(a) An employer covered by FMLA is any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce, who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year. Employers covered by FMLA also include any person acting, directly or indirectly, in the interest of a covered employer to any of the employees of the employer, any successor in interest of a covered employer, and any public agency. Public agencies are covered employers without regard to the number of employees employed. Public as well as private elementary and secondary schools are also covered employers without regard to the number of employees employed. See § 825.600.
(b) The terms commerce and industry affecting commerce are defined in accordance with section 501(1) and (3) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA) (29 U.S.C. 142(1) and (3)), as set forth in the definitions at § 825.102 of this part. For purposes of the FMLA, employers who meet the 50-employee coverage test are deemed to be engaged in commerce or in an industry or activity affecting commerce.
(c) Normally the legal entity which employs the employee is the employer under FMLA. Applying this principle, a corporation is a single employer rather than its separate establishments or divisions.
(1) Where one corporation has an ownership interest in another corporation, it is a separate employer unless it meets the joint employment test discussed in § 825.106, or the integrated employer test contained in paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
(2) Separate entities will be deemed to be parts of a single employer for purposes of FMLA if they meet the integrated employer test. Where this test is met, the employees of all entities making up the integrated employer will be counted in determining employer coverage and employee eligibility. A determination of whether or not separate entities are an integrated employer is not determined by the application of any single criterion, but rather the entire relationship is to be reviewed in its totality. Factors considered in determining whether two or more entities are an integrated employer include:
(i) Common management;
(ii) Interrelation between operations;
(iii) Centralized control of labor relations; and
(iv) Degree of common ownership/financial control.
(d) An employer includes any person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer to any of the employer's employees. The definition of employer in section 3(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 203(d), similarly includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. As under the FLSA, individuals such as corporate officers “acting in the interest of an employer” are individually liable for any violations of the requirements of FMLA.
[78 FR 8902, Feb. 6, 2013, as amended at 82 FR 2230, Jan. 9, 2017]
Notes of Decisions
Engelhardt v. S.P. Richards Co., 472 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006).
· cites it 9× “Engelhardt argued that GPC and SPR ought to be considered a single, integrated employer under 29 C.F.R. § 825.104 (c)(2) because of the overlap in the substance and administration of their employment policies, and the implication suggested by SPR’s documents that GPC controlled…”
Joey L. Mitchell v. Glenn Chapman, 343 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2003).
· cites it 4× “See 29 C.F.R. § 825.104 (a) (“Public agencies are covered employers without regard to the number of employees employed.”
Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655 (6th Cir. 2008).
· cites it 4× “29 C.F.R. § 825.104 (c)(1). 8 Courts have consistently applied the Department of Labor regulations when addressing questions about FMLA leave.”
Wonasue v. Univ. of Maryland Alumni Ass'n, 984 F. Supp. 2d 480 (D. Maryland 2013).
· cites it 4× “§ 2611 (4)(A)(ii)(I); see 29 C.F.R. § 825.104 (a). Notably, “[a] plaintiff may bring a Title VII claim against an employer with fewer than fifteen employees where that employer is ‘integrated’ with another employer/s with a sufficient number of employees.”
Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408 (3rd Cir. 2012).
· cites it 3× “” 29 C.F.R. § 825.104 (a). The regulations then explicitly provide that “individuals such as corporate officers ‘acting in the interest of an employer’ are individually liable for any violations of the requirements of FMLA.”
Monte J. Hukill v. Auto Care, Inc. McGillicuddy & Assocs. William McGillicuddy, 192 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 1999).
· cites it 5× “Prior to trial, the district court held that, even though the defendants, individually or collectively, employed less than fifty employees during the period relevant to Hukill’s FMLA claims, it had subject matter jurisdiction over Hu-kill’s FMLA claims because the defendants and…”
Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2006).
· cites it 3× “3d at 831 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.104 (a)). We do not find these arguments persuasive.”
Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2016).
“§ 2611 (4)(A)(ii)(I); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.104 (d). -The Second Circuit has not yet tested the contours of this provision, but several of our sister circuits, as well as district courts within this Circuit, have observed that the FMLA’s definition of “employer” largely…”
William Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Incorp, 815 F.3d 356 (7th Cir. 2016).
“d at 942, or, as Bridge argues, under the FMLA, see 29 C.F.R. § 825.104 (c)(2). In Papa , we explained that the legal principles governing affiliate liability “should [not] vary from statute to statute, unless the statute, or the particular policy that animates the statute,…”
Smith v. Westchester Cnty., 769 F. Supp. 2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
· cites it 2× “” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.104 (a))). The Court agrees with the reasoning of the Modica court.”
— 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a) — 1 case
Engelhardt v. S.P. Richards Co., 472 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006).
“Engelhardt argued that GPC and SPR ought to be considered a single, integrated employer under 29 C.F.R. § 825.104 (c)(2) because of the overlap in the substance and administration of their employment policies, and the implication suggested by SPR’s documents that GPC controlled…”
— 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(c)(2) — 3 cases
Shain (D. Maryland 2026).
— 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d) — 1 case
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