28 C.F.R. § 2.7

Committed fines and restitution orders

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(a) Committed fines. In any case in which a prisoner shall have had a fine imposed upon him by the committing court for which he is to stand committed until it is paid or until he is otherwise discharged according to law, such prisoner shall not be released on parole or mandatory release until payment of the fine, or until the fine commitment order is discharged according to law under the regulations of the Bureau of Prisons. Discharge from the commitment obligation of any committed fine does not discharge the prisoner's obligation to pay the fine as a debt due the United States.

(b) Restitution orders. Where a prisoner applying for parole is under an order of restitution, and it appears that the prisoner has the ability to pay and has willfully failed to do so, the Commission shall require that approval of a parole release plan be contingent upon the prisoner first satisfying such restitution order. The prisoner shall be notified that failure to satisfy this condition shall result in retardation of parole under the provisions of § 2.28(e).

[48 FR 44527, Sept. 29, 1983, as amended at 50 FR 36422, Sept. 6, 1985]

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 9 cases, 1982–1994 · leading case: Ramesh Solomon v. Robert I. Elsea, Warden, 676 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1982).

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Ramesh Solomon v. Robert I. Elsea, Warden, 676 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1982). “A committed fine is a fine for which a prisoner shall remain incarcerated, without being released on parole, until such time that the fine is paid or the prisoner is otherwise discharged according to law.”

United States v. Francis William Hewes, Ii, Gene M. Simpson, Millard Clifford Haley, Walter Langford, & Howard E. Caldwell, 729 F.2d 1302 (11th Cir. 1984). “28 C.F.R. § 2.7 *1325 (1983). Three Courts of Appeals when faced with challenges to committed fines have refused to rule on their constitutionality prior to the expiration of the prisoner’s non-contingent prison terms until the prisoner exhausts the administrative remedy…”

United States v. Gene A. Blanton, 739 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1984). · cites it 2× “28 C.F.R. § 2.7 (1983). 2 However, even the regulation appears to contemplate that the convict will be incarcerated at the time he seeks to establish his indigency.”

Ariel Santiago v. United States, 889 F.2d 371 (1st Cir. 1989). “He contended that he had remained unable to pay the fines, that nonpayment adversely affected his eligibility for parole, see 28 C.F.R. § 2.7 (a) (1988) (“In any case in which a prisoner shall have had a fine imposed upon him by the committing court for which he is to stand…”

United States v. Anthony David Harris, 727 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1984). “2d at 584-85 ; see 28 C.F.R. § 2.7 . The Estrada court then upheld the sentence, finding that “the possibility of a future illegal action on the part of prison authorities does not make a sentence illegal.”

Molinas v. Comm'r of Corr., 652 A.2d 481 (Conn. 1994). “) 28 C.F.R. § 2.7 (a) (1994); see also Solomon v.”

Joseph Michael Lincoln v. United States, 12 F.3d 132 (8th Cir. 1994). “See 28 C.F.R. § 2.7 (a) (1993) (committed fine requires payment before release from prison).”

United States v. Arnold Ellis, 907 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1990). “See 28 C.F.R. § 2.7 (a); Santiago v. U.S., 889 F.”

Chatterjee v. United States Parole Comm'n, 731 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Ill. 1990). “Commission’s relevant policy is set out at 28 C.F.R. § 2.7 (b): Where a prisoner applying for parole is under an order of restitution, and it appears that the prisoner has the ability to pay and has willfully failed to do so, the Commission shall require that approval of a…”

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