20 C.F.R. §§ 404.950 (d), 416.1450(d). Claimant’s representative sent a letter to the ALJ on June 21, 1993, demanding an opportunity to cross-examine Dr.”
Memoli v. Califano, 463 F. Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
“20 C.F.R. § 404.950 . This would have been the proper method of manifesting the Department’s duty to explore all of the relevant facts concerning a disability claim.”
Whitzell v. Astrue, 589 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D. Mass. 2008).
“Under 20 C.F.R. 404.950(f) and 20 C.F.R. 416.1450(f), an issue that was previously determined may not be reconsidered by the hearing officer.”
Miley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin. (S.D. Fla. 2022).
· cites it 3× “22 (d) Whether the ALJ Erred in not Permitting Plaintiff’s Mother to be Called as a Witness at the Hearing Plaintiff relies on 20 CFR 404.950(e) and 20 CFR 416.1450(e) for the premise that he should have been permitted to call his mother as a witness at the hearing.”
White v. Saul (N.D. Ill. 2022).
· cites it 2× “” 20 C.F.R. 404.950(d)(2). Counsel didn’t do that before the ALJ, and hasn’t done it here.”
Dallas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. (N.D.N.Y. 2023).
“The plain 10 language of 20 CFR Section 404.950(d)(1) clearly places the 11 decision to issue a subpoena within the sound discretion of 12 the ALJ.”
Powell v. Berryhill (W.D. Pa. 2020).
“20 C.F.R. 404.950(d)(1). Neither party has supplied this Court with informative case law.”
Brown v. Bowen, 660 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
“section 405 (b)(1); 20 C.F.R. section 404.950(c) (1986). Moreover, defendant explains that although the disputed worksheets may appear to be facially inconsistent, they are in reality consistent.”
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(c) — 1 case
Brown v. Bowen, 660 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
“section 405 (b)(1); 20 C.F.R. section 404.950(c) (1986). Moreover, defendant explains that although the disputed worksheets may appear to be facially inconsistent, they are in reality consistent.”
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d) — 2 cases
Lopez v. Chater, 8 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.P.R. 1998).
“Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs due process rights were restricted, such error was harmless.”
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d)(1) — 5 cases
Michelle Ford v. Andrew Saul, 950 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2020).
“20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (d)(2) (2013).11 Here, Ford made her request for a subpoena a week after the hearing.”
Feliciano v. Chater, 901 F. Supp. 50 (D.P.R. 1995).
“20 C.F.R. § 404.950 (d)(1) & (2). The discretion granted the ALJ in this regard is entirely proper.”
Dallas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. (N.D.N.Y. 2023).
“The plain 10 language of 20 CFR Section 404.950(d)(1) clearly places the 11 decision to issue a subpoena within the sound discretion of 12 the ALJ.”
Powell v. Berryhill (W.D. Pa. 2020).
“20 C.F.R. 404.950(d)(1). Neither party has supplied this Court with informative case law.”
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d)(2) — 1 case
White v. Saul (N.D. Ill. 2022).
“” 20 C.F.R. 404.950(d)(2). Counsel didn’t do that before the ALJ, and hasn’t done it here.”
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(e) — 2 cases
Delker v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
“2008); 20 CFR § 404.950 (e)). 8 Claimant asserts that the ALJ violated her due process rights for three reasons.”
Miley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin. (S.D. Fla. 2022).
“22 (d) Whether the ALJ Erred in not Permitting Plaintiff’s Mother to be Called as a Witness at the Hearing Plaintiff relies on 20 CFR 404.950(e) and 20 CFR 416.1450(e) for the premise that he should have been permitted to call his mother as a witness at the hearing.”
— 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(f) — 1 case
Whitzell v. Astrue, 589 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D. Mass. 2008).
“Under 20 C.F.R. 404.950(f) and 20 C.F.R. 416.1450(f), an issue that was previously determined may not be reconsidered by the hearing officer.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.