20 C.F.R. § 416.1242

Time limits for disposing of resources

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(a) In order for payment conditioned on the disposition of nonliquid resources to be made, the individual must agree in writing to dispose of real property within 9 months and personal property within 3 months. The time period for disposal of property begins on the date we accept the individual's signed written agreement to dispose of the property. If we receive a signed agreement on or after the date we have determined that the individual meets the eligibility requirements described in § 416.202 of this part, with the exception of the resource requirements described in this subpart, our acceptance of the written agreement will occur on the date the individual receives our written notice that the agreement is in effect. If we receive a signed agreement prior to the date we determine that all nonresource requirements are met, our acceptance of the written agreement will not occur until the date the individual receives our written notice that all nonresource requirements are met and that the agreement is in effect. When the written notice is mailed to the individual, we assume that the notice was received 5 days after the date shown on the notice unless the individual shows us that he or she did not receive it within the 5-day period.

(b) The 3-month time period for disposition of personal property will be extended an additional 3 months where it is found that the individual had “good cause” for failing to dispose of the resources within the original time period. The rules on the valuation of real property not disposed of within 9 months are described in § 416.1245(b).

(c) An individual will be found to have “good cause” for failing to dispose of a resource if, despite reasonable and diligent effort on his part, he was prevented by circumstances beyond his control from disposing of the resource.

(d) In determining whether the appropriate time limits discussed in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section have elapsed, no month will be counted for which an individual's benefits have been suspended as described in § 416.1320, provided that the reason for the suspension is unrelated to the requirements in § 416.1245(b) and that the individual's eligibility has not been terminated as defined in §§ 416.1331 through 416.1335.

[40 FR 48915, Oct. 20, 1975, as amended at 53 FR 13257, Apr. 22, 1988; 55 FR 10419, Mar. 21, 1990; 58 FR 60105, Nov. 15, 1993]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases, 1978–2004 · leading case: Smith v. Arizona Long Term Care Sys., 84 P.3d 482 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
Smith v. Arizona Long Term Care Sys., 84 P.3d 482 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). “20 C.F.R. § 416.1242 (a) and (b). The applicant must agree in writing to dispose of the property and must take steps to do so.”
Davis v. Lukhard, 788 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1986). “20 C.F.R. § 416.1242 (1985). The Secretary has interpreted the grace period envisioned by this regulation to mean that, in the SSI program, if an individual cannot sell excess resources for reasons that are beyond his control, then the resource will not be counted in the…”
Hecht v. Barnhart, 217 F. Supp. 2d 356 (E.D.N.Y 2002). “ation, and injunctive relief, including orders that the Commissioner end his policy and practice of not “acquiesc[ing]” to the White holding and to “State Court orders that limit the use of funds under the jurisdiction of State Court Judges,” that the Commissioner implement a…”
Woods v. Shalala, 884 F. Supp. 156 (D.N.J. 1995). “See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1242 . Consequently, the Secretary was correct in terminating Plaintiffs benefits when it was discovered that Plaintiffs resources exceeded the limitations established by SSI eligibility provisions.”
Golis v. Rubin, 857 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Haw. 1994). “The grace period in the 1984 SSI program, as promulgated in 20 C.F.R. § 416.1242 , allowed six-to-nine months to dispose of resources.”
Fabula v. Solomon, 463 F. Supp. 830 (D. Maryland 1978). · cites it 2× “The state also notes that transfer of assets regulations in other contexts, unrelated to state efforts to regulate fraudulent transfers, have been considered financial conditions.”
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