C.F.R. » Title 29 » CHAPTER V—WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR › SUBCHAPTER C—OTHER LAWS › PART 825—THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993 › Subpart A—Coverage Under the Family and Medical Leave Act

29 C.F.R. § 825.114

Inpatient care

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Inpatient care means an overnight stay in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility, including any period of incapacity as defined in § 825.113(b), or any subsequent treatment in connection with such inpatient care.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 293 cases (13 in the last 5 years), 1994–2026 · leading case: Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 429 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
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Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 429 (W.D. Pa. 2008). · cites it 40× “” ” 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (a)(1). The second does not require an inpatient stay, but merely “[c]ontinuing treatment by a health care provider.”
Mauder v. Metro. Transit Auth., 446 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2006). · cites it 9× “A “Serious Health Condition,” defined under the FMLA at 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (a), is an illness, injury, impairment or physical condition that involves 1) inpatient care or 2) continuing treatment by a health care provider.”
Woodman v. Miesel Sysco Food Co., 657 N.W.2d 122 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 28× “4, 2001) (episode of flu may constitute serious health condition and the plaintiff's second visit to physician as a result of flu, which included physical examination and drawing blood, constituted "treatment" within meaning of 29 C.F.R. 825.114[b] to determine if serious health…”
Lee Brenneman v. Medcentral Health Sys., 366 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2004). · cites it 7× “§ 2611 (11); see 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (defining “inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility” and “continuing treatment by a health care provider”).”
Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151 (1st Cir. 1998). · cites it 7× “29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (a) & (b) (1993). Hodgens suffered from numerous symptoms in July and August 1993.”
Jeffrey Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus. Inc, 787 F.3d 190 (3rd Cir. 2015). · cites it 12× “Specifically, the District Court was required to interpret 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 , which defines the terms “inpatient care” as “an overnight stay in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical facility, including any period of incapacity as defined in 29 C.”
Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294 (3rd Cir. 2012). · cites it 4× “§ 2611 (11); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (defining inpatient care as ―an overnight stay in a hospital‖).”
Hurlbert Ex Rel. Est. of Hurlbert v. St. Mary's Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2006). · cites it 4× “29 C.F.R. § 825.114 ; see Russell v. North Broward Hosp.”
Jones v. Denver Pub. Schs., 427 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2005). · cites it 7× “29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (a)(2)(i). For purposes of the regulations, “treatment” includes both “examinations to determine if a serious health condition exists and evaluations of the condition,” while a “regimen of continuing treatment” includes “a course of prescription medication (e.”
Wheeler v. Pioneer Developmental Servs., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D. Mass. 2004). · cites it 13× “§ 2611 (11) (2004); 29 C.F.R. 825.114. Although the FMLA requires an employee to have an “illness” to qualify for medical leave, the FMLA itself does not define qualifying illnesses.”
Peter v. Lincoln Technical Inst., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 417 (E.D. Pa. 2002). · cites it 7× “29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (b). Defendant’s arguments on this issue conflate what is required to prove that an individual is disabled within the meaning of the ADA with what is required to prove that an individual has as serious medical condition within the meaning of the FMLA.”
Margaret Russell v. North Broward Hosp., 346 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). · cites it 6× “The answer to that question, in turn, depends upon the interpretation and validity of 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 , a regulation that the Department of Labor adopted to provide an objective definition for the terms “serious health condition” and “continuing treatment.”
Show all 293 citing cases →
— 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a) — 3 cases
Peter v. Lincoln Technical Inst., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 417 (E.D. Pa. 2002). “29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (b). Defendant’s arguments on this issue conflate what is required to prove that an individual is disabled within the meaning of the ADA with what is required to prove that an individual has as serious medical condition within the meaning of the FMLA.”
Wheeler v. Pioneer Developmental Servs., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D. Mass. 2004). “§ 2611 (11) (2004); 29 C.F.R. 825.114. Although the FMLA requires an employee to have an “illness” to qualify for medical leave, the FMLA itself does not define qualifying illnesses.”
Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Cor (1st Cir. 1998).
— 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2) — 4 cases
Wheeler v. Pioneer Developmental Servs., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D. Mass. 2004). “§ 2611 (11) (2004); 29 C.F.R. 825.114. Although the FMLA requires an employee to have an “illness” to qualify for medical leave, the FMLA itself does not define qualifying illnesses.”
Whitaker v. Bosch Braking Sys. Div. of Robert Bosch Corp., 180 F. Supp. 2d 922 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
Mun. of Anchorage v. Gregg, 101 P.3d 181 (Alaska 2004).
Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Cor (1st Cir. 1998).
— 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i) — 4 cases
Wheeler v. Pioneer Developmental Servs., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D. Mass. 2004). “§ 2611 (11) (2004); 29 C.F.R. 825.114. Although the FMLA requires an employee to have an “illness” to qualify for medical leave, the FMLA itself does not define qualifying illnesses.”
Fritz v. Phillips Serv. Indus., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 820 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
Kirk v. Reed Tool Co., 247 F. App'x 485 (5th Cir. 2007).
Townsend-Taylor v. Ameritech Servs. Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (E.D. Wis. 2007).
— 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i)(A) — 2 cases
Woodman v. Miesel Sysco Food Co., 657 N.W.2d 122 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). “4, 2001) (episode of flu may constitute serious health condition and the plaintiff's second visit to physician as a result of flu, which included physical examination and drawing blood, constituted "treatment" within meaning of 29 C.F.R. 825.114[b] to determine if serious health…”
Wheeler v. Pioneer Developmental Servs., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D. Mass. 2004). “§ 2611 (11) (2004); 29 C.F.R. 825.114. Although the FMLA requires an employee to have an “illness” to qualify for medical leave, the FMLA itself does not define qualifying illnesses.”
— 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b) — 3 cases
Woodman v. Miesel Sysco Food Co., 657 N.W.2d 122 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). “4, 2001) (episode of flu may constitute serious health condition and the plaintiff's second visit to physician as a result of flu, which included physical examination and drawing blood, constituted "treatment" within meaning of 29 C.F.R. 825.114[b] to determine if serious health…”
Wheeler v. Pioneer Developmental Servs., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D. Mass. 2004). “§ 2611 (11) (2004); 29 C.F.R. 825.114. Although the FMLA requires an employee to have an “illness” to qualify for medical leave, the FMLA itself does not define qualifying illnesses.”
Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Cor (1st Cir. 1998).
— 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(c) — 2 cases
Wheeler v. Pioneer Developmental Servs., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 158 (D. Mass. 2004). “§ 2611 (11) (2004); 29 C.F.R. 825.114. Although the FMLA requires an employee to have an “illness” to qualify for medical leave, the FMLA itself does not define qualifying illnesses.”
Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 429 (W.D. Pa. 2008). “” ” 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (a)(1). The second does not require an inpatient stay, but merely “[c]ontinuing treatment by a health care provider.”
— 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(d) — 2 cases
Woodman v. Miesel Sysco Food Co., 657 N.W.2d 122 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). “4, 2001) (episode of flu may constitute serious health condition and the plaintiff's second visit to physician as a result of flu, which included physical examination and drawing blood, constituted "treatment" within meaning of 29 C.F.R. 825.114[b] to determine if serious health…”
Sloop v. ABTCO, Inc. (4th Cir. 1999).
— 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(e) — 3 cases
Betty Faye Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 1997).
Kaylor v. Fannin Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp (5th Cir. 1997).
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