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C.F.R.Title 49Chapter III—Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Department of TransportationSubchapter B—Federal Motor Carrier Safety RegulationsPart 387—Minimum Levels of Financial Responsibility for Motor CarriersSubpart A—Motor Carriers of Property

49 C.F.R. § 387.5 (2026)

Definitions

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 cited 1985–2023 39citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 39 opinions since 1985, 5 of them in the last five years.

As used in this subpart—

Accident includes continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions resulting in public liability which the insured neither expected nor intended.

Bodily injury means injury to the body, sickness, or disease including death resulting from any of these.

Cancellation of insurance means the withdrawal of insurance coverage by either the insurer or the insured.

Endorsement means an amendment to an insurance policy.

Environmental restoration means restitution for the loss, damage, or destruction of natural resources arising out of the accidental discharge, dispersal, release or escape into or upon the land, atmosphere, watercourse, or body of water of any commodity transported by a motor carrier. This shall include the cost of removal and the cost of necessary measure taken to minimize or mitigate damage to human health, the natural environment, fish, shellfish, and wildlife.

Evidence of security means a surety bond or a policy of insurance with the appropriate endorsement attached.

Financial responsibility means the financial reserves (e.g., insurance policies or surety bonds) sufficient to satisfy liability amounts set forth in this subpart covering public liability.

For-hire carriage means the business of transporting, for compensation, the goods or property of another.

In bulk means the transportation, as cargo, of property, except Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 materials, and Division 2.3, Hazard Zone A gases, in containment systems with capacities in excess of 3500 water gallons.

In bulk (Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives) means the transportation, as cargo, of any Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 materials in any quantity.

In bulk (Division 2.3, Hazard Zone A or Division 6.1, Packing Group I, Hazard Zone A materials) means the transportation, as cargo, of any Division 2.3, Hazard Zone A, or Division 6.1, packing Group I, Hazard Zone A material, in any quantity.

Insured and principal means the motor carrier named in the policy of insurance, surety bond, endorsement, or notice of cancellation, and also the fiduciary of such motor carrier.

Insurance premium means the monetary sum an insured pays an insurer for acceptance of liability for public liability claims made against the insured.

Motor carrier means a for-hire motor carrier or a private motor carrier. The term includes, but is not limited to, a motor carrier's agent, officer, or representative; an employee responsible for hiring, supervising, training, assigning, or dispatching a driver; or an employee concerned with the installation, inspection, and maintenance of motor vehicle equipment and/or accessories.

Property damage means damage to or loss of use of tangible property.

Public liability means liability for bodily injury or property damage and includes liability for environmental restoration.

State means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands.

[46 FR 30982, June 11, 1981; 46 FR 45612, Sept. 14, 1981; 47 FR 12801, Mar. 25, 1982, as amended at 48 FR 52683, Nov. 21, 1983; 51 FR 33856, Sept. 23, 1986; 53 FR 12160, Apr. 13, 1988; 59 FR 63923, Dec. 12, 1994; 62 FR 16709, Apr. 8, 1997; 63 FR 33275, June 18, 1998; 78 FR 58482, Sept. 24, 2013]
The 20 cases that cite 49 C.F.R. § 387.5 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENHilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509 (Kan. 2019).
cites § 387.5 4×cited by 69 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“" 49 C.F.R. § 387.5 . They define "public liability" as "liability for bodily injury or property damage.”
The case’s holding
A statutory cap on noneconomic damages is facially unconstitutional because it violates the right to trial by jury under the Kansas Constitution.
Later courts cite it for
“is facially unconstitutional because it violates section 5 of the kansas constitution bill of rights.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENMartinez v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 139 A.3d 611 (Conn. 2016).
cites § 387.5 8×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“As previously explained, 49 C.F.R. § 387.5 defines the term ‘‘[f]or-hire carriage’’ as ‘‘the business of transporting, for compensation, the goods or property of another.”
Later courts cite it for
“when addressing questions of federal law, we give special consideration to the decisions of the second circuit” · 1 citing court
3
GREENPierre v. Providence Washington Ins., 784 N.E.2d 52 (N.Y. 2002).
cites § 387.5 6×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“Elsewhere in the financial security regulations the terms "insured and principal" are defined as "the motor carrier named in the policy of insurance, surety bond, endorsement, or notice of cancellation, and also the fiduciary of such motor carrier" (49 CFR 387.5). Using this…”
The case’s holding
The MCS-90 endorsement incorporates the policy's definition of insured and requires coverage for any party meeting that definition regardless of policy notice requirements.
Later courts cite it for
“by its literal language, the mcs-90 endorsement simply does not provide separate coverage. like most endorsements to insurance policies, it explicitly cross-refer-enees and incorporates several of the terms of the policy.” · 1 citing court
4
GREENArmstrong v. United States Fire Ins., 606 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. Tenn. 2009).
cites § 387.5 3×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“Those same definitions appear in 49 C.F.R. § 387.5 , which also includes various other definitions including that of “insured and principal,” which is defined to mean “the motor carrier named in the policy of insurance, surety bond, endorsement, or notice of cancellation, and…”
Later courts cite it for
“the motor carrier named in the policy of insurance.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENForkwar v. Progressive N. Ins., 910 F. Supp. 2d 815 (D. Md. 2012).
cites § 387.5 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“49 C.F.R. § 387.5 . “Insured and principal” is defined in the same regulation as “the motor carrier named in the policy of insurance, surety bond, endorsement, or notice of cancellation, and also the fiduciary of such motor carrier.”
Later courts cite it for
“feder al courts have been virtually unaniihous in holding that the mcs-90 endorsement provides coverage only to the named insured.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENHerrod v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 499 F. App'x 753 (10th Cir. 2012).
cites § 387.5 3×cited by 12 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 387.5
“” 6 49 C.F.R. § 387.5 . In turn, “for-hire carriage” is defined as “the business of transporting, for compensation, the goods or property of another.”
7
REDR.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 156 A.3d 539 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
cites § 387.5 1×cited by 33 cases
Reversed in part by R.T. Vanderbilt Co., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (2019): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case ("The Appellate Court, therefore, properly reversed the decision of the trial…
Where it cites § 387.5
“) 49 C.F.R. § 387.5 . These authorities lend strong support to Vanderbilt's argument that the policy language, when read as a whole, is intended to exclude coverage only for traditional environmental pollution, such as the intentional disposal or negligent release of industrial…”
The case’s holding
An umbrella policy provision requiring exhaustion of underlying insurance does not unambiguously obligate the insurer to defend claims that would have been covered by primary insurance but for its exhaustion.
Later courts cite it for
“because continental's reading of the policy language is equally plausible on its face and best comports with other specific provisions of the policy, the overall policy structure, and the conclusions reached by our sister courts, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that coverage b unambiguously does not require the insurer to defend claims that would have been covered by underlying insurance but for its exhaustion.” · 1 citing court
8
GREENNat'l Specialty Ins. v. Martin-Vegue, 644 F. App'x 900 (11th Cir. 2016).
cites § 387.5 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“” 49 C.F.R. § 387.5 . So, to decide if Freight’s MCS-90 endorsement could possibly apply here, the relevant question is whether Freight was the for-hire motor carrier for the pebbles at the time of the accident.”
9
GREENOoida Risk Retention Grp., Inc. v. Williams, 579 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2009).
cites § 387.5 1×cited by 67 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“] 49 C.F.R. § 387.5 . The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration has issued regulatory guidance emphasizing that “Form MCS-90 .”
The case’s holding
An insurer has no duty to defend if the underlying pleading alleges only facts excluded by the policy.
Later courts cite it for
“determined by all the facts and circumstances that result in the insured's potential liability.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENSentry Select Ins. v. Thompson, 665 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. Va. 2009).
cites § 387.5 3×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“” 49 C.F.R. § 387.5 . Sentry also cites cases finding that the predecessor to the MCS-90, the BMC-90 endorsement, was consistently interpreted as limiting coverage to judgments against the name insureds, regardless of the terms of the insurance policy.”
11
GREENCarolina Cas. Ins. v. Yeates, 584 F.3d 868 (10th Cir. 2009).
cites § 387.5 1×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“” 49 C.F.R. § 387.5 . 7 . Only the Second Circuit has appeared to follow the first approach, holding that an MCS-90 endorsement, irrespective of the terms of the underlying insurance policy, makes that policy primary as a matter of law with respect to coverage for a motor…”
The case’s holding
The MCS-90 endorsement functions as a safety net that triggers only when the underlying policy fails to provide coverage and other insurance is insufficient to meet federal minimums.
Later courts cite it for
“the endorsement is a safety net in the event other insurance is lacking.” · 4 citing courts
12
GREENCanal Ins. v. YMV Transp., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
cites § 387.5 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“” 49 C.F.R. 387.5. Thus, the Court must determine whether the Bering truck was being operated by YMV to transport the goods or property of another for compensation.”
13
GREENPierre v. Providence Washington Ins., 286 A.D.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2001).
cites § 387.5 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“The terms “insured and principal” are defined as “the motor carrier named in the policy of insurance, surety bond, endorsement, or notice of cancellation, and also the fiduciary of such motor carrier” (49 CFR 387.”
14
GREENCastro v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 154 Cal. App. 4th 1162 (Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 387.5 1×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“” ( 49 C.F.R. § 387.5 (2006).) Although the financial responsibility regulations do not contain a specific definition of either a “for-hire motor carrier” or a “private motor carrier,” they define “[f]or-hire carriage” as “the business of transporting, for compensation, the…”
The case’s holding
Under governmental interest analysis, where a traffic accident and resulting injury occur within a state's borders, that state's law generally governs a vehicle owner's liability for a permissive user's negligence.
Later courts cite it for
“the accident and castro's injury occurred within alabama's borders, thus giving alabama a presumptive interest in controlling the conduct of those persons who use its roadways, absent some other compelling interest to be served by applying california law.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENReal v. United States Fire Ins. Crum & Forster, 64 F. Supp. 2d 958 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
cites § 387.5 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“The relevant federal regulations reinforce the conclusion that only the named insured is an “insured” under the endorsement: “insured and principal” are defined as “the motor carrier named in the policy of insurance, surety bond, endorsement, or notice of eancellation, and also…”
Later courts cite it for
“any final judgment recovered against the insured.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENGREAT WEST CAS. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wisconsin, 734 F. Supp. 2d 718 (D. Minn. 2010).
cites § 387.5 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“” 49 C.F.R. § 387.5 . The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration has also issued regulatory guidance interpreting who is the “insured” under the regulatory scheme: Under 49 CFR 387.”
17
GREENMcComb v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 994 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
cites § 387.5 2×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“First, we agree with NCC that the Endorsement only applies to a final judgment against the named insured (J.”
18
GREENIllinois Nat'l Ins. v. Temian, 779 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
cites § 387.5 1×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“FMCSA guidance, issued in response to a request for clarification of the meaning of “insured” in Form MCS-90, defined “insured and principal” as “the motor carrier named in the policy of insurance, surety bond, endorsement, or notice of cancellation, and also the fiduciary of…”
19
GREENProgressive Gulf Ins. v. Est. of Jones, 958 F. Supp. 2d 706 (S.D. Miss. 2013).
cites § 387.5 1×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“” 49 C.F.R. § 387.5 . The regulations implementing the MCA apply only to “for-hire motor carriers operating motor vehicles transporting property in interstate or foreign commerce” and “motor carriers operating motor vehicles transporting hazardous materials, hazardous…”
20
GREENTerry Ross v. Wall Street Sys. & Gulf Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2005).
cites § 387.5 1×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 387.5
“” 49 C.F.R. § 387.5 . If, arguendo, the operator of a leased vehicle is an “insured motor carrier,” then the operator would be able to terminate its policy with the insurance company.”

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Citing cases by year
198520042023

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 2009. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
N.D. Ill.410th Cir.36th Cir.2Conn. App. Ct.2La. Ct. App.211th Cir.14th Cir.15th Cir.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 31 courts in all.

By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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