Colo. Rev. Stat. » Title 38
Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-35-201 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of July 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section CO-LEGleg.colorado.gov JustiaTitle on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

As used in this part 2, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Federal official or employee" means an appointed or elected official or any employee of the government of the United States of America or of any agency of such government as defined for purposes of the "Federal Tort Claims Act", 28 U.S.C. sec. 2671.

(2) "Lien" means an encumbrance on real or personal property as security for the payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.

(3) "Spurious document" means any document that is forged or groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim, or is otherwise patently invalid.

(4) "Spurious lien" means a purported lien or claim of lien that:

(a) Is not provided for by a specific Colorado or federal statute or by a specific ordinance or charter of a home rule municipality;

(b) Is not created, suffered, assumed, or agreed to by the owner of the property it purports to encumber; or

(c) Is not imposed by order, judgment, or decree of a state court or a federal court.

(5) "State court" means a court established pursuant to title 13, C.R.S.

(6) "State or local official or employee" means an appointed or elected official or any employee of:

(a) The state of Colorado;

(b) Any agency, board, commission, or state department in any branch of state government;

(c) Any institution of higher education; or

(d) Any school district, political subdivision, county, municipality, intergovernmental agency, or other unit of local government in Colorado.

Source: L. 97: Entire part added, p. 35, § 1, effective March 20. L. 98: (4)(a) amended, p. 152, § 1, effective April 2.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 18 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1999–2026 · leading case: Tuscany, LLC v. W. States Excavating Pipe & Boring, LLC, 128 P.3d 274 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Tuscany, LLC v. W. States Excavating Pipe & Boring, LLC, 128 P.3d 274 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 4× “Western States first contends mechanics liens cannot be "spurious liens" because § 38-35-201(4)(a), C.R.S.2004, excludes from the definition of "spurious lien" any lien provided for by a specific Colorado statute, and mechanies' liens are governed by the General Mechanics' Lien…”
v. Evans, 2019 COA 179 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 28× “Evans — Real Property — Spurious Liens and Documents A division of the court of appeals considers two issues involving invalidation of an encumbrance as a spurious lien or spurious document under section 38-35-201, C.R.S. 2019. First, is an order issued by a district court…”
SR Condos., LLC v. K.C. Constr., Inc., 176 P.3d 866 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 7× “On June 3, 2005, SR Condominiums petitioned the district court under the Spurious Liens and Documents statute (SLD statute), sections 38-35-201 through-204, C.R.S.2007, to invalidate the mechanic’s lien, arguing that it was a spurious lien or a spurious document.”
GMAC Mortg. Corp. v. PWI Grp., 155 P.3d 556 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 5× “In this action under the Spurious Liens and Documents Act, § 38-35-201, et seq., C.R.8.2006, plaintiffs, GMAC Mortgage Corporation; INDY MAC FSB Principal Residential Mortgage, Inc.”
Baked, LLC v. GJG Prop., LLC, 2020 COA 51 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 6× “GJG Property, LLC — Real Property — Spurious Liens and Documents — Lis Pendens In this dispute over a right of first refusal in a commercial lease, a division of the court of appeals considers how to assess the spuriousness of a lis pendens under the Spurious Liens and Documents…”
Rossi v. Osage Highland Dev., LLC, 219 P.3d 319 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “§ 38-35-201, C.R.S.2008. Under this statute, neither the 1990 lien nor the 2005 promissory note was a "spurious lien" because each was "created .”
Battle North, LLC v. Sensible Hous. Co., 370 P.3d 238 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015). “JONES T1 Respondent, Sensible Housing Company (Sensible), appeals the district court's order determining that a stock certificate and two quitclaim deeds are spurious documents under sections 38-35-201(38) and -204, C.R.S. 2014.”
Alpine Bank v. Moreno (In Re Moreno), 293 B.R. 777 (Bankr.D. Colo. 2003). · cites it 2× “Finally, by illustration only, Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 38-35-201, the Spurious Liens and Documents Act, defines a "spurious lien” as: "a purported lien or claim of lien that .”
Shyanne Props., LLC v. Torp, 210 P.3d 490 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “1 and the spurious lien statutes, sections 38-35-201 to -204. Plaintiff did not respond to the petition.”
Wester Holdings P'ship v. Reece, 991 P.2d 328 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999). “A similar statute prohibiting recordation of invalid liens contains language identical to that used to define “spurious documents” in § 38-35-201. See § 38-35-109(3), C.R.S.1999.”
Angela Lea Argo v. Christina T. Hemphill (Colo. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 4× “1 and sections 38-35-201 to -204, 3 C.R.S. 2021, and requested that the court quiet title to the property in them.”
Eaglebank v. Yajia Hu Schwartz Revocable Trust Dated 12/12017 (D. Colo. 2024). · cites it 4× “” See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-35-201 (3); see also Better Baked, 465 P.”
Show all 18 citing cases →
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-35-201(2) — 1 case
Baked, LLC v. GJG Prop., LLC, 2020 COA 51 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020). “GJG Property, LLC — Real Property — Spurious Liens and Documents — Lis Pendens In this dispute over a right of first refusal in a commercial lease, a division of the court of appeals considers how to assess the spuriousness of a lis pendens under the Spurious Liens and Documents…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-35-201(3) — 8 cases
SR Condos., LLC v. K.C. Constr., Inc., 176 P.3d 866 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). “On June 3, 2005, SR Condominiums petitioned the district court under the Spurious Liens and Documents statute (SLD statute), sections 38-35-201 through-204, C.R.S.2007, to invalidate the mechanic’s lien, arguing that it was a spurious lien or a spurious document.”
GMAC Mortg. Corp. v. PWI Grp., 155 P.3d 556 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). “In this action under the Spurious Liens and Documents Act, § 38-35-201, et seq., C.R.8.2006, plaintiffs, GMAC Mortgage Corporation; INDY MAC FSB Principal Residential Mortgage, Inc.”
v. Evans, 2019 COA 179 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019). “Evans — Real Property — Spurious Liens and Documents A division of the court of appeals considers two issues involving invalidation of an encumbrance as a spurious lien or spurious document under section 38-35-201, C.R.S. 2019. First, is an order issued by a district court…”
Baked, LLC v. GJG Prop., LLC, 2020 COA 51 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020). “GJG Property, LLC — Real Property — Spurious Liens and Documents — Lis Pendens In this dispute over a right of first refusal in a commercial lease, a division of the court of appeals considers how to assess the spuriousness of a lis pendens under the Spurious Liens and Documents…”
Angela Lea Argo v. Christina T. Hemphill (Colo. Ct. App. 2022). “1 and sections 38-35-201 to -204, 3 C.R.S. 2021, and requested that the court quiet title to the property in them.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-35-201(38) — 1 case
Battle North, LLC v. Sensible Hous. Co., 370 P.3d 238 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015). “JONES T1 Respondent, Sensible Housing Company (Sensible), appeals the district court's order determining that a stock certificate and two quitclaim deeds are spurious documents under sections 38-35-201(38) and -204, C.R.S. 2014.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-35-201(4) — 4 cases
SR Condos., LLC v. K.C. Constr., Inc., 176 P.3d 866 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). “On June 3, 2005, SR Condominiums petitioned the district court under the Spurious Liens and Documents statute (SLD statute), sections 38-35-201 through-204, C.R.S.2007, to invalidate the mechanic’s lien, arguing that it was a spurious lien or a spurious document.”
v. Evans, 2019 COA 179 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019). “Evans — Real Property — Spurious Liens and Documents A division of the court of appeals considers two issues involving invalidation of an encumbrance as a spurious lien or spurious document under section 38-35-201, C.R.S. 2019. First, is an order issued by a district court…”
Liberty Mortg. Corp. v. Fiscus, 2016 CO 31 (Colo. 2016).
Pritchett (Bankr.D. Colo. 2025).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-35-201(4)(a) — 1 case
Tuscany, LLC v. W. States Excavating Pipe & Boring, LLC, 128 P.3d 274 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005). “Western States first contends mechanics liens cannot be "spurious liens" because § 38-35-201(4)(a), C.R.S.2004, excludes from the definition of "spurious lien" any lien provided for by a specific Colorado statute, and mechanies' liens are governed by the General Mechanics' Lien…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-35-201(4)(c) — 1 case
v. Evans, 2019 COA 179 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019). “Evans — Real Property — Spurious Liens and Documents A division of the court of appeals considers two issues involving invalidation of an encumbrance as a spurious lien or spurious document under section 38-35-201, C.R.S. 2019. First, is an order issued by a district court…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-35-201(5) — 1 case
v. Evans, 2019 COA 179 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019). “Evans — Real Property — Spurious Liens and Documents A division of the court of appeals considers two issues involving invalidation of an encumbrance as a spurious lien or spurious document under section 38-35-201, C.R.S. 2019. First, is an order issued by a district court…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-35-201(8) — 3 cases
Tuscany, LLC v. W. States Excavating Pipe & Boring, LLC, 128 P.3d 274 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005). “Western States first contends mechanics liens cannot be "spurious liens" because § 38-35-201(4)(a), C.R.S.2004, excludes from the definition of "spurious lien" any lien provided for by a specific Colorado statute, and mechanies' liens are governed by the General Mechanics' Lien…”
GMAC Mortg. Corp. v. PWI Grp., 155 P.3d 556 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). “In this action under the Spurious Liens and Documents Act, § 38-35-201, et seq., C.R.8.2006, plaintiffs, GMAC Mortgage Corporation; INDY MAC FSB Principal Residential Mortgage, Inc.”
Rossi v. Osage Highland Dev., LLC, 219 P.3d 319 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “§ 38-35-201, C.R.S.2008. Under this statute, neither the 1990 lien nor the 2005 promissory note was a "spurious lien" because each was "created .”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.