28 C.F.R. § 41.53
Reasonable accommodation
A recipient shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 53
cases (13 in the last 5 years), 1987–2026 · leading case: Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003).
Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003). “” 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (2002) (emphasis added).”
Wisconsin Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2006). “” 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 . The regulation’s use of the terms “applicant or employee” suggests that it pertains most directly to workplace accommodation, rather than to the modification of a city’s zoning practices.”
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). “" 28 CFR § 41.53 (1990 and 1998 eds.). While the part 41 regulations do not define "undue hardship," other § 504 regulations make clear that the "undue hardship" inquiry requires not simply an assessment of the cost of the accommodation in relation to the recipient's overall…”
A.H. ex rel. Holzmueller v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 881 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2018). “While Title II and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act lack such specific reasonable accommodation language, their corresponding regulations employ language indicating that, entities must provide reasonable accommodations to the disabled.”
Marie Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Examiners, Univ. of Connecticut Sch. of Med., Bruce M. Koeppen, 364 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2004). “28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (2002). The ADA defines undue hardship as one requiring significant difficulties or expense when considered in light of a number of factors, one factor being the type of service or product being offered.”
McElwee v. Cnty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2012). “3d at 88 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 41.53 , 35.130(b)(7)) (internal quotation marks omitted).”
Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825 (Ind. 2012). “” 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 . As outlined in the preceding paragraph, to sustain a claim under either the ADA or the RA, Perdue must demonstrate that (1) she is a “qualified individual with a disability” (2) who was excluded from or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or…”
John Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 926 F.3d 235 (6th Cir. 2019). “§ 794 (d) ; 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 . And when that holds true, a denial of the requested accommodation may amount to unlawful discrimination.”
Snell v. Neville, 998 F.3d 474 (1st Cir. 2021). “130 (b)(7), while the coordinating regulations under the Rehabilitation Act use the term 'reasonable accommodation,' 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 , but there is no material difference between the terms.”
Dean v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Med. & Biomedical Sciences, 804 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2015). “3d at 88 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 ); see Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.”
Terrance Shaw v. Paul Kemper, 52 F.4th 331 (7th Cir. 2022). “See 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 . For all practical purposes here, the two stat- utes are the same.”
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999). “28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (1998) (emphasis added).”
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