29 C.F.R. § 1630.15

Defenses

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Defenses to an allegation of discrimination under this part may include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a) Disparate treatment charges. It may be a defense to a charge of disparate treatment brought under §§ 1630.4 through 1630.8 and 1630.11 through 1630.12 that the challenged action is justified by a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

(b) Charges of discriminatory application of selection criteria—(1) In general. It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination, as described in § 1630.10, that an alleged application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screens out or tends to screen out or otherwise denies a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished with reasonable accommodation, as required in this part.

(2) Direct threat as a qualification standard. The term “qualification standard” may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others in the workplace. (See § 1630.2(r) defining direct threat.)

(c) Other disparate impact charges. It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination brought under this part that a uniformly applied standard, criterion, or policy has a disparate impact on an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities that the challenged standard, criterion or policy has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished with reasonable accommodation, as required in this part.

(d) Charges of not making reasonable accommodation. It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination, as described in § 1630.9, that a requested or necessary accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the covered entity's business.

(e) Conflict with other Federal laws. It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this part that a challenged action is required or necessitated by another Federal law or regulation, or that another Federal law or regulation prohibits an action (including the provision of a particular reasonable accommodation) that would otherwise be required by this part.

(f) Claims based on transitory and minor impairments under the “regarded as” prong. It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination by an individual claiming coverage under the “regarded as” prong of the definition of disability that the impairment is (in the case of an actual impairment) or would be (in the case of a perceived impairment) “transitory and minor.” To establish this defense, a covered entity must demonstrate that the impairment is both “transitory” and “minor.” Whether the impairment at issue is or would be “transitory and minor” is to be determined objectively. A covered entity may not defeat “regarded as” coverage of an individual simply by demonstrating that it subjectively believed the impairment was transitory and minor; rather, the covered entity must demonstrate that the impairment is (in the case of an actual impairment) or would be (in the case of a perceived impairment) both transitory and minor. For purposes of this section, “transitory” is defined as lasting or expected to last six months or less.

(g) Additional defenses. It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this part that the alleged discriminatory action is specifically permitted by § 1630.14 or § 1630.16.

[56 FR 35734, July 26, 1991, as amended at 76 FR 17003, Mar. 25, 2011]

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 159 cases (51 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: William Eshleman v. Patrick Indus. Inc, 961 F.3d 242 (3rd Cir. 2020).

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William Eshleman v. Patrick Indus. Inc, 961 F.3d 242 (3rd Cir. 2020). · cites it 3× “Put differently, a regarded-as plaintiff alleging a transitory and minor impairment has failed to state a legally sufficient claim, even if the employer does not include a transitory and minor defense in its Answer.”

Paula Babb v. Maryville Anesthesiologists, P.C., 942 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2019). · cites it 2× “Federal regulations then clarify that this “transitory and minor” limitation is an affirmative defense that the employer bears the burden of proving, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15 (f), and that “physical impairment” is otherwise defined broadly, to include “any physiological disorder or…”

Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2012). · cites it 4× “§ 12112 (b)(6); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15 (b)(1). An employer must make “reasonable accommodations” for an otherwise qualified individual unless the employer “can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business .”

Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999). · cites it 2× “[16] The implementing regulations of Title I also recognize a defense to liability under the ADA that "a challenged action is required or necessitated by another Federal law or regulation," 29 CFR § 1630.15 (e) (1998). As the parties do not invoke this specific regulation, we…”

Willard Buskirk v. Apollo Metals Pma Ins. Grp., 307 F.3d 160 (3rd Cir. 2002). · cites it 2× “§ 12111 (9)(B). The duty to provide a reasonable accommodation is subject to certain limitations.”

Dennis R. Bay v. Cassens Transp. Co., 212 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2000). · cites it 3× “§ 12113 (a); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15 (b)(1). Moreover, an employer may have a defense to a charge of discrimination if an action is “required or necessitated by another Federal law or regulation.”

Edward R. Williams Angelynne Williams, H/w v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, Edward R. Williams, 380 F.3d 751 (3rd Cir. 2004). “12 ("regarded as” plaintiff “might be entitled to injunctive relief against future discrimination”). 15 . We are, of course, aware that "an employer is not required to provide a reasonable accommodation if it .”

Featherstone v. S. California Permanente Med. Grp., 10 Cal. App. 5th 1150 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). “1051-1052; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15 (f) (2016) [“transitory and minor impairments” are a defense to Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ( 42 U.”

Woodruff, Phillip v. Peters, Mary, 482 F.3d 521 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “§ 12111(10)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15 (d) (confirming that “undue hardship” is an affirmative defense).”

Taylor, Lorenzo v. Rice, Condoleeza, 451 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 2006). · cites it 2× “29 C.F.R. § 1630.15 (b)(2); see id. § 1630.”

Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002). “2 Chevron defended under a regulation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) permitting the defense that a worker’s disability on the job would pose a “direct threat” to his health, see 29 CFR § 1630.15 (b)(2) (2001). Although two medical witnesses disputed…”

Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Maryland, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720 (D. Maryland 1996). · cites it 2× “” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15 (d) (Appendix: Interpretative Guidelines) (‘Whether a particular accommodation will impose an undue hardship for a particular employer is determined on a case by case basis.”

Show all 159 citing cases →

— 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(1) — 2 cases

Marc Shell v. Kevin Smith, 789 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2015).

Marc Shell v. Kevin Smith (7th Cir. 2015).

— 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) — 4 cases

Coralyn Anne Brown v. Lester E. Cox Med. Centers, D/B/A Cox Med. Centers South, 286 F.3d 1040 (8th Cir. 2002).

Victoria Rizzo v. Child.'s World Learning Centers, Inc., 213 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 2000).

MacY v. Hopkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 2d 888 (W.D. Ky. 2006).

Coralyn Anne Brown v. Lester E. Cox (8th Cir. 2002).

— 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(c) — 1 case

Cleary v. Fed. Express Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 930 (E.D. Wis. 2004).

— 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) — 1 case

Honstein v. Metro West Ambulance Serv., Inc., 90 P.3d 1030 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).

— 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) — 4 cases

Christopher v. Laidlaw Transit Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

Cleary v. Fed. Express Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 930 (E.D. Wis. 2004).

Samson v. Fed. Express Corp., 874 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (M.D. Fla. 2012).

Mills v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (D. Idaho 2024).

— 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) — 2 cases

Nevitt v. United States Steel Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 1322 (N.D. Ala. 2014).

Thomas v. PNC Bank, N.A., 2018 Ohio 4000 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).

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