20 C.F.R. § 725.203

Duration and cessation of entitlement; miner

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(a) An individual is entitled to benefits as a miner for each month beginning with the first month on or after January 1, 1974, in which the miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment.

(b) The last month for which such individual is entitled to benefits is the month before the month during which either of the following events first occurs:

(1) The miner dies; or

(2) The miner's total disability ceases (see § 725.504).

(c) An individual who has been finally adjudged to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis and is receiving benefits under the Act shall promptly notify the Office and the responsible coal mine operator, if any, if he or she engages in his or her usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work.

(d) Upon reasonable notice, an individual who has been finally adjudged entitled to benefits shall submit to any additional tests or examinations the Office deems appropriate, and shall submit medical reports and other relevant evidence the Office deems necessary, if an issue arises pertaining to the validity of the original award.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases, 1986–2018 · leading case: Big Branch Resources, Inc. v. John Ogle, 737 F.3d 1063 (6th Cir. 2013).
Big Branch Resources, Inc. v. John Ogle, 737 F.3d 1063 (6th Cir. 2013). “1989) (discussing how a doctor’s opinion was “insufficient to rule out occupational coal dust exposure as a ‘contributing cause’ to [claimant’s respiratory disability” (emphasis added) to rebut a presumption under 20 C.F.R. § 725.203 (b)(3) which had an identical “did not arise…”
Zurich Am. Ins. Grp. v. Duncan Ex Rel. Duncan, 889 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 2018). “" Zurich American argues that the special provisions concerning coal mine construction and transportation workers, located in 20 C.F.R. § 725.202 (b), create the presumption that all miners are regularly exposed to coal dust and therefore make § 718.”
Josephine Mancia Widow of Angelo Mancia v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, United States Dep't of Labor, 130 F.3d 579 (3rd Cir. 1997). “Although these, and other cases cited therein, address the "reasoned medical judgment” standard as it relates to the presumption that arises under 20 C.F.R. § 725.203 (a)(4), we see no distinction between that standard and the "reasoned medical judgment” necessary to establish…”
Salvadore Plesh v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, United States Dep't of Labor, 71 F.3d 103 (3rd Cir. 1995). “20 C.F.R. § 725.203 (a)(1) — (4). 14 . See supra note 14 for the text of section 727.”
E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs Franklin E. Patrick, 791 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1986). “The issue of whether a mine inspector is a "miner” will be critical when a claimant needs the time spent as an inspector to qualify for the provision in 20 C.F.R. § 725.203 (1985) that one who has worked as a miner for 10 years may be presumed to be disabled from pneumoconiosis.”
Cumberland River Coal Co. v. Caudill, 207 F. App'x 529 (6th Cir. 2006). · cites it 3× “404 (b) (now 20 C.F.R. § 725.203 (d)) because it had failed to prove a mistake in fact or a change in condition; therefore, the BRB did not address whether the employer had a right to an examination upon giving sufficient notice to the claimant.”
Charles v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, 1 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1993). “The dependency test for surviving divorced spouses is stated in 20 C.F.R. § 725.217 (emphasis added): (a) An individual who is the miner's surviving divorced spouse .”
Wolf Creek Collieries v. Sammons, 142 F. App'x 854 (6th Cir. 2005). · cites it 5× “On November 21, 1988, ALJ Gray, relying on a 1975 x-ray interpreted as positive for pneumoconiosis by a B-reader, found sufficient evidence to support invocation of the interim presumption of total disability pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 725.203 (a)(1). *856 The ALJ nonetheless…”
Roberts v. WV CWP Fund (4th Cir. 1996). “The ALJ found that Roberts did not have a totally disabling respi- ratory condition. Rarely does a finding of fact fail the substantial evi- dence test unless it was induced by an analytical error or misapplication of the governing law.”
Plesh v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs (3rd Cir. 1995). “20 C.F.R. § 725.203 (a)(1)-(4). 14 time he filed his second claim.”
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