Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-127 (2026)

Civil actions - degree of proof required

✓ current as of July 2026
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(1) Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding and except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the burden of proof in any civil action shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. The provisions of this subsection (1) shall not apply to the burden of proof required in determining the validity of any legislative enactment. (2) Exemplary damages against the party against whom the claim is asserted shall only be awarded in a civil action when the party asserting the claim proves beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of a wrong under the circumstances set forth in section 13-21-102. Nothing in this subsection (2) shall be construed as preventing a party asserting the claim from being awarded money damages or other appropriate relief, other than exemplary damages, if he sustains the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (3) (Deleted by amendment, L. 95, p. 15, § 5, effective March 9, 1995.) (4) This section became effective July 1, 1972, and applies only to civil actions which accrue on or after such date.

Source: L. 71: p. 579, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 52-1-28. L. 72: pp. 317, 318, §§ 1, 2. L. 95: (1) and (3) amended, p. 15, § 5, effective March 9.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 136 cases (13 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case: Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1979).
Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1979). · cites it 38× “The Burden of Proof Section 13-25-127(1), C.R.S.1973, provides: "Civil actions—degree of proof required.”
Borer v. Lewis, 91 P.3d 375 (Colo. 2004). · cites it 70× “In particular, we are called upon to address whether section 13-25-127, 5 C.R.S. (2003), which sets forth the burden of proof for civil actions, has effectively overridden the standard previously established through our common law.”
Gerner v. Sullivan, 768 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1989). · cites it 26× “1984), the court stated: Notwithstanding the provisions of § 13-25-127(1), C.R.S., the clear and convincing standard of proof applies in cases involving adverse possession, and thus, by inference, in cases involving prescriptive easements.”
Diversified Mgmt., Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982). · cites it 16× “, section 13-25-127, C.R.S.1973. The policy considerations and compromise inherent in the legislative process make it a better forum for determining the balance between freedom of the press and individual liberty.”
Blood v. Qwest Servs. Corp., 224 P.3d 301 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 6× “§ 13-25-127(2), C.R.S.2008. Simple negligence cannot support such an award.”
Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419 (Colo. 1991). · cites it 10× “§ 13-25-127(1). III Finally, we requested sua sponte that the parties brief whether a cross-petition for review on certiorari may issue absent timely filing by the cross-petitioner of a petition for rehearing in the court of appeals.”
Qwest Servs. Corp. v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071 (Colo. 2011). · cites it 4× “Before a jury may impose exemplary damages, it must determine that the "injury complained of" was "attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct," § 18-21-102(1)(a), which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, § 13-25-127(2), C.R.S. (2010).…”
Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988). · cites it 8× “Outrageous conduct need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, section 13-25-127(1), and is an independent tort which entitles the plaintiff to compensatory damages.”
In re the Marriage of Krejci, 297 P.3d 1035 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 3× “In the absence of such language, I would suggest that section 13-25-127(1), C.R.S.2012, applies here, and thus, the marital presumption to be applied in this case should be subject to refutation by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by clear and convincing evidence.”
IN RE the Parental Responsibilities Concerning A.C.B., a Child, & Concerning Laura Jeane Frederick, & Joshua Broyhill, & Concerning Pueblo Cnty. Child Support Servs., Intervenor-Appellee., 507 P.3d 1078 (Colo. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 2× “See § 13-25-127(1), C.R.S. 2021 (burden of proof in civil cases is a preponderance of the evidence); see also C.”
Colorado Dog Fanciers, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver Ex Rel. City Council, 820 P.2d 644 (Colo. 1991). · cites it 12× “Under section 13-25-127, 6A C.R.S. (1987), the burden of proof in civil actions is measured by a preponderance of the evidence standard.”
People v. Shifrin, 342 P.3d 506 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 3× “This is the presumptive standard for civil actions, section 13-25-127(1), C.R.S.2018, and the CCPA does not impose a heavier burden.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-127(1) — 57 cases
Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1979). “The Burden of Proof Section 13-25-127(1), C.R.S.1973, provides: "Civil actions—degree of proof required.”
Gerner v. Sullivan, 768 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1989). “1984), the court stated: Notwithstanding the provisions of § 13-25-127(1), C.R.S., the clear and convincing standard of proof applies in cases involving adverse possession, and thus, by inference, in cases involving prescriptive easements.”
In re the Marriage of Krejci, 297 P.3d 1035 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013). “In the absence of such language, I would suggest that section 13-25-127(1), C.R.S.2012, applies here, and thus, the marital presumption to be applied in this case should be subject to refutation by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by clear and convincing evidence.”
IN RE the Parental Responsibilities Concerning A.C.B., a Child, & Concerning Laura Jeane Frederick, & Joshua Broyhill, & Concerning Pueblo Cnty. Child Support Servs., Intervenor-Appellee., 507 P.3d 1078 (Colo. Ct. App. 2022). “See § 13-25-127(1), C.R.S. 2021 (burden of proof in civil cases is a preponderance of the evidence); see also C.”
People v. Shifrin, 342 P.3d 506 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014). “This is the presumptive standard for civil actions, section 13-25-127(1), C.R.S.2018, and the CCPA does not impose a heavier burden.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-127(2) — 46 cases
Blood v. Qwest Servs. Corp., 224 P.3d 301 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “§ 13-25-127(2), C.R.S.2008. Simple negligence cannot support such an award.”
Qwest Servs. Corp. v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071 (Colo. 2011). “Before a jury may impose exemplary damages, it must determine that the "injury complained of" was "attended by circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct," § 18-21-102(1)(a), which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, § 13-25-127(2), C.R.S. (2010).…”
Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419 (Colo. 1991). “§ 13-25-127(1). III Finally, we requested sua sponte that the parties brief whether a cross-petition for review on certiorari may issue absent timely filing by the cross-petitioner of a petition for rehearing in the court of appeals.”
Boulder Valley Sch. Dist. R-2 v. Price, 805 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1991).
Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988). “Outrageous conduct need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, section 13-25-127(1), and is an independent tort which entitles the plaintiff to compensatory damages.”
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