Except as provided in sections 24-10-104 to 24-
10-106 and 24-10-106.3, sovereign immunity shall be a bar to any action against a public entity
for injury which lies in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of
action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant. If a public entity raises the issue of sovereign
immunity prior to or after the commencement of discovery, the court shall suspend discovery,
except any discovery necessary to decide the issue of sovereign immunity and shall decide such
issue on motion. The court's decision on such motion shall be a final judgment and shall be
subject to interlocutory appeal.
Source: L. 71: p. 1207, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-8. L. 86: Entire section amended, p.
877, § 8, effective July 1. L. 92: Entire section amended, p. 1117, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2015:
Entire section amended, (SB 15-213), ch. 266, p. 1039, § 4, effective June 3.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration in SB 15-213, see section 1 of chapter
266, Session Laws of Colorado 2015.
Notes of Decisions
Finnie v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 79 P.3d 1253 (Colo. 2003).
· cites it 33× “We first examine the text of section 24-10-108, 7B C.R.S. (2003), of the GIA and determine that it requires trial courts to resolve all issues of immunity before trial.”
Fogg v. MacAluso, 892 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1995).
· cites it 44× “It reasoned that the usual rules regarding summary judgment applied to a pre-trial claim of immunity brought under section 24-10-108, 10A C.R.S. (1988), and disputed issues of material fact should have been reserved for trial.”
Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001).
· cites it 13× “The state, arguing that it is immune from liability under the CGIA, brought a motion to dismiss these claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to C.”
Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998).
· cites it 15× “The State then took an interlocutory appeal under CGIA section 24-10-108, 7 C.R.S. (1998). The court of appeals reversed and directed dismissal of Walton’s complaint.”
Martinez v. Est. of Bleck Ex Rel. Churchill, 2016 CO 58 (Colo. 2016).
· cites it 8× “(2016) (referring to the waiver of a public entity's "sovereign immunity"); § 24-10-108 (stating that "sovereign immunity" is a bar to suit against a public entity for actions that lie in tort or could lie in tort).”
Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000).
· cites it 12× “The trial court determined that the threshold plate was "constructed" by the City within the meaning of section 24-10-108(1), 7 C.R.S. (2000), notwithstanding the role of PCL as an independent contractor to the City.”
City of Lakewood v. Brace, 919 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1996).
· cites it 10× “The trial court found that these three claims were barred by the CGIA because they were tort claims and thus precluded under section 24-10-108, 10A C.R.S. (1995 Supp.”
v. Advisorlaw LLC, 2020 COA 122 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 2× “2019 (orders concerning arbitration); § 24-10-108, C.R.S. 2019 (orders concerning sovereign immunity); § 24-10-118(2.”
Wood v. People, 255 P.3d 1136 (Colo. 2011).
· cites it 3× “The court of appeals declined to review the trial court's pretrial ruling and affirmed Wood's conviction.”
Daniel v. City of Colorado Springs, 327 P.3d 891 (Colo. 2014).
· cites it 7× “17 In a July 18, 2011 Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ("Order"), the trial court summarily denied the City's Motion "for the reasons and analysis (and the legal authorities) contained in [Daniel's] Response.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-108(1) — 12 cases
Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001).
“The state, arguing that it is immune from liability under the CGIA, brought a motion to dismiss these claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to C.”
Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000).
“The trial court determined that the threshold plate was "constructed" by the City within the meaning of section 24-10-108(1), 7 C.R.S. (2000), notwithstanding the role of PCL as an independent contractor to the City.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-108(2) — 4 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-108(4) — 2 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-108(4)(2a) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-108(4)(a) — 4 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-108(4)(b) — 2 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-108(4)(b)(I) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-108(4)(b)(IID) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-108(5) — 11 cases
Daniel v. City of Colorado Springs, 327 P.3d 891 (Colo. 2014).
“17 In a July 18, 2011 Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ("Order"), the trial court summarily denied the City's Motion "for the reasons and analysis (and the legal authorities) contained in [Daniel's] Response.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-108(8) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-108(8)(a) — 3 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-108(B) — 1 case
Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2000).
“The trial court determined that the threshold plate was "constructed" by the City within the meaning of section 24-10-108(1), 7 C.R.S. (2000), notwithstanding the role of PCL as an independent contractor to the City.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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