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C.F.R.Title 28Chapter I—Department of JusticePart 2—Parole, Release, Supervision and Recommitment of Prisoners, Youth Offenders, And Juvenile DelinquentsSubpart C—District of Columbia Code: Prisoners and Parolees

28 C.F.R. § 2.73 (2026)

Parole suitability criteria

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 cited 2006–2018 9citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 9 opinions since 2006. The most litigated part is subsection (b) (1 case).

(a) In accordance with D.C. Code 24-404(a), the Commission shall be authorized to release a prisoner on parole in its discretion after the prisoner has served the minimum term of the sentence imposed, if the following criteria are met:

(1) The prisoner has substantially observed the rules of the institution;

(2) There is a reasonable probability that the prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the law; and

(3) In the opinion of the Commission, the prisoner's release is not incompatible with the welfare of society.

(b) It is the policy of the Commission with respect to District of Columbia Code offenders that the minimum term imposed by the sentencing court presumptively satisfies the need for punishment for the crime of which the prisoner has been convicted, and that the responsibility of the Commission is to account for the degree and the seriousness of the risk that the release of the prisoner would entail. This responsibility is carried out by reference to the Salient Factor Score and the Point Assignment Table at § 2.80. However, there may be exceptional cases in which the gravity of the offense is sufficient to warrant an upward departure from § 2.80 and denial of parole.

[65 FR 45888, July 26, 2000, as amended at 68 FR 41530, July 14, 2003]
The 9 cases that cite 28 C.F.R. § 2.73 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENFletcher, Thaddeus v. Reilly, Edward, 433 F.3d 867 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
cites § 2.73 1×cited by 64 cases
Where it cites § 2.73
“6); see 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.73 , 2.80 (1999). No such modifications were made in the regulations governing decisions to grant reparole when the new offense for which parole was revoked was not a *872 D.”
The case’s holding
A retroactively applied parole or reparole regulation violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it creates a significant risk of prolonging an inmate's incarceration.
Later courts cite it for
“creates a significant risk of prolonging an inmate's incarceration.” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENSellmon v. Reilly, 551 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 2008).
cites § 2.73 1×subsections: (b)cited by 62 cases
Where it cites § 2.73
“18 and 28 C.F.R § 2.73(b). It is readily apparent (in fact, defendants do not appear to contest) that offense accountability was considered in plaintiffs’ cases.”
The case’s holding
The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the retroactive application of parole guidelines that increase punishment for crimes committed before the new regulations were established.
Later courts cite it for
“the ex post facto clause of the united states constitution prohibits retroactive increases in punishment for a crime after its commission.” · 6 citing courts
3
GREENPhillips v. Fulwood, 616 F.3d 577 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
cites § 2.73 1×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 2.73
“Phillips notes that in “exceptional cases” the 2000 regulations permit the Commission to depart upward based on the gravity of the offense, 28 C.F.R. § 2.73 (b), the consideration he terms “offense accountability.”
The case’s holding
Retroactive application of parole guidelines violates the Ex Post Facto Clause only when it creates a significant risk of prolonging incarceration; no violation exists where an upward departure rests on a ground available under both regimes.
Later courts cite it for
“in ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must 'accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENRoy Daniel v. Isaac Fulwood, Jr., 766 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
cites § 2.73 1×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 2.73
“See 28 C.F.R. § 2.73 (b). Under the 2000 Guidelines, the first step in the suitability determination involves assigning points based on the prisoner’s risk of recidivism (his “salient factor score”), 2 the presence of violence in his current or prior offenses, and whether the…”
The case’s holding
Retroactive application of parole guidelines violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it creates a significant risk of prolonging incarceration compared to prior guidelines, even where the agency retains discretion.
Later courts cite it for
“in order to prevail on the merits of an ex post facto claim with regard to parole guidelines, a plaintiff must show that his retroactive application of the new guidelines 'creates a significant risk of prolonging his incarceration' as compared to application of the prior guidelines.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENDaniel v. Smoot, 287 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
cites § 2.73 1×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 2.73
“As evidence of the Commission's breach, Plaintiffs point to: (1) the frequency with which the Commission has rejected hearing examiners' recommendations to grant parole; (2) the Commission's notice of actions in those cases, which, in Plaintiffs' view, assign undue weight to…”
6
GREENCrutchfield v. United States Parole Comm'n, 438 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
cites § 2.73 1×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 2.73
“, the minimum sentence imposed by the court), (b) the “base guideline range” (any additional term of incarceration that should be served to reflect the “degree and the seriousness of the risk that the release of the prisoner would entail,” 28 C.F.R. § 2.73 ), and (c) the…”
7
GREENMcgill v. Sniezek, 735 F. Supp. 2d 162 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
cites § 2.73 1×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 2.73
“6); see 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.73 , 2.80 (1999). No such modifications were made in the regulations governing decisions to grant reparole when the new offense for which parole was revoked was not a D.”
8
NO FLAGHill v. United States Parole Comm'n, No. 2016-1476, 2017 WL 2414446 (D.D.C. June 2, 2017).
cites § 2.73 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 2.73
“2 (November 8, 2016, Hearing Summary) at 4 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 2.73 ); see 28 C.F.R. § 2.80 (o)(4) (specifying effective Guidelines and policies).”
9
NO FLAGDaniel v. Fulwood, No. 2010-0862 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2018).
cites § 2.73 1×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 2.73
“Failure to Apply the 1972 Guidelines’ Parole Suitability Factors Plaintiffs first contend that the Commission breached the Settlement Agreement by applying the Commission’s parole suitability criteria under its 2000 regulation, see 28 C.F.R. § 2.73 , instead of the six factors…”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
200620122018

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 2006. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
D.C. Cir.4D.D.C.3S.D.N.Y.1M.D. Penn.1
By subsection
(b)1 case
Sellmon v. Reilly, 551 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 2008).“18 and 28 C.F.R § 2.73(b). It is readily apparent (in fact, defendants do not appear to contest) that offense accountability was considered in plaintiffs’ cases.”
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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