(a) Section 3(e)(2)(C) provides an exclusion from the Act's coverage for officials elected by the voters of their jurisdictions. Also excluded under this provision are personal staff members and officials in policymaking positions who are selected or appointed by the elected public officials and certain advisers to such officials.
(b) The statutory term “member of personal staff” generally includes only persons who are under the direct supervision of the selecting elected official and have regular contact with such official. The term typically does not include individuals who are directly supervised by someone other than the elected official even though they may have been selected by the official. For example, the term might include the elected official's personal secretary, but would not include the secretary to an assistant.
(c) In order to qualify as personal staff members or officials in policymaking positions, the individuals in question must not be subject to the civil service laws of their employing agencies. The term “civil service laws” refers to a personnel system established by law which is designed to protect employees from arbitrary action, personal favoritism, and political coercion, and which uses a competitive or merit examination process for selection and placement. Continued tenure of employment of employees under civil service, except for cause, is provided. In addition, such personal staff members must be appointed by, and serve solely at the pleasure or discretion of, the elected official.
(d) The exclusion for “immediate adviser” to elected officials is limited to staff who serve as advisers on constitutional or legal matters, and who are not subject to the civil service rules of their employing agency.
Notes of Decisions
Paul Flint v. Dep't of Labor, 177 A.3d 1080 (Vt. 2017).
· cites it 2× “One exception is for "elected officials and their appointees," 29 C.F.R. § 553.11 , and the other is for "employees of legislative branches.”
Renna v. Cnty. of Fresno, 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1074 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 6× “” ( 29 C.F.R. § 553.11 (1999); as first promulgated, see 52 Fed.”
Lifrak v. New York City Council, 389 F. Supp. 2d 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
· cites it 2× “29 C.F.R. § 553.11 (c). In order to maintain her claim, Lifrak must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that she is subject — at least to some extent — to those New York laws that create the type of protective regime described above.”
Bland v. New York, 263 F. Supp. 2d 526 (E.D.N.Y 2003).
“29 CFR § 553.11 (emphasis added). See also Howard v.”
Croci v. Town of Haverstraw, 175 F. Supp. 3d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
“§ 203 (e) (2) (C) (ii) (II) (excluding from definition of employee any individual “selected by the holder of [public elective] office to be a member of his personal staff’) with 29 C.F.R. § 553.11 (b) (noting that “[t]he statutory term ’member of personal staff generally…”
Baker v. Stone Cnty., Mo., 41 F. Supp. 2d 965 (W.D. Mo. 1999).
“29 C.F.R. § 553.11 (b). Moreover, the Secretary of Labor has consistently argued that sheriffs’ deputies are not the personal staff of the elected sheriff.”
Rodriguez v. Twp. of Holiday Lakes, 866 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
“Thus, although 29 C.F.R. § 553.11 (b) excludes from the personal staff exemption employees who are directly supervised by someone other than the elected official, even though they may have been selected by the official, the regulation does not prevent the Holiday Lakes’ Police…”
Brandi McKay v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 36 F.4th 1128 (11th Cir. 2022).
“, dissenting) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 553.11 (1975)). Labor regula- tions also provided a general exception to public and private employees who voluntarily engaged in civic or charitable work.”
Nichols v. Hurley, 921 F.2d 1101 (10th Cir. 1990).
“29 C.F.R. § 553.11 (b). Inasmuch as the definition of “employee” under the FLSA is essentially identical to that under Title VII, see 42 U.”
Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
· cites it 2× “29 CFR § 553.11 (1975). That the question whether an individual is an employee or a volunteer might be resolved in the courts has nothing to do with federalism, since Congress has rationally decided to regulate the wages of state employees under the Commerce Clause.”
Akers v. Cnty. of Sampson (E.D.N.C. 2022).
· cites it 3× “” 29 C.F.R. § 553.11 (b) (emphasis added). North Carolina law does not mandate either requirement.”
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