Colo. Rev. Stat. » Title 18
Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-21-102 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of July 2026
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As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Convicted" and "conviction" means a plea of guilty, including a plea of guilty entered pursuant to a deferred sentence under section 18-1.3-102 or a verdict of guilty by a judge or jury, and includes a plea of no contest accepted by the court.

(2) "Sex offense" has the same meaning as defined in section 16-11.7-102 (3), C.R.S.

Source: L. 92: Entire article added, p. 462, § 10, effective June 2. L. 2002: (1) amended, p. 1522, § 219, effective October 1.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (1), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

18-21-103. Source of revenues - allocation of money - sex offender surcharge fund - sexual exploitation of children surcharge fund - creation. (1) On and after July 1, 1992, each person who is convicted of a sex offense, or receives for such offense a deferred sentence pursuant to section 18-1.3-102, shall be required to pay a surcharge to the clerk of the court in which the conviction occurs or in which the deferred sentence is entered. Such surcharge shall be in the following amounts:

(a) For each class 2 felony of which a person is convicted, three thousand dollars;

(b) For each class 3 felony of which a person is convicted, two thousand dollars;

(c) For each class 4 felony of which a person is convicted, one thousand dollars;

(d) For each class 5 felony of which a person is convicted, seven hundred fifty dollars;

(e) For each class 6 felony of which a person is convicted, five hundred dollars;

(f) For each class 1 misdemeanor of which a person is convicted, four hundred dollars;

(g) For each class 2 misdemeanor of which a person is convicted, three hundred dollars;

(h) For each class 3 misdemeanor of which a person is convicted, one hundred fifty dollars.

(1.5) Repealed.

(2) The clerk of the court shall allocate the surcharge required by subsection (1) of this section as follows:

(a) Five percent shall be retained by the clerk for administrative costs incurred pursuant to this subsection (2). Such amount retained shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the general fund, and such amount shall be subject to appropriation by the general assembly for the costs of such administration.

(b) Ninety-five percent shall be transferred to the state treasurer who shall credit the same to the sex offender surcharge fund created pursuant to subsection (3) of this section.

(3) There is hereby created in the state treasury a sex offender surcharge fund which shall consist of moneys received by the state treasurer pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section. The state treasurer may invest any moneys in the fund not expended for the purpose of this section as provided by law. The state treasurer shall credit all interest and income derived from the investment and deposit of moneys in the fund to the fund. Any moneys not appropriated by the general assembly shall remain in the sex offender surcharge fund and shall not be transferred or revert to the general fund of the state at the end of any fiscal year. All moneys in the fund shall be subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly to the judicial department, the department of corrections, the division of criminal justice of the department of public safety, and the department of human services, after consideration of the plan developed pursuant to section 16-11.7-103 (4)(c), C.R.S., to cover the direct and indirect costs associated with the evaluation, identification, and treatment and the continued monitoring of sex offenders.

(3.3) (a) On and after January 1, 2022, each person who is convicted of or receives a deferred sentence pursuant to section 18-1.3-102 for sexual exploitation of a child, as described in section 18-6-403, is required to pay a sexual exploitation of children surcharge in addition to the sex offender surcharge required pursuant to subsection (1) of this section to the clerk of the court where the conviction occurs or the deferred sentence is entered. The amount of the additional surcharge is, based on the highest penalty level among the crimes of conviction or deferred sentence in the case:

(I) For a class 3 felony of which a person is convicted, two thousand dollars;

(II) For a class 4 felony of which a person is convicted, one thousand dollars;

(III) For a class 5 felony of which a person is convicted, five hundred dollars; and

(IV) For a class 6 felony of which a person is convicted, two hundred and fifty dollars.

(b) A juvenile who is convicted or receives a deferred sentence pursuant to section 18- 1.3-102 for sexual exploitation of a child, as described in section 18-6-403, is not required to pay an additional surcharge pursuant to subsection (3.3)(a) of this section.

(3.5) The clerk of the court shall allocate the surcharge required by subsection (3.3) of this section as follows:

(a) The clerk of the court shall retain five percent for administrative costs incurred pursuant to this subsection (3.5). The clerk of the court shall transmit the amount retained pursuant to this subsection (3.5)(a) to the state treasurer, who shall credit the amount to the general fund. The amount is subject to appropriation by the general assembly for the costs of such administration.

(b) The clerk of the court shall transmit ninety-five percent to the state treasurer, who shall credit the amount to the sexual exploitation of children surcharge fund created in subsection (3.7) of this section.

(3.7) (a) There is hereby created in the state treasury the sexual exploitation of children surcharge fund, referred to in this subsection (3.7) as the "fund", that consists of money received by the state treasurer pursuant to subsection (3.5) of this section. The money in the fund is continuously appropriated to the Colorado bureau of investigation in the department of public safety to enhance the effective investigation and prosecution of computer-facilitated sexual exploitation of children pursuant to section 24-33.5-430.

(b) The state treasurer may invest any money in the fund not expended for the purpose of this section as provided by law. The state treasurer shall credit all interest and income derived from the investment of money in the fund to the fund. Any money not appropriated by the general assembly and all unexpended and unencumbered money at the end of the fiscal year remains in the fund and must not be transferred or revert to the general fund at the end of any fiscal year.

(4) The court may waive all or any portion of a surcharge required by this section if the court finds that a person is indigent or financially unable to pay all or any portion of such surcharge. The court shall waive only that portion of a surcharge if the court has found that the person is financially unable to pay.

Source: L. 92: Entire article added, p. 462, § 10, effective June 2. L. 94: (3) amended, p. 2657, § 141, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1.5) added, p. 923, § 13, effective July 1. L. 2002: IP(1) amended, p. 1522, § 220, effective October 1. L. 2012: (3) amended, (HB 12-1310), ch. 268, p. 1398, § 17, effective June 7. L. 2021: (1.5) repealed, (HB 21-1315), ch. 461, p. 3109, § 8, effective July 6; (3.3), (3.5), and (3.7) added and (4) amended, (HB 21-1069), ch. 446, p. 2943, § 5, effective September 7.

Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending the introductory portion to subsection (1), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1069 stating the purpose of, and the provision directing legislative staff agencies to conduct, a post-enactment review pursuant to § 2-2-1201 scheduled in 2024, see sections 1 and 7 of chapter 446, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. To obtain a copy of the review, once completed, go to "Legislative Resources and Requirements" on the Colorado General Assembly's website.

ARTICLE 22 Juvenile Offender Surcharge

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 29 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1990–2024 · leading case: Qwest Servs. Corp. v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071 (Colo. 2011).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Qwest Servs. Corp. v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071 (Colo. 2011). · cites it 40× “14 Based on our own de novo review of the record, we disagree with Qwest's arguments.”
Blood v. Qwest Servs. Corp., 224 P.3d 301 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 25× “Constitutionality of Section 18-21-102 . . ll rere klk lls 310 1.”
Sky Fun 1 v. Schuttloffel, 27 P.3d 361 (Colo. 2001). · cites it 15× “The court of appeals allowed the trial court's award of exemplary damages in exeess of actual damages, despite the limitation on such damages contained in section 18-21-102(1)(a), because the exemplary damages awarded were "reasonable.”
Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 3× “" Section 18-21-102(1)(a), C.R.S.2006; Tri-Aspen Constr.”
Gen. Steel Dom. Sales, LLC v. Bacheller, 291 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2012). · cites it 11× “Because these principles do not comport with section 18-21-102, I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to affirm the district court's trebling of punitive damages.”
Tait Ex Rel. Tait v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 49 P.3d 337 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 6× “" Section 18-21-102@B)(a), C.R.S8.2000, permits a trial court to increase any exemplary damages award to a sum that does not exceed three times the actual damages if, as relevant here, during the pendency of the action a party engages in willful and wanton conduct and such…”
Palmer v. Diaz, 214 P.3d 546 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 6× “Thus, pursuant to section 18-21-102, each defendant was entitled to an award of exemplary damages not to exceed $300,000.”
Ajay Sports, Inc. v. Casazza, 1 P.3d 267 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 3× “Although exemplary damages are governed by statute, see § 18-21-102, there is no Colorado statutory or case law to guide us on the apportionment issue.”
Eurpac Serv. Inc. v. Repub. Acceptance Corp., 37 P.3d 447 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 6× “The governing statute, § 18-21-102, C.R.S.1999, allows recovery of exemplary damages if damages are assessed for the claimed wrong and the injury is attended by cireumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.”
People v. Shifrin, 342 P.3d 506 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014). “See § 18-21-102, C.R.8.2018. But the CCPA refers to "civil penalties," not punitive damages.”
J.D. Padilla & JDP, LLC v. Ghuman, 183 P.3d 653 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 5× “The trial court concluded that Padilla's conduct was "beyond a reasonable doubt both willful and wanton.”
Vickery v. Vickery, 271 P.3d 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 26× “We are not able to rationalize such a result, which would essentially make the supreme court's interpretation of section 18-21-102(1) in Seaward Construction meaningless.”
Show all 29 citing cases →
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-21-102(1) — 2 cases
Qwest Servs. Corp. v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071 (Colo. 2011). “14 Based on our own de novo review of the record, we disagree with Qwest's arguments.”
Vickery v. Vickery, 271 P.3d 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010). “We are not able to rationalize such a result, which would essentially make the supreme court's interpretation of section 18-21-102(1) in Seaward Construction meaningless.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-21-102(1)(a) — 12 cases
Qwest Servs. Corp. v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071 (Colo. 2011). “14 Based on our own de novo review of the record, we disagree with Qwest's arguments.”
Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). “" Section 18-21-102(1)(a), C.R.S.2006; Tri-Aspen Constr.”
Sky Fun 1 v. Schuttloffel, 27 P.3d 361 (Colo. 2001). “The court of appeals allowed the trial court's award of exemplary damages in exeess of actual damages, despite the limitation on such damages contained in section 18-21-102(1)(a), because the exemplary damages awarded were "reasonable.”
Blood v. Qwest Servs. Corp., 224 P.3d 301 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “Constitutionality of Section 18-21-102 . . ll rere klk lls 310 1.”
Tait Ex Rel. Tait v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 49 P.3d 337 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). “" Section 18-21-102@B)(a), C.R.S8.2000, permits a trial court to increase any exemplary damages award to a sum that does not exceed three times the actual damages if, as relevant here, during the pendency of the action a party engages in willful and wanton conduct and such…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-21-102(1)(b) — 8 cases
Qwest Servs. Corp. v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071 (Colo. 2011). “14 Based on our own de novo review of the record, we disagree with Qwest's arguments.”
Blood v. Qwest Servs. Corp., 224 P.3d 301 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “Constitutionality of Section 18-21-102 . . ll rere klk lls 310 1.”
Ajay Sports, Inc. v. Casazza, 1 P.3d 267 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). “Although exemplary damages are governed by statute, see § 18-21-102, there is no Colorado statutory or case law to guide us on the apportionment issue.”
Martinez v. Est. of Bleck Ex Rel. Churchill, 2016 CO 58 (Colo. 2016).
Archer v. Farmer Bros. Co., 70 P.3d 495 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-21-102(1)(g) — 1 case
Vickery v. Vickery, 271 P.3d 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010). “We are not able to rationalize such a result, which would essentially make the supreme court's interpretation of section 18-21-102(1) in Seaward Construction meaningless.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-21-102(2) — 3 cases
Sky Fun 1 v. Schuttloffel, 27 P.3d 361 (Colo. 2001). “The court of appeals allowed the trial court's award of exemplary damages in exeess of actual damages, despite the limitation on such damages contained in section 18-21-102(1)(a), because the exemplary damages awarded were "reasonable.”
People v. Meidinger, 987 P.2d 937 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
Peo v. Denny (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-21-102(6) — 1 case
Razi v. Schmitt, 36 P.3d 102 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-21-102(8) — 4 cases
Qwest Servs. Corp. v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071 (Colo. 2011). “14 Based on our own de novo review of the record, we disagree with Qwest's arguments.”
Gen. Steel Dom. Sales, LLC v. Bacheller, 291 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2012). “Because these principles do not comport with section 18-21-102, I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to affirm the district court's trebling of punitive damages.”
Eurpac Serv. Inc. v. Repub. Acceptance Corp., 37 P.3d 447 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). “The governing statute, § 18-21-102, C.R.S.1999, allows recovery of exemplary damages if damages are assessed for the claimed wrong and the injury is attended by cireumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.”
Sky Fun 1, Inc. v. Schuttloffel, 8 P.3d 570 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-21-102(8)(a) — 3 cases
Blood v. Qwest Servs. Corp., 224 P.3d 301 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “Constitutionality of Section 18-21-102 . . ll rere klk lls 310 1.”
Sky Fun 1 v. Schuttloffel, 27 P.3d 361 (Colo. 2001). “The court of appeals allowed the trial court's award of exemplary damages in exeess of actual damages, despite the limitation on such damages contained in section 18-21-102(1)(a), because the exemplary damages awarded were "reasonable.”
Vickery v. Vickery, 271 P.3d 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010). “We are not able to rationalize such a result, which would essentially make the supreme court's interpretation of section 18-21-102(1) in Seaward Construction meaningless.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-21-102(F)(b) — 1 case
Core-Mark Midcontinent, Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp., 300 P.3d 963 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-21-102(b) — 1 case
Gen. Steel Dom. Sales, LLC v. Bacheller, 291 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2012). “Because these principles do not comport with section 18-21-102, I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to affirm the district court's trebling of punitive damages.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-21-102(l)(a) — 1 case
Borquez v. Robert C. Ozer, PC, 923 P.2d 166 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
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