20 C.F.R. § 416.935

How we will determine whether your drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability

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(a) General. If we find that you are disabled and have medical evidence of your drug addiction or alcoholism, we must determine whether your drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability, unless we find that you are eligible for benefits because of your age or blindness.

(b) Process we will follow when we have medical evidence of your drug addiction or alcoholism. (1) The key factor we will examine in determining whether drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability is whether we would still find you disabled if you stopped using drugs or alcohol.

(2) In making this determination, we will evaluate which of your current physical and mental limitations, upon which we based our current disability determination, would remain if you stopped using drugs or alcohol and then determine whether any or all of your remaining limitations would be disabling.

(i) If we determine that your remaining limitations would not be disabling, we will find that your drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability.

(ii) If we determine that your remaining limitations are disabling, you are disabled independent of your drug addiction or alcoholism and we will find that your drug addiction or alcoholism is not a contributing factor material to the determination of disability.

[60 FR 8151, Feb. 10, 1995]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 232 cases (109 in the last 5 years), 1995–2026 · leading case: Josephine L. Cage v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2012).
Josephine L. Cage v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2012). · cites it 3× “.. disabled ... if alcoholism or drug addiction would .”
Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2005). · cites it 2× “20 C.F.R. § 416.935 . A drug or alcohol addiction is a contributing factor if the claimant’s remaining limitations would not be disabling in the absence of drugs or alcohol.”
Marlene A. Drapeau v. Larry G. Massanari, Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 255 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2001). · cites it 2× “20 C.F.R. § 416.935 (b)(1). Under this regulation, the ALJ must evaluate which of plaintiffs current physical and mental limitations would remain if plaintiff stopped using alcohol, and then determine whether any or all of plaintiffs remaining limitations would be disabling.”
Bruce v. Berryhill, 294 F. Supp. 3d 346 (E.D. Pa. 2018). · cites it 4× “§ 1382c(a)(3)(J) ; 20 C.F.R. § 416.935 . Moreover, with respect to plaintiff's claim that that the ALJ erred at step five of the sequential analysis by failing to incorporate all of plaintiff's credibly established limitations in the hypothetical questions posed to the VE, the…”
Debra Vester v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 416 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2005). · cites it 2× “20 C.F.R. § 416.935 (b)(1); Pettit v. Apfel, 218 F.”
Joseph Bustamante v. Larry G. Massanari, Acting Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 262 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2001). “(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.935 , the parallel regulation to 20 C.”
Raymond E. ANDREWS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., Defendant-Appellee, 53 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 1995). “Finding that Andrews was not a “medically determined alcoholic or drug addict,” as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.935 , since he had not lost the voluntary ability to control his substance use, the ALJ concluded that Andrews was not disabled.”
Debra M. Estes v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 1, 275 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2002). “1535 (disability) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.935 (supplemental security income), the relevant inquiry is “whether [the Commissioner] would still find you disabled if you stopped using drugs or *725 alcohol.”
Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615 (10th Cir. 2006). “” 20 C.F.R. § 416.935 (a). And 20 C.F.R. § 416.”
Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533 (8th Cir. 2010). “When a claimant is actively abusing drugs, this inquiry is necessarily hypothetical, and thus more difficult than if the claimant had stopped.”
Cordero v. Astrue, 574 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). · cites it 2× “See 20 C.F.R. § 416.935 (b)(1). The ALJ then determines which of the current physical and mental limitations would remain if the individual stopped using drugs or alcohol, and analyzes the Five Steps again to conclude whether these remaining limitations would be disabling under…”
Rosemary Harlin v. Michael Astrue, 424 F. App'x 564 (7th Cir. 2011). · cites it 4× “§ 1382c(a)(3)(J); 20 C.F.R. § 416.935 . Because the ALJ neither adequately explained why he discounted the opinion of Harlin’s treating psychiatrist nor supported his conclusion that Harlin’s cocaine use materially contributed to her disability, we vacate and remand.”
— 20 C.F.R. § 416.935(a) — 1 case
Smith V. SSA (E.D. Ky. 2021).
— 20 C.F.R. § 416.935(b) — 1 case
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