33 C.F.R. § 325.6

Duration of permits

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(a) General. DA permits may authorize both the work and the resulting use. Permits continue in effect until they automatically expire or are modified, suspended, or revoked.

(b) Structures. Permits for the existence of a structure or other activity of a permanent nature are usually for an indefinite duration with no expiration date cited. However, where a temporary structure is authorized, or where restoration of a waterway is contemplated, the permit will be of limited duration with a definite expiration date.

(c) Works. Permits for construction work, discharge of dredged or fill material, or other activity and any construction period for a structure with a permit of indefinite duration under paragraph (b) of this section will specify time limits for completing the work or activity. The permit may also specify a date by which the work must be started, normally within one year from the date of issuance. The date will be established by the issuing official and will provide reasonable times based on the scope and nature of the work involved. Permits issued for the transport of dredged material for the purpose of disposing of it in ocean waters will specify a completion date for the disposal not to exceed three years from the date of permit issuance.

(d) Extensions of time. An authorization or construction period will automatically expire if the permittee fails to request and receive an extension of time. Extensions of time may be granted by the district engineer. The permittee must request the extension and explain the basis of the request, which will be granted unless the district engineer determines that an extension would be contrary to the public interest. Requests for extensions will be processed in accordance with the regular procedures of § 325.2 of this part, including issuance of a public notice, except that such processing is not required where the district engineer determines that there have been no significant changes in the attendant circumstances since the authorization was issued.

(e) Maintenance dredging. If the authorized work includes periodic maintenance dredging, an expiration date for the authorization of that maintenance dredging will be included in the permit. The expiration date, which in no event is to exceed ten years from the date of issuance of the permit, will be established by the issuing official after evaluation of the proposed method of dredging and disposal of the dredged material in accordance with the requirements of 33 CFR parts 320 to 325. In such cases, the district engineer shall require notification of the maintenance dredging prior to actual performance to insure continued compliance with the requirements of this regulation and 33 CFR parts 320 to 324. If the permittee desires to continue maintenance dredging beyond the expiration date, he must request a new permit. The permittee should be advised to apply for the new permit six months prior to the time he wishes to do the maintenance work.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1991–2024 · leading case: Vieux Carre Prop. Owners, Residents & Assocs., Inc. v. Colonel Lloyd Kent Brown, 948 F.2d 1436 (5th Cir. 1991).
Vieux Carre Prop. Owners, Residents & Assocs., Inc. v. Colonel Lloyd Kent Brown, 948 F.2d 1436 (5th Cir. 1991). · cites it 4× “6 (a). "Permits for the existence of a structure or other activity of a permanent nature are usually for an indefinite duration with no expiration date cited.”
Ocean Advocates v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (W.D. Wash. 2001). · cites it 3× “§ 476 ; (2) the Corps’ decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”); and (3) the Corps’ decision not to issue a revised public notice and allow public comment prior to the extension of the permit…”
Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81 (Fed. Cl. 1997). · cites it 2× “See 33 C.F.R. § 325.6 (1996). As those deadlines approached, however, plaintiff continued to experience difficulty obtaining the required state and county authorizations for his plan.”
Lloyd A. Good, Jr. v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999). “See 33 CFR § 325.6 (1998). Good and Keycology were also pursuing the required state and county permits.”
Abenaki Nation of Mississquoi v. Hughes, 805 F. Supp. 234 (D. Vt. 1992). “33 C.F.R. § 325.6 (d). GP 38. was reissued in essentially the same form in 1987.”
Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2006). · cites it 3× “ACI’s characterization of the Corps’ action as a “decision to temporarily extend” the permit may be factually accurate, but is legally irrelevant.”
Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 100 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2024). “See 33 C.F.R. § 325.6 (a). So if the letter of permission is rescinded, Lumar’s right to maintain the dock will disappear along with it.”
Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2008). “See 33 C.F.R. § 325.6 (a), (d). Typically, § 404 permits automatically expire in five years.”
Ocean Advocates v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 402 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2004). “4 (a); see also 33 C.F.R. § 325.6 (b). We also REMAND this case to the district court to consider OA’s request for injunc-tive relief.”
Ocean Advocates v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 361 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2004). “We REMAND this case to the district court with instructions to remand to the Corps so that it can (1) prepare a full EIS considering the impact of reasonably foreseeable increases in tanker traffic, and (2) reevaluate the dock extension’s potential violation of the Mag-nuson…”
Shrimpers v. US Army Corps (5th Cir. 2021). “” See 33 C.F.R. § 325.6 (a). Further, the Corps is reconsidering the permit, and after doing so, it may “reinstate, modify, or revoke” it.”
Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast v. Nat'l Park Serv. (S.D. Ga. 2022). “2 (referencing 33 C.F.R. 325.6(b)); AR 11, merely obviating that authorization does not actually solve anything.”
— 33 C.F.R. § 325.6(b) — 1 case
Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast v. Nat'l Park Serv. (S.D. Ga. 2022). “2 (referencing 33 C.F.R. 325.6(b)); AR 11, merely obviating that authorization does not actually solve anything.”
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