The general assembly hereby finds that organized
crime in the state of Colorado, as well as nationwide, is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and
widespread activity that annually consumes millions of dollars locally and billions of dollars
nationally from this state's and the nation's economy through unlawful conduct and the illegal
use of force, fraud, and corruption. Organized crime derives a major portion of its power through
money procured from such illegal endeavors as syndicated and organized gambling, loan-
sharking, the theft of property and fencing of stolen property, the illegal importation,
manufacture, and distribution of drugs and other controlled substances, and other forms of social
exploitation. This money and power are increasingly being used to infiltrate and corrupt
legitimate business and labor organizations and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes.
Organized crime activities within this state weaken the stability of this state's and the nation's
economy, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, impede free competition,
threaten the peace and health of the public, endanger the domestic security, and undermine the
general welfare of the state and its citizens. The general assembly further finds that organized
crime continues to grow and flourish because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the
law which inhibits the development and use of the legally admissible evidence necessary to
bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies presently available to the
state are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact. Therefore, the general assembly declares that
it is the purpose of this article to seek the eradication of organized crime in this state by
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal
prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime.
Source: L. 81: Entire article added, p. 1015, § 1, effective July 1; entire section
amended, p. 2032, § 47, effective July 14.
Notes of Decisions
Hamon Contractors, Inc. v. Carter & Burgess, Inc., 229 P.3d 282 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 8× “Kitz-man's recovery of attorney fees and costs pertaining to post-contractual claims to the grounds set forth in section 18-17-102 because the court had granted summary judgment on those claims.”
In re the Marriage of Nelson, 292 P.3d 1214 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 3× “¶ 52 Husband filed a written objection and response to wife's request for attorney fees, adding his own request for attorney fees under section 18-17-102, C.R.S.2012, and C.R.C.”
Mitchell v. Ryder, 104 P.3d 316 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 12× “However, because we uphold the fee award under the third criterion of § 18-17-102, C.R.S8.2004, that the action was "substantially vexatious," we need not determine whether the record supports this aspect of the remand court's conclusions.”
Justi v. Rho Condo. Ass'n, 277 P.3d 847 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 3× “38(d) and section 18-17-102, C.R.S.2010. Specifically, RHO contends that Justi's appeal was frivolous as filed, due to what RHO claims was a complete absence of case law that would have allowed him to reopen his case-in-chief.”
Carruthers v. Carrier Access Corp., 251 P.3d 1199 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 3× “Again, a claim for an amount of $7,500 or less is subject to an award of fees under section 18-17-102 if it is substantially frivolous.”
Giguere v. SJS Fam. Enter., Ltd., 155 P.3d 462 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 3× “Finally, defendant contends it should be awarded attorney fees on appeal, limited to the Ratification Agreement issue, based on § 18-17-102(4), C.R.S.2005. We disagree. Under § 18-17-102(4), a court shall award attorney fees if an attorney or a party brings or defends an action…”
Front Range Home Enhancements v. Stowell, 172 P.3d 973 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 10× “Plaintiff also appeals from a subsequent order imposing sanctions against it pursuant to section 18-17-102, C.R.S$.2007. We affirm.”
In Re Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 2× “, § 18-17-102(6), C.R.S8.2007 ("No party who is appearing without an attorney shall be assessed attorney fees unless the court finds that the party clearly knew or reasonably should have known that his action or defense .”
Crow v. Penrose-St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 262 P.3d 991 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 3× “- Section 18-17-102(2), C.R.S.2010, which was adopted before the enactment of section 13-17-201, requires an award of attorney fees against a party who brings, or asserts a defense against an action, that "lacks substantial justification.”
In Re the Parental Responsibilities of Reese, 227 P.3d 900 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 2× “Petitioners' Request for Appellate Attorney Fees The petitioners request attorney fees pursuant to section 18-17-102, C.R.9.2009, alleging that mother's appeal is frivolous, groundless, and vexatious.”
Martin v. Essrig, 277 P.3d 857 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 2× “Section 18-17-102(2), provides that a court may award attorney fees where a party brought an action that "lacks substantial justification.”
J.D. Padilla & JDP, LLC v. Ghuman, 183 P.3d 653 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 10× “- Defendants also sought attorney fees incurred throughout this action, pursuant to section 18-17-102, C.R.8.2007. After trial to the court, the court denied plaintiffs' claim for deficiency on the merits and further dismissed Padilla's claims because "he was no longer a holder…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-17-102(1) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-17-102(2) — 15 cases
Crow v. Penrose-St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 262 P.3d 991 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
“- Section 18-17-102(2), C.R.S.2010, which was adopted before the enactment of section 13-17-201, requires an award of attorney fees against a party who brings, or asserts a defense against an action, that "lacks substantial justification.”
Martin v. Essrig, 277 P.3d 857 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
“Section 18-17-102(2), provides that a court may award attorney fees where a party brought an action that "lacks substantial justification.”
Mitchell v. Ryder, 104 P.3d 316 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
“However, because we uphold the fee award under the third criterion of § 18-17-102, C.R.S8.2004, that the action was "substantially vexatious," we need not determine whether the record supports this aspect of the remand court's conclusions.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-17-102(4) — 24 cases
Giguere v. SJS Fam. Enter., Ltd., 155 P.3d 462 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
“Finally, defendant contends it should be awarded attorney fees on appeal, limited to the Ratification Agreement issue, based on § 18-17-102(4), C.R.S.2005. We disagree. Under § 18-17-102(4), a court shall award attorney fees if an attorney or a party brings or defends an action…”
J.D. Padilla & JDP, LLC v. Ghuman, 183 P.3d 653 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
“- Defendants also sought attorney fees incurred throughout this action, pursuant to section 18-17-102, C.R.8.2007. After trial to the court, the court denied plaintiffs' claim for deficiency on the merits and further dismissed Padilla's claims because "he was no longer a holder…”
Hamon Contractors, Inc. v. Carter & Burgess, Inc., 229 P.3d 282 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
“Kitz-man's recovery of attorney fees and costs pertaining to post-contractual claims to the grounds set forth in section 18-17-102 because the court had granted summary judgment on those claims.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-17-102(5) — 3 cases
Mitchell v. Ryder, 104 P.3d 316 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
“However, because we uphold the fee award under the third criterion of § 18-17-102, C.R.S8.2004, that the action was "substantially vexatious," we need not determine whether the record supports this aspect of the remand court's conclusions.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-17-102(6) — 1 case
In Re Marriage of Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
“, § 18-17-102(6), C.R.S8.2007 ("No party who is appearing without an attorney shall be assessed attorney fees unless the court finds that the party clearly knew or reasonably should have known that his action or defense .”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-17-102(7) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-17-102(d4) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.