29 C.F.R. § 1918.91
Housekeeping
(a) General. Active work areas shall be kept free of equipment, such as lashing gear, and materials not in use, and clear of debris, projecting nails, strapping and other objects not necessary to the work in progress.
(b) Slippery surfaces. The employer shall eliminate conditions causing slippery walking and working surfaces in immediate areas used by employees.
(c) Free movement of drafts. Dunnage shall not be placed at any location where it interferes with the free movement of drafts.
(d) Dunnage height. Dunnage racked against sweat battens or bulkheads shall not be used when the levels of such racks are above the safe reach of employees.
(e) Coaming clearance. Dunnage, hatch beams, tarpaulins or gear not in use shall be stowed no closer than three feet (.91 m) to the port and starboard sides of the weather deck hatch coaming.
(f) Nails. (1) Nails that are protruding from shoring or fencing in the work area shall be rendered harmless.
(2) Dunnage, lumber, or shoring material in which there are visibly protruding nails shall be removed from the work area, or, if left in the area, the nails shall be rendered harmless.
(g) Ice aloft. Employees shall be protected from ice that may fall from aloft.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 26
cases, 1976–2013 · leading case: Richard Bunn v. Oldendorff Carriers GmbH & Co., 723 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2013).
Richard Bunn v. Oldendorff Carriers GmbH & Co., 723 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2013). “” 29 C.F.R. § 1918.91 . Thus, the general principle that a shipowner can reasonably rely on an expert stevedore and its expert longshoremen to notice and avoid an open and obvious hazard applies with full force to this case.”
Mario Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 572 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1978). “29 C.F.R. 1918.91(c). If the shipowner is to be liable only for negligence, it would be manifestly unfair to saddle the shipowner with unfortunate results which occurred after turning the work over to the stevedore.”
Edward J. Rich v. United States Lines, Inc., 596 F.2d 541 (3rd Cir. 1979). “Finally, 29 C.F.R. Section 1918.91(c) states, "Slippery conditions shall be eliminated as they occur.”
Salvatore Giglio & Carmela Giglio v. Farrell Lines Inc., & Third-Party v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., Third-Party, 613 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1980). “The only apparent communication concerned pails and shovels for cleaning the locker, which is an area that is less open and obvious than the deck and which is, in my view, one where the ship’s responsibilities are probably therefore less extensive.”
Jack A. Doca & Fannie C. Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A. & Pittston Stevedoring Corp., 634 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980). “Pittston’s liability is based on a regulation, promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 29 C.F.R. § 1918.91 (a) (1979), which requires stevedores to keep their work area free of “tripping or stumbling hazards.”
Augustus Chavis v. Finnlines Ltd., O/y, 576 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1978). “Specifically, appellant asked the court to instruct the jury on 29 C.F.R., section 1918.91, of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Regulations for Longshoring, which provides: (a) Weather deck walking and working areas shall be kept reasonably clear of…”
William Kirsch v. Prekookeanska Plovidba, 971 F.2d 1026 (3rd Cir. 1992). “Even if Kirsch is correct that the OSHA regulation does not require the stevedore to eliminate slippery conditions that came into being before the stevedore assumed control, the regulation nonetheless indicates that stevedores are considered competent to treat oil spills, a…”
Gordon Anderson v. Iceland S.S. Co., 585 F.2d 1142 (1st Cir. 1978). “” 29 C.F.R. § 1918.91 (c). There was no testimony that any crew member or officer of the GODAFOSS was in the shed area where Anderson sustained his injury, nor any evidence that they knew or had been informed of the hazardous conditions on the dock.”
Charles Evans v. Transportacion Mar. Mexicana Ss \Campeche\"", 639 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1981). “29 C.F.R. § 1918.91 (1980) provides: (a) Weather deck walking and working areas shall be kept reasonably clear of lines, bundles, dunnage and all other loose tripping or stumbling hazards .”
Orazio Albergo v. Hellenic Lines, Inc., 658 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1981). “I there pointed out that the trial judge’s construction of the Safety and Health Regulations for Long-shoring (there 29 C.F.R. § 1918.91 (c), here 29 C.F.R. § 1918.”
Pasquale Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 678 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1982). “91 (a) (1979), required stevedores to keep their work area free of “tripping or stumbling hazards”; we affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the regulation created a non-delegable duty to remove the hazard, adding that “[t]he fact that the *428 hazard was primarily the…”
Smith v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 2004 A.M.C. 862 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). “Under these circumstances, Supreme Court correctly determined that, should plaintiff be determined to be a longshoreman, a material issue of fact exists as to whether the Lone Star defendants, as the owners of Barge 38, breached their duty owed to him.”
— 29 C.F.R. § 1918.91(a) — 1 case
Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense S.A., 474 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
— 29 C.F.R. § 1918.91(c) — 5 cases
Mario Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 572 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1978). “29 C.F.R. 1918.91(c). If the shipowner is to be liable only for negligence, it would be manifestly unfair to saddle the shipowner with unfortunate results which occurred after turning the work over to the stevedore.”
Edward J. Rich v. United States Lines, Inc., 596 F.2d 541 (3rd Cir. 1979). “Finally, 29 C.F.R. Section 1918.91(c) states, "Slippery conditions shall be eliminated as they occur.”
Salvatore Giglio & Carmela Giglio v. Farrell Lines Inc., & Third-Party v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., Third-Party, 613 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1980). “The only apparent communication concerned pails and shovels for cleaning the locker, which is an area that is less open and obvious than the deck and which is, in my view, one where the ship’s responsibilities are probably therefore less extensive.”
Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1978).
Anthony Canizzo, & Cross-Appellant v. Farrell Lines, Inc., & Cross-Appellee, & Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., & Third Party Farrell Lines, Inc., Third Party v. Frank J. Holleran, Inc., Third Party, 579 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1978).
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