28 C.F.R. § 41.53
Reasonable accommodation
A recipient shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 53
cases (13 in the last 5 years), 1987–2026 · leading case: Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg
Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg (2003)
“” 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (2002) (emphasis added).”
Wisconsin Community Services, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee (2006)
“…accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program.” 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 . The regulation’s use of the terms “applicant or employee” suggests that it pertains most directly to workplace accommodation, rather than to the modification of a city’s zoning…”
Olmstead v. L.C. (1999)
“…the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program." 28 CFR § 41.53 (1990 and 1998 eds.). While the part 41 regulations do not define "undue hardship," other § 504 regulations make clear that the "undue hardship" inquiry requires not simply an…”
A.H. ex rel. Holzmueller v. Illinois High School Ass'n (2018)
“130 (b)(7)®; 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 . Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized a duty to provide reasonable accommodations in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”
Marie Powell v. National Board of Medical Examiners, University of Connecticut School of Medicine, Bruce M. Koeppen (2004)
“28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (2002). The ADA defines undue hardship as one requiring significant difficulties or expense when considered in light of a number of factors, one factor being the type of service or product being offered.”
McElwee v. County of Orange (2012)
“3d at 88 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 41.53 , 35.130(b)(7)) (internal quotation marks omitted).”
Perdue v. Gargano (2012)
“” 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 . As outlined in the preceding paragraph, to sustain a claim under either the ADA or the RA, Perdue must demonstrate that (1) she is a “qualified individual with a disability” (2) who was excluded from or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or…”
John Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc. (2019)
“…index="88" url="https://cite.case.law/citations/?q=28%20C.F.R.%20%C2%A7%2041.53"> 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 . And when that holds true, a denial of the requested accommodation may amount to unlawful discrimination. See Kaltenberger , <extracted-citation case-ids="11800677" index”
Snell v. Neville (2021)
“130 (b)(7), while the coordinating regulations under the Rehabilitation Act use the term 'reasonable accommodation,' 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 , but there is no material difference between the terms.”
Dean v. University at Buffalo School of Medicine & Biomedical Sciences (2015)
“3d at 88 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 ); see Rothschild v.”
Terrance Shaw v. Paul Kemper (2022)
“…modifications of the prison’s policies or practices to avoid discrimination. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 . For all practical purposes here, the two stat- utes are the same. See Jaros, 684 F.3d at 671–72 (comparing the acts). With Shaw no longer incarcerated, he seeks only money…”
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. (1999)
“28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (1998) (emphasis added).”
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