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Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-119 (2026)

One-year limitation

✓ current as of July 2026
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No action shall be commenced or maintained to enforce the terms of any building restriction concerning real property or to compel the removal of any building or improvement on land because of the violation of any terms of any building restriction unless said action is commenced within one year from the date of the violation for which the action is sought to be brought or maintained.

Source: L. 27: p. 606, § 47. CSA: C. 40, § 154. CRS 53: § 118-8-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 118- 8-4. L. 72: p. 616, § 146.

PART 2

HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS

Law reviews: For article, "Homestead Marshalling", see 14 Colo. Law. 1612 (1985).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases, 1975–2000 · leading case: McDowell v. United States, 870 P.2d 656 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
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McDowell v. United States, 870 P.2d 656 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 13× “Defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the setback claim only, asserting that plaintiffs’ action was time barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in § 38-41-119, C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A).”
Ass'n of Owners, Satellite Apt., Inc. v. Otte, 550 P.2d 894 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976). · cites it 7× “1963, 118-8-4, (now § 38-41-119, C.R.S. 1973). We affirm. The Association's original complaint consisted of two counts: The first alleged that defendants had violated certain provisions of both the condominium declaration and the corporate bylaws of the Association, in that…”
Nicol v. Nelson, 776 P.2d 1144 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 3× “The trial court, therefore, found that plaintiffs had complied with the time limitations set forth in § 38-41-119, C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A) which both parties concede is the proper statute of limitations.”
Barker v. Jeremiasen, 676 P.2d 1259 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “The statute was amended in 1972 and is now § 38-41-119, C.R.S.1973 (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A).”
Town of Grand Lake v. Lanzi, 937 P.2d 785 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 11× “) there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the parking agreement precluded the Town from enforcing the parking ordinance; and (4) although defendant did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment, there was also a genuine issue of material fact as to when…”
Highland Meadow Estates at Castle Peak Ranch, Inc. v. Buick, 994 P.2d 459 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 4× “3-123(2) & § 38-41-119, C.R.S.1998. We are not persuaded.”
Styers v. Mara, 631 P.2d 1138 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). “Since plaintiffs' action was not commenced within the one-year period as required by § 38-41-119, C.R.$.1978, the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of defendants.”
Highland Meadow Estates v. Buick, 994 P.2d 459 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 4× “3-123(2) & § 38-41-119, C.R.S.1998. We are not persuaded.”
Johnson v. City of Wheat Ridge, 532 P.2d 985 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975). · cites it 2× “See § 38-41-119, C.R.S.1973 (Colo.Sess.Laws 1972, ch.”
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