(a) Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance of the regulations in this part preempts any State law, rule, regulation, order or standard covering the same subject matter, except for a provision necessary to eliminate or reduce a local safety hazard if that provision is not incompatible with this part and does not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to preempt an action under State law seeking damages for personal injury, death, or property damage alleging that a party has failed to comply with the Federal standard of care established by this part, has failed to comply with its own plan, rule, or standard that it created pursuant to this part, or has failed to comply with a State law, regulation, or order that is not incompatible with the first sentence of this paragraph.
(b) Preemption should also be considered pursuant to the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act (now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20701-20703), the Safety Appliance Acts (now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20301-20304), and the Commerce Clause based on the relevant case law pertaining to preemption under those provisions.
(c) FRA does not intend by issuance of the regulations in this part to preempt provisions of State criminal law that impose sanctions for reckless conduct that leads to actual loss of life, injury, or damage to property, whether such provisions apply specifically to railroad employees or generally to the public at large.
[66 FR 4193, Jan. 17, 2001, as amended at 73 FR 61552, Oct. 16, 2008]
Notes of Decisions
CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Plymouth, 92 F. Supp. 2d 643 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
“This latter form of testing can take up to forty-five minutes. The performance of these federally mandated air brake tests causes CSXT to block crossings in both Plymouth and Wayne.”
Union Pac. R.R. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 723 F. Supp. 526 (D. Or. 1989).
“49 C.F.R. §§ 232.13 , 232.19. The court concluded that the FRA has examined the safety function of visual inspection from the caboose at the rear of the train by a crew member, and that the FRA had determined that a caboose requirement was unnecessary for safety, and that…”
Burlington N. R.R. v. Montana, 880 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1989).
“See 49 C.F.R. §§ 232.13 , 232.19 (1987). In the FRA rulemaking proceedings, those opposing the amendments focused on the caboose issue, arguing that “the elimination of a caboose from the end of the train adversely affects safety” and requesting that the FRA affirmatively…”
United Transp. Union v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 410 (D.D.C. 1972).
“In that proceeding the Association of American Railroads petitioned for an amendment to 49 C.F.R. 232.13(e) to permit transfer trains and yard trains to be moved for a distance of up to 30 miles instead of the 20 mile maximum movement provided in the rule, together with changes…”
— 49 C.F.R. § 232.13(e) — 1 case
United Transp. Union v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 410 (D.D.C. 1972).
“In that proceeding the Association of American Railroads petitioned for an amendment to 49 C.F.R. 232.13(e) to permit transfer trains and yard trains to be moved for a distance of up to 30 miles instead of the 20 mile maximum movement provided in the rule, together with changes…”
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