8 C.F.R. § 1240.57

Extension of time to depart

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Authority to reinstate or extend the time within which to depart voluntarily specified initially by an immigration judge or the Board is within the sole jurisdiction of the district director, except that an immigration judge or the Board may reinstate voluntary departure in a deportation proceeding that has been reopened for a purpose other than solely making an application for voluntary departure. A request by an alien for reinstatement or an extension of time within which to depart voluntarily shall be filed with the district director having jurisdiction over the alien's place of residence. Written notice of the district director's decision shall be served upon the alien and no appeal may be taken therefrom.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases, 2004–2009 · leading case: Yuri Harchenko, Oleksandr Harchenko, & Tetiana Harchenko v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., 379 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2004).
Yuri Harchenko, Oleksandr Harchenko, & Tetiana Harchenko v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., 379 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2004). “8 C.F.R. § 1240.57 (emphasis added). As is clear from the above language, the BIA’s authority to.”
Sierra Vidal v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007). · cites it 2× “The government also argues that 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.57 and 1240.26(f) vest the Attorney General with exclusive authority to stay or extend voluntary departures.”
Vladimir Iouri & Vera Yuriy v. John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen. of the United States, 464 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2006). “See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.57 (“Authority to reinstate or extend the time within which to depart voluntarily specified initially by an immigration judge or the Board is within the sole jurisdiction of the district director.”
Sulam Sidhwani v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 191 F. App'x 873 (11th Cir. 2006). “On appeal, Sidhwani contends that the BIA erred because: (1) the BIA should have considered INA § 245© an exception to the 90-day time limit on the filing of motions to reopen; (2) the BIA should have remanded the case for a factual determination on whether it presented…”
Iouri v. Ashcroft (2d Cir. 2007). “See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.57 (“Authority to reinstate or extend the time within which to depart voluntarily specified initially by an immigration judge or the 19 Board is within the sole jurisdiction of the district director.”
Harchenko v. INS (6th Cir. 2004). “Instead, the provision merely provides the BIA the discretion to reopen immigration 8 C.F.R. § 1240.57 (emphasis added). As is clear from the proceedings as it sees fit.”
Deocariza v. Holder, 324 F. App'x 611 (9th Cir. 2009). “See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.57 . We lack jurisdiction to consider the Deocarizas’ contention that the BIA should have treated their motion to reopen as a motion to reissue its August 16, 2000, decision because they did not exhaust this claim before the BIA.”
Deocariza v. Holder, 324 F. App'x 611 (9th Cir. 2009). “See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.57 . We lack jurisdiction to consider the Deocarizas’ contention that the BIA should have treated their motion to reopen as a motion to reissue its August 16, 2000, decision because they did not exhaust this claim before the BIA.”
Netsajeva v. Keisler, 249 F. App'x 914 (2d Cir. 2007). “8 C.F.R. § 1240.57 . Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Netsajeva’s request for an extension of the voluntary departure period.”
Claros-Ramirez v. Attorney Gen., 183 F. App'x 271 (3rd Cir. 2006). “See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.57 . In any event, Claros-Ramirez was not prejudiced by her attorney’s alleged failure to apply for cancellation of removal.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.