(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a defendant is not brought to trial on the issues raised by the complaint, information, or indictment within six months from the date of the entry of a plea of not guilty, he shall be discharged from custody if he has not been admitted to bail, and, whether in custody or on bail, the pending charges shall be dismissed, and the defendant shall not again be indicted, informed against, or committed for the same offense, or for another offense based upon the same act or series of acts arising out of the same criminal episode.
(2) If trial results in conviction which is reversed on appeal, any new trial must be commenced within six months after the date of the receipt by the trial court of the mandate from the appellate court.
(3) If a trial date has been fixed by the court, and thereafter the defendant requests and is granted a continuance for trial, the period within which the trial shall be had is extended for an additional six-month period from the date upon which the continuance was granted.
(3.5) If a trial date has been fixed by the court and the defendant fails to make an appearance in person on the trial date, the period within which the trial shall be had is extended for an additional six-month period from the date of the defendant's next appearance.
(4) If a trial date has been fixed by the court, and thereafter the prosecuting attorney requests and is granted a continuance, the time is not thereby extended within which the trial shall be had, as is provided in subsection (1) of this section, unless the defendant in person or by his counsel in open court of record expressly agrees to the continuance or unless the defendant without making an appearance before the court in person or by his counsel files a dated written waiver of his rights to a speedy trial pursuant to this section and files an agreement to the continuance signed by the defendant. The time for trial, in the event of such agreement, is then extended by the number of days intervening between the granting of such continuance and the date to which trial is continued. (5) To be entitled to a dismissal under subsection (1) of this section, the defendant must move for dismissal prior to the commencement of his trial and prior to any pretrial motions which are set for hearing immediately before the trial or prior to the entry of a plea of guilty to the charge or an included offense. Failure to so move is a waiver of the defendant's rights under this section.
(5.1) If a trial date is offered by the court to a defendant who is represented by counsel and neither the defendant nor his counsel expressly objects to the offered date as being beyond the time within which such trial shall be had pursuant to this section, then the period within which the trial shall be had is extended until such trial date and may be extended further pursuant to any other applicable provisions of this section.
(6) In computing the time within which a defendant is brought to trial as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the following periods of time are excluded:
(a) Any period during which the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, or is unable to appear by reason of illness or physical disability, or is under observation or examination at any time after the issue of the defendant's mental condition, insanity, incompetency, or impaired mental condition is raised;
(b) The period of delay caused by an interlocutory appeal whether commenced by the defendant or by the prosecution;
(c) A reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and there is good cause for not granting a severance;
(d) The period of delay resulting from the voluntary absence or unavailability of the defendant; however, a defendant shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained, or he resists being returned to the state for trial;
(e) The period of delay caused by any mistrial, not to exceed three months for each mistrial;
(f) The period of any delay caused at the instance of the defendant;
(g) The period of delay not exceeding six months resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney, without the consent of the defendant, if:
(I) The continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material to the state's case, when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that this evidence will be available at the later date; or
(II) The continuance is granted to allow the prosecuting attorney additional time in felony cases to prepare the state's case and additional time is justified because of exceptional circumstances of the case and the court enters specific findings with respect to the justification;
(h) The period of delay between the new date set for trial following the expiration of the time periods excluded by paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (f) of this subsection (6), not to exceed three months;
(i) The period of delay between the filing of a motion pursuant to section 18-1-202 (11) and any decision by the court regarding such motion, and if such decision by the court transfers the case to another county, the period of delay until the first appearance of all the parties in a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the county to which the case has been transferred, and in such event subsection (7) of this section applies; and
(j) Repealed.
(7) If a trial date has been fixed by the court and the case is subsequently transferred to a court in another county, the period within which trial must be had is extended for an additional three months from the date of the first appearance of all of the parties in a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the county to which the case has been transferred.
(8) Repealed.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 398, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-1-505. L. 79: (2) amended, p. 725, § 1, effective October 1. L. 85: (4) and (5) amended and (5.1) and (6)(h) added, pp. 622, 623, §§ 6, 7, effective July 1. L. 87: (3.5) added, p. 606, § 11, effective April 16. L. 88: (3.5) amended, p. 664, § 4, effective July 1. L. 92: (6) amended and (7) added, p. 402, § 13, effective June 3. L. 94: (6)(a) amended, p. 1716, § 4, effective July 1. L. 99: (6)(a) amended, p. 404, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2021: IP(6) and (6)(i) amended and (6)(j) and (8) added, (HB 21-1309), ch. 277, p. 1600, § 1, effective June 21. Editor's note: (1) Subsection (6)(j)(VI) provided for the repeal of subsection (6)(j), effective July 1, 2023. (See L. 2021, p. 1600.)
(2) Subsection (8)(d) provided for the repeal of subsection (8), effective July 1, 2023. (See L. 2021, p. 1600.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
253
cases (
34 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case:
Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20 (Colo. 2017).
Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20 (Colo. 2017).
· cites it 37× “¶2 This ease requires us to examine the interplay between various subsections of Colorado’s speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405, C.R.S. (2016), and specifically, whether the exclusions listed in subsection (6) of the statute apply to the six-month speedy trial calculation for…”
Nagi v. People, 2017 CO 12 (Colo. 2017).
· cites it 38× “The defendant had argued that the district court lacked sufficient grounds to justify ordering a competency evaluation, and that the period during which the defendant was under observation or examination was therefore not properly excluded from the calculation of the time within…”
In re Lucy & Meresa, 2020 CO 68 (Colo. 2020).
· cites it 30× “Standard of Review ¶18 Having determined to exercise our original jurisdiction, we must analyze the merits of the legal issue raised by the prosecution.”
People v. Martin, 732 P.2d 1210 (Colo. 1987).
· cites it 77× “, for failure to bring the defendant to trial within the six month speedy trial period imposed by section 18-1-405, 8B C.R.S. (1986), and Crim.”
in Interest of G.S.S, 2019 COA 4 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 32× “¶ 15 Second, the prosecution argues that when the tolling provisions of section 18-1-405 are applied, the sixty-day speedy trial period was either extended or waived when G.”
People v. Pipkin, 655 P.2d 1360 (Colo. 1982).
· cites it 73× “Because the defendant's rescheduled trial date of September 28, 1981, was within three months of the declaration of a mistrial on July 1, 1981, I would reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand the case to the trial court with directions to commence a trial with all speed…”
People v. Sanchez, 649 P.2d 1049 (Colo. 1982).
· cites it 51× “The People bring this appeal from a ruling of the Denver District Court dismissing the charges against the defendant because his right to a speedy trial under section 18-1-405, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol.”
v. Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106 (Colo. 2019).
· cites it 5× “The second example we pointed to was Colorado’s speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. (2019). Like the federal statute at issue in Zedner, section 18-1-405(1) states that [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, if a defendant is not brought to trial on the…”
Pinelli v. Dist. Ct. in & for 18th Jud. Dist., 595 P.2d 225 (Colo. 1979).
· cites it 9× “The petitioners objected to that action, contending that retrial on that date would violate their rights to a speedy trial under section 18-1-405, C.R.S. 1973, and Crim. P.”
Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1993).
· cites it 14× “Specifically, we addressed whether the government's failure to bring the defendant to trial within the six-month time period required by section 18-1-405 was attributable to the defendant so that the charges against him were not required to be dismissed.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(1) — 91 cases
v. Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106 (Colo. 2019).
“The second example we pointed to was Colorado’s speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. (2019). Like the federal statute at issue in Zedner, section 18-1-405(1) states that [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, if a defendant is not brought to trial on the…”
Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20 (Colo. 2017).
“¶2 This ease requires us to examine the interplay between various subsections of Colorado’s speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405, C.R.S. (2016), and specifically, whether the exclusions listed in subsection (6) of the statute apply to the six-month speedy trial calculation for…”
Nagi v. People, 2017 CO 12 (Colo. 2017).
“The defendant had argued that the district court lacked sufficient grounds to justify ordering a competency evaluation, and that the period during which the defendant was under observation or examination was therefore not properly excluded from the calculation of the time within…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(1)(a) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(2) — 14 cases
Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20 (Colo. 2017).
“¶2 This ease requires us to examine the interplay between various subsections of Colorado’s speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405, C.R.S. (2016), and specifically, whether the exclusions listed in subsection (6) of the statute apply to the six-month speedy trial calculation for…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(3) — 32 cases
Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20 (Colo. 2017).
“¶2 This ease requires us to examine the interplay between various subsections of Colorado’s speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405, C.R.S. (2016), and specifically, whether the exclusions listed in subsection (6) of the statute apply to the six-month speedy trial calculation for…”
People v. Sanchez, 649 P.2d 1049 (Colo. 1982).
“The People bring this appeal from a ruling of the Denver District Court dismissing the charges against the defendant because his right to a speedy trial under section 18-1-405, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol.”
People v. Martin, 732 P.2d 1210 (Colo. 1987).
“, for failure to bring the defendant to trial within the six month speedy trial period imposed by section 18-1-405, 8B C.R.S. (1986), and Crim.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(4) — 9 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(5) — 19 cases
Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1993).
“Specifically, we addressed whether the government's failure to bring the defendant to trial within the six-month time period required by section 18-1-405 was attributable to the defendant so that the charges against him were not required to be dismissed.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(5)(c) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6) — 39 cases
Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20 (Colo. 2017).
“¶2 This ease requires us to examine the interplay between various subsections of Colorado’s speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405, C.R.S. (2016), and specifically, whether the exclusions listed in subsection (6) of the statute apply to the six-month speedy trial calculation for…”
Nagi v. People, 2017 CO 12 (Colo. 2017).
“The defendant had argued that the district court lacked sufficient grounds to justify ordering a competency evaluation, and that the period during which the defendant was under observation or examination was therefore not properly excluded from the calculation of the time within…”
People v. Martin, 732 P.2d 1210 (Colo. 1987).
“, for failure to bring the defendant to trial within the six month speedy trial period imposed by section 18-1-405, 8B C.R.S. (1986), and Crim.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6)(F) — 2 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6)(a) — 10 cases
Nagi v. People, 2017 CO 12 (Colo. 2017).
“The defendant had argued that the district court lacked sufficient grounds to justify ordering a competency evaluation, and that the period during which the defendant was under observation or examination was therefore not properly excluded from the calculation of the time within…”
in Interest of G.S.S, 2019 COA 4 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
“¶ 15 Second, the prosecution argues that when the tolling provisions of section 18-1-405 are applied, the sixty-day speedy trial period was either extended or waived when G.”
People v. Sanchez, 649 P.2d 1049 (Colo. 1982).
“The People bring this appeal from a ruling of the Denver District Court dismissing the charges against the defendant because his right to a speedy trial under section 18-1-405, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6)(b) — 15 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6)(c) — 3 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6)(d) — 8 cases
People v. Sanchez, 649 P.2d 1049 (Colo. 1982).
“The People bring this appeal from a ruling of the Denver District Court dismissing the charges against the defendant because his right to a speedy trial under section 18-1-405, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6)(e) — 19 cases
People v. Pipkin, 655 P.2d 1360 (Colo. 1982).
“Because the defendant's rescheduled trial date of September 28, 1981, was within three months of the declaration of a mistrial on July 1, 1981, I would reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand the case to the trial court with directions to commence a trial with all speed…”
People v. Sanchez, 649 P.2d 1049 (Colo. 1982).
“The People bring this appeal from a ruling of the Denver District Court dismissing the charges against the defendant because his right to a speedy trial under section 18-1-405, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6)(f) — 27 cases
Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20 (Colo. 2017).
“¶2 This ease requires us to examine the interplay between various subsections of Colorado’s speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405, C.R.S. (2016), and specifically, whether the exclusions listed in subsection (6) of the statute apply to the six-month speedy trial calculation for…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6)(g) — 7 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6)(g)(1) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6)(g)(D) — 3 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) — 21 cases
In re Lucy & Meresa, 2020 CO 68 (Colo. 2020).
“Standard of Review ¶18 Having determined to exercise our original jurisdiction, we must analyze the merits of the legal issue raised by the prosecution.”
Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20 (Colo. 2017).
“¶2 This ease requires us to examine the interplay between various subsections of Colorado’s speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405, C.R.S. (2016), and specifically, whether the exclusions listed in subsection (6) of the statute apply to the six-month speedy trial calculation for…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6)(g)(II) — 10 cases
People v. Sanchez, 649 P.2d 1049 (Colo. 1982).
“The People bring this appeal from a ruling of the Denver District Court dismissing the charges against the defendant because his right to a speedy trial under section 18-1-405, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6)(g)(T) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6)(h) — 5 cases
People v. Martin, 732 P.2d 1210 (Colo. 1987).
“, for failure to bring the defendant to trial within the six month speedy trial period imposed by section 18-1-405, 8B C.R.S. (1986), and Crim.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(6)(j) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-405(8) — 3 cases
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.