The Portal Act provides in section 4(a) that except as provided in subsection (b) no employer shall be liable for the failure to pay the minimum wage or overtime compensation for time spent in “walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities.” Section 4(a) further provides that the use of an employer's vehicle for travel by an employee and activities that are incidental to the use of such vehicle for commuting are not considered principal activities when the use of such vehicle is within the normal commuting area for the employer's business or establishment and is subject to an agreement on the part of the employer and the employee or the representative of such employee. Subsection (b) provides that the employer shall not be relieved from liability if the activity is compensable by express contract or by custom or practice not inconsistent with an express contract. Thus traveltime at the commencement or cessation of the workday which was originally considered as working time under the Fair Labor Standards Act (such as underground travel in mines or walking from time clock to work-bench) need not be counted as working time unless it is compensable by contract, custom or practice. If compensable by express contract or by custom or practice not inconsistent with an express contract, such traveltime must be counted in computing hours worked. However, ordinary travel from home to work (see § 785.35) need not be counted as hours worked even if the employer agrees to pay for it. (See Tennessee Coal, Iron & RR. Co. v. Musecoda Local, 321 U.S. 590 (1946); Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 690 (1946); Walling v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 66 F. Supp. 913 (D. Mont. (1946).)
[26 FR 190, Jan. 11, 1961, as amended at 76 FR 18860, Apr. 5, 2011]
Notes of Decisions
Sec'y Labor v. Timberline S., LLC, 925 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2019).
“) Although the plain language of the Portal-to-Portal Act suggests that home-to-work commutes are deemed compensable if the employer has a custom or practice of compensating for such work, 29 C.F.R. § 785.34 explains that "ordinary travel from home to work (see § 785.”
Johnson v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, 554 F. Supp. 2d 693 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
· cites it 2× “949 (1944); 29 C.F.R. § 785.34 ; id. § 790.5(b). Taking the latter *708 situation as an example, such travel was considered hours worked under the FLSA prior to the enactment of the Portal-to-Portal Act in 1947.”
Hyman v. Efficiency, Inc., 605 S.E.2d 254 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
“Travel Time Travel time is only compensable under The Portal to Portal Act if it is a principal activity of the employee. 29 U.S.C. § 254 . Normal commuting from home to work and back is considered ordinary travel and not a “principal activity” absent a contract stating…”
Montana Pub. Emp.'s Ass'n v. Montana Dep't of Transp., 1998 MT 17 (Mont. 1998).
“An employee who travels from home before his regular workday and returns to his home at the end of the workday is engaged in ordinary home to work travel which is a normal incident of employment. This is true whether he works at a fixed location or at different job sites.”
Whitehead v. Sparrow Enter., Inc., 605 S.E.2d 234 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
“§ 254 ; 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.34 and 785.35 (2004). Travel from an employer’s campus to the “actual place of performance” is noncom-pensable.”
Sec'y Labor v. Timberline S., LLC, 920 F.3d 1065 (6th Cir. 2019).
“) Although the plain language of the Portal-to-Portal Act suggests that home-to-work commutes are deemed compensable if the employer has a custom or practice of compensating for such work, 29 C.F.R. § 785.34 explains that "ordinary travel from home to work (see § 785.”
Stephen Abell v. Sky Bridge Resources (6th Cir. 2017).
· cites it 2× “” 29 C.F.R. § 785.34 . And “[h]ours worked in excess of the statutory maximum in any workweek are overtime hours under the [FLSA].”
Martin J. Walsh v. Timberline S. LLC (6th Cir. 2022).
“As the Secretary points out, the employee affidavits are somewhat vague regarding the number of commute or meal hours included in the employees’ time records, and they do not specify whether the employees were completely relieved of their duties during the commute and meal times…”
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