(1) Definitions set forth in any section of this title apply wherever the same term is used in the same sense in another section of this title unless the definition is specifically limited or the context indicates that it is inapplicable.
(2) The terms defined in section 18-1-104 and in section 18-1-501, as well as the terms defined in subsection (3) of this section, are terms which appear in various articles of this code. Other terms which need definition but which are used only in a limited number of sections of this code are defined in the particular section or article in which the terms appear.
(3) (a) "To aid" or "to assist" includes knowingly to give or lend money or extend credit to be used for, or to make possible or available, or to further the activity thus aided or assisted.
(b) "Benefit" means any gain or advantage to the beneficiary including any gain or advantage to another person pursuant to the desire or consent of the beneficiary.
(c) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical or mental condition.
(d) "Deadly physical force" means force, the intended, natural, and probable consequence of which is to produce death, and which does, in fact, produce death.
(e) "Deadly weapon" means:
(I) A firearm, whether loaded or unloaded; or
(II) A knife, bludgeon, or any other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate, that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. (III) and (IV) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2013.)
(f) "Deface" means to alter the appearance of something by removing, distorting, adding to, or covering all or a part of the thing.
(g) "Dwelling" means a building which is used, intended to be used, or usually used by a person for habitation.
(h) "Firearm" means any handgun, automatic, revolver, pistol, rifle, shotgun, or other instrument or device capable or intended to be capable of discharging bullets, cartridges, or other explosive charges. (h.5) "Gender identity" and "gender expression" mean a person's gender-related identity and gender-related appearance or behavior whether or not that gender-related identity, appearance, or behavior is associated with the person's assigned sex at birth.
(i) "Government" includes the United States, any state, county, municipality, or other political unit, any branch, department, agency, or subdivision of any of the foregoing, and any corporation or other entity established by law to carry out any governmental function.
(j) "Governmental function" includes any activity which a public servant is legally authorized to undertake on behalf of government.
(k) "Motor vehicle" includes any self-propelled device by which persons or property may be moved, carried, or transported from one place to another by land, water, or air, except devices operated on rails, tracks, or cables fixed to the ground or supported by pylons, towers, or other structures.
(l) Repealed.
(m) "Pecuniary benefit" means benefit in the form of money, property, commercial interests, or anything else, the primary significance of which is economic gain.
(n) "Public place" means a place to which the public or a substantial number of the public has access, and includes but is not limited to highways, transportation facilities, schools, places of amusement, parks, playgrounds, and the common areas of public and private buildings and facilities.
(o) "Public servant" means any officer or employee of government, whether elected or appointed, and any person participating as an advisor, consultant, process server, or otherwise in performing a governmental function, but the term does not include witnesses. (o.5) "Restorative justice practices" means practices that emphasize repairing the harm caused to victims and the community by offenses. Restorative justice practices include victim- offender conferences, family group conferences, circles, community conferences, and other similar victim-centered practices. Restorative justice practices are facilitated meetings attended voluntarily by the victim or victim's representatives, the victim's supporters, the offender, and the offender's supporters and may include community members. By engaging the parties to the offense in voluntary dialogue, restorative justice practices provide an opportunity for the offender to accept responsibility for the harm caused to the victim and community, promote victim healing, and enable the participants to agree on consequences to repair the harm, to the extent possible, including but not limited to apologies, community service, reparation, restoration, and counseling. Restorative justice practices may be used in addition to any other conditions, consequences, or sentence imposed by the court.
(p) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that, either at the time of the actual injury or at a later time, involves a substantial risk of death; a substantial risk of serious permanent disfigurement; a substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body; or breaks, fractures, a penetrating knife or penetrating gunshot wound, or burns of the second or third degree.
(q) "Tamper" means to interfere with something improperly, to meddle with it, or to make unwarranted alterations in its condition.
(r) "Thing of value" includes real property, tangible and intangible personal property, contract rights, choses in action, services, confidential information, medical records information, and any rights of use or enjoyment connected therewith. (r.5) "Transgender identity" means identity based on an individual's gender identity or expression being different from that typically associated with their sex at birth.
(s) "Utility" means an enterprise which provides gas, sewer, electric, steam, water, transportation, or communication services, and includes any carrier, pipeline, transmitter, or source, whether publicly or privately owned or operated.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 413, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-1-1001. L. 73: p. 534, § 1. L. 75:
(3)(l) amended, p. 1315, § 8, effective July 14. L. 77: (3)(l) amended, p. 949, § 11, effective August 1. L. 79: (3)(l) amended, p. 1212, § 1, effective June 21; (3)(r) amended, p. 726, § 2, effective July 1; (3)(e) amended, p. 731, § 1, effective October 1. L. 80: (3)(l) amended, p. 531, § 1, effective January 29. L. 81: (3)(e) and (3)(l) amended, p. 972, §§ 2, 3, effective July 1. L. 82: (3)(l) amended, p. 384, § 2, effective April 30. L. 84: (3)(l) amended, p. 921, § 8, effective January 1, 1985. L. 85: (3)(p) amended, p. 664, § 1, effective March 1. L. 86: (3)(l) R&RE, p. 773, § 1, effective July 1; (3)(l)(III) amended, p. 1236, § 45, effective July 1. L. 87: (3)(l)(III) amended, p. 1489, § 1, effective April 30; (3)(l)(IV) amended, p. 817, § 20, effective October 1. L. 88: (3)(l)(II) and (3)(l)(IV) amended and (3)(l)(IV.5) added, pp. 664, 720, §§ 5, 1, effective July 1. L. 89: (3)(l)(II) and (3)(l)(III) amended, p. 888, § 1, effective April 6; (3)(l)(II) amended, p. 890, § 1, effective April 8. L. 90: (3)(l)(IV) and (3)(l)(IV.5)(C) amended, pp. 1613, 565, §§ 8, 38, effective July 1. L. 91: (3)(l)(III) amended, p. 1582, § 7, effective June 4; (3)(p) amended, p. 405, § 8, effective June 6. L. 92: (3)(l)(I), (3)(l)(II), and IP(3)(l)(IV.5) amended, p. 1097, § 6, effective March 6; (3)(l)(II) and (3)(l)(III) amended, p. 431, § 1, effective April 23. L. 93: (3)(l)(IV.5)(A) and (3)(l)(IV.5)(B) amended, p. 56, § 1, effective March 22; (3)(l)(II)(B) amended, p. 1776, § 38, effective June 6; (3)(l)(IV) amended, p. 1236, § 5, effective July 1. L. 94: (3)(l)(III) amended, p. 1731, § 11, effective May 31; (3)(l)(II)(A) amended, p. 1716, § 6, effective July 1; (3)(l)(IV) amended, p. 1311, § 11, effective July 1. L. 95: (3)(l)(II)(A) and
(3)(l)(III) amended, p. 870, § 1, effective May 24; (3)(l)(III) amended, p. 109, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (3)(l)(III) and (3)(l)(IV) amended, p. 1004, § 10, effective May 23; (3)(l)(IV.5) and
(3)(l)(V) amended and (3)(l)(IV.7) added, p. 1574, § 6, effective June 3; (3)(l)(IV) amended, p. 1691, § 24, effective January 1, 1997. L. 97: (3)(l)(III) amended, p. 301, § 12, effective July 1. L. 98: (3)(l)(III) amended, p. 1186, § 3, effective July 1. L. 99: (3)(l)(II)(A) and (3)(l)(III) amended, p. 424, § 4, effective April 30. L. 2000: (3)(l)(II)(A) amended, p. 42, § 1, effective March 10; (3)(l)(II)(A) amended, p. 230, § 4, effective March 29. L. 2002: (3)(l)(I) and
(3)(l)(III) amended, p. 839, § 1, effective May 30; (3)(l)(II)(A) amended, p. 1212, § 8, effective June 3; (3)(l)(III) amended, p. 71, § 4, effective August 7; (3)(l)(III) amended, p. 1511, § 181, effective October 1. L. 2003: (3)(l) repealed, p. 1605, § 1, effective August 6. L. 2011: (3)(o.5) added, (HB 11-1032), ch. 296, p. 1402, § 6, effective August 10. L. 2013: (3)(e) amended, (HB 13-1043), ch. 39, p. 110, § 1, effective March 15; (3)(o.5) amended, (HB 13-1254), ch. 341, p. 1981, § 1, effective August 7. L. 2020: (3)(h.5) added, (SB 20-221), ch. 279, p. 1368, § 5, effective July 13. L. 2023: (3)(p) amended, (SB 23-034), ch. 316, p. 1916, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2024: (3)(r.5) added, (SB 24-189), ch. 305, p. 2068, § 3, effective July 1.
Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (3)(l)(II) in House Bill 89-1236 and Senate Bill 89-66 were harmonized. Amendments to subsection (3)(l)(II) in House Bill 92-1192 and House Bill 92-1276 were harmonized. Amendments to subsection (3)(l)(III) in House Bill 95-1087 and House Bill 95-1280 were harmonized. Amendments to subsection (3)(l)(IV) in Senate Bill 96-176 and House Bill 96-1005 were harmonized, effective January 1, 1997. Amendments to subsection (3)(l)(II)(A) in Senate Bill 00-077 and House Bill 00-1421 were harmonized. Amendments to subsection (3)(l)(III) by House Bill 02-1313, House Bill 02-1046, and Senate Bill 02-005 were harmonized.
(2) Section 4 of chapter 305 (SB 24-189), Session Laws of Colorado 2024, provides that the act changing this section applies to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2024.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1992 act amending subsections (3)(l)(I), (3)(l)(II), and IP(3)(l)(IV.5), see section 12 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1992. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (3)(l)(III), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration in SB 20-221, see section 1 of chapter 279, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
PART 10 ORDERS AND PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DEFENDANT Law reviews: For article, "1994 Legislature Strengthens Domestic Violence Protective Orders", see 23 Colo. Law. 2327 (1994); for article, "Dissolution of Marriage and Domestic Violence: Considerations for the Family Law Practitioner", see 37 Colo. Law. 43 (Oct. 2008).
Notes of Decisions
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado v. Joshua Alan STRICKLER, 507 P.3d 1018 (Colo. Ct. App. 2022).
· cites it 12× “3d 1228 , which analyzed an earlier but similar version of section 18-1-901(3)(e), Strickler contends that our supreme court has declared that "only a discrete list of ‘objects’ can be deadly weapons.”
City of Florence v. Pepper, 145 P.3d 654 (Colo. 2006).
· cites it 56× “In contrast, the Colorado criminal justice statutes which define volunteer reserve po *658 lice officers, section 18-1-901(IV.5), clearly state that volunteer reserve police officers are entitled to workers' compensation coverage.”
Montez v. People, 269 P.3d 1228 (Colo. 2012).
· cites it 17× “" § 18-1-901@8)(e)(I). The proseeution argues that this statute classifies a firearm as per se a deadly weapon.”
People v. Ross, 831 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1992).
· cites it 55× “1991), wherein the court of appeals determined that fists are not deadly weapons within section 18-1-901(3)(e), 8B C.R.S. (1986).”
People v. Daniels, 240 P.3d 409 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 42× “Defendant asserts that neither of these injuries amounted to "serious bodily injury," as defined by section 18-1-901(3)(p), C.R.S.2009, because the prosecution failed to show that (1) the victim's broken rib was of the second or third degree or (2) the lacerated spleen involved…”
Lucero v. People, 272 P.3d 1063 (Colo. 2012).
· cites it 10× “Section 18-1-901(@8)(e) does not classify a firearm as a deadly weapon per se.”
People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002).
· cites it 6× “Section 18-1-901(8)(e), 6 CRS. (2001), provides the statutory definition of deadly weapon: "Deadly weapon" means any of the following which in the manner it is used or intended to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury: (D) A firearm, whether loaded or…”
People v. Opana, 2017 CO 56 (Colo. 2017).
· cites it 15× “” § 18-1-901(3)(d), C.R.S. (2016). In summarily concluding that “[w]here there is a factual dispute about whether a defendant intended to cause death by his or her use of force, and in fact caused death, both ordinary physical force and deadly physical force instructions must be…”
People v. Degreat, 2018 CO 83 (Colo. 2018).
· cites it 13× “§ 18-1-901(1). While it may be reasonable to presume that the phrase “anything of 5 value” contained in the definition of robbery refers to things of value as generally defined, it is equally clear that many, if not most, of the things included in the general definition could…”
People v. O'NEAL, 228 P.3d 211 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 31× “Because there was ample evidence that the item was a pistol, we necessarily reject defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that he possessed a "firearm.”
People v. Esparza-Treto, 282 P.3d 471 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 8× “Section 18-1-901@)(e), C.R.S.2010, provides: "Deadly weapon" means any of the following which in the manner it is used or intended to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury: (I) A firearm, whether loaded or unloaded; (II) A knife; (III) A bludgeon; or…”
People v. Saleh, 45 P.3d 1272 (Colo. 2002).
· cites it 16× “2000), to determine whether Saleh's foot qualified as a deadly weapon under section 18-1-901@8)(e), 6 CRS. (2001). 1 Because his foot did not actually and directly cause the serious bodily injury, the court of appeals held that Saleh could not be convicted of second degree…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(1) — 14 cases
People v. Degreat, 2018 CO 83 (Colo. 2018).
“§ 18-1-901(1). While it may be reasonable to presume that the phrase “anything of 5 value” contained in the definition of robbery refers to things of value as generally defined, it is equally clear that many, if not most, of the things included in the general definition could…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(1)(IV) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(1)(r) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(2)(e)(I) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3) — 10 cases
City of Florence v. Pepper, 145 P.3d 654 (Colo. 2006).
“In contrast, the Colorado criminal justice statutes which define volunteer reserve po *658 lice officers, section 18-1-901(IV.5), clearly state that volunteer reserve police officers are entitled to workers' compensation coverage.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(1) — 7 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(I) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(Z) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(Z)(I) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(a) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(b) — 2 cases
People v. O'NEAL, 228 P.3d 211 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
“Because there was ample evidence that the item was a pistol, we necessarily reject defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that he possessed a "firearm.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(c) — 16 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(d) — 13 cases
People v. Opana, 2017 CO 56 (Colo. 2017).
“” § 18-1-901(3)(d), C.R.S. (2016). In summarily concluding that “[w]here there is a factual dispute about whether a defendant intended to cause death by his or her use of force, and in fact caused death, both ordinary physical force and deadly physical force instructions must be…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(e) — 20 cases
People v. Ross, 831 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1992).
“1991), wherein the court of appeals determined that fists are not deadly weapons within section 18-1-901(3)(e), 8B C.R.S. (1986).”
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado v. Joshua Alan STRICKLER, 507 P.3d 1018 (Colo. Ct. App. 2022).
“3d 1228 , which analyzed an earlier but similar version of section 18-1-901(3)(e), Strickler contends that our supreme court has declared that "only a discrete list of ‘objects’ can be deadly weapons.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(e)(I) — 7 cases
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado v. Joshua Alan STRICKLER, 507 P.3d 1018 (Colo. Ct. App. 2022).
“3d 1228 , which analyzed an earlier but similar version of section 18-1-901(3)(e), Strickler contends that our supreme court has declared that "only a discrete list of ‘objects’ can be deadly weapons.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(e)(II) — 9 cases
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado v. Joshua Alan STRICKLER, 507 P.3d 1018 (Colo. Ct. App. 2022).
“3d 1228 , which analyzed an earlier but similar version of section 18-1-901(3)(e), Strickler contends that our supreme court has declared that "only a discrete list of ‘objects’ can be deadly weapons.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(e)(IV) — 5 cases
People v. Ross, 831 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1992).
“1991), wherein the court of appeals determined that fists are not deadly weapons within section 18-1-901(3)(e), 8B C.R.S. (1986).”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(g) — 8 cases
v. Rau, 2020 COA 92 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(h) — 8 cases
v. Wright, 2021 COA 106 (Colo. Ct. App. 2021).
People v. O'NEAL, 228 P.3d 211 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
“Because there was ample evidence that the item was a pistol, we necessarily reject defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that he possessed a "firearm.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(i) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(j) — 3 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(k) — 6 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(l)(I) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(n) — 5 cases
v. Lopez, 2020 COA 119 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(o) — 4 cases
v. Knox, 2019 COA 152 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(p) — 32 cases
People v. Daniels, 240 P.3d 409 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
“Defendant asserts that neither of these injuries amounted to "serious bodily injury," as defined by section 18-1-901(3)(p), C.R.S.2009, because the prosecution failed to show that (1) the victim's broken rib was of the second or third degree or (2) the lacerated spleen involved…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(r) — 6 cases
People v. Degreat, 2018 CO 83 (Colo. 2018).
“§ 18-1-901(1). While it may be reasonable to presume that the phrase “anything of 5 value” contained in the definition of robbery refers to things of value as generally defined, it is equally clear that many, if not most, of the things included in the general definition could…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(x) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(8) — 3 cases
City of Florence v. Pepper, 145 P.3d 654 (Colo. 2006).
“In contrast, the Colorado criminal justice statutes which define volunteer reserve po *658 lice officers, section 18-1-901(IV.5), clearly state that volunteer reserve police officers are entitled to workers' compensation coverage.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(8)(0) — 2 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(8)(F) — 2 cases
City of Florence v. Pepper, 145 P.3d 654 (Colo. 2006).
“In contrast, the Colorado criminal justice statutes which define volunteer reserve po *658 lice officers, section 18-1-901(IV.5), clearly state that volunteer reserve police officers are entitled to workers' compensation coverage.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(8)(a) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(8)(b) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(8)(c) — 1 case
Montez v. People, 269 P.3d 1228 (Colo. 2012).
“" § 18-1-901@8)(e)(I). The proseeution argues that this statute classifies a firearm as per se a deadly weapon.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(8)(d) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(8)(e) — 11 cases
Montez v. People, 269 P.3d 1228 (Colo. 2012).
“" § 18-1-901@8)(e)(I). The proseeution argues that this statute classifies a firearm as per se a deadly weapon.”
Lucero v. People, 272 P.3d 1063 (Colo. 2012).
“Section 18-1-901(@8)(e) does not classify a firearm as a deadly weapon per se.”
People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002).
“Section 18-1-901(8)(e), 6 CRS. (2001), provides the statutory definition of deadly weapon: "Deadly weapon" means any of the following which in the manner it is used or intended to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury: (D) A firearm, whether loaded or…”
People v. Saleh, 45 P.3d 1272 (Colo. 2002).
“2000), to determine whether Saleh's foot qualified as a deadly weapon under section 18-1-901@8)(e), 6 CRS. (2001). 1 Because his foot did not actually and directly cause the serious bodily injury, the court of appeals held that Saleh could not be convicted of second degree…”
People v. Esparza-Treto, 282 P.3d 471 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
“Section 18-1-901@)(e), C.R.S.2010, provides: "Deadly weapon" means any of the following which in the manner it is used or intended to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury: (I) A firearm, whether loaded or unloaded; (II) A knife; (III) A bludgeon; or…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(8)(e)(I) — 2 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(8)(e)(IV) — 2 cases
People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002).
“Section 18-1-901(8)(e), 6 CRS. (2001), provides the statutory definition of deadly weapon: "Deadly weapon" means any of the following which in the manner it is used or intended to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury: (D) A firearm, whether loaded or…”
People v. Esparza-Treto, 282 P.3d 471 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
“Section 18-1-901@)(e), C.R.S.2010, provides: "Deadly weapon" means any of the following which in the manner it is used or intended to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury: (I) A firearm, whether loaded or unloaded; (II) A knife; (III) A bludgeon; or…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(8)(h) — 4 cases
People v. O'NEAL, 228 P.3d 211 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
“Because there was ample evidence that the item was a pistol, we necessarily reject defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that he possessed a "firearm.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(8)(k) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(8)(n) — 3 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(8)(p) — 7 cases
People v. Daniels, 240 P.3d 409 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
“Defendant asserts that neither of these injuries amounted to "serious bodily injury," as defined by section 18-1-901(3)(p), C.R.S.2009, because the prosecution failed to show that (1) the victim's broken rib was of the second or third degree or (2) the lacerated spleen involved…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(8)(r) — 4 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(B8)(e) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(S)(g) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(c) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(e)(II) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.