(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it:
(a) On the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or
(b) Without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them.
Source: L. 65: p. 1330, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 155-2-608.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
16
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case:
Cissell Mfg. Co. v. Park, 36 P.3d 85 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
Cissell Mfg. Co. v. Park, 36 P.3d 85 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 16× “While acknowledging Park's argument that he had "rejected" acceptance under § 4-2-608 of the UCC, the court found that "because the dryers had been accepted in April 1998, [Park] did not provide in September a 'formal notice of rejection' pursuant to C.R.S. § 4-2-608. At most,…”
Ranta Constr., Inc. v. Anderson, 190 P.3d 835 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 14× “A seller's right to cure when the buyer revokes accep *844 tance under section 4-2-608 is a matter of first impression in Colorado.”
Keen v. Modern Trailer Sales, Inc., 578 P.2d 668 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
· cites it 8× “And, in a ruling which is not challenged here, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs' claim for damages.”
Graham Hydraulic Power, Inc. v. Stewart & Stevenson Power, Inc., 797 P.2d 835 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 7× “Thus, under these circumstances, we conclude that plaintiff’s disclaimer extended to the System II components. III. Defendant next contends the trial court erred in denying its claim for revocation of acceptance of the System II motors.”
Carter v. Brighton Ford, Inc., 251 P.3d 1179 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 3× “Also, section 4-2-608, C.R.S.2010, permits revocation of acceptance by the buyer where goods do not conform and their value has been substantially impaired.”
Jackson v. Rocky Mountain Datsun, Inc., 693 P.2d 391 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 9× “Substantial Impairment The dealer argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the buyer had justifiably revoked her acceptance of the car because she failed to establish that the ear’s value was substantially impaired as a result of a nonconformity. We disagree.”
Homier v. Faricy Truck & Equip. Co., 784 P.2d 798 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 4× “Homier first contends that the trial court erred in determining that, because they had not contracted to purchase a commercial unit, they cannot have revoked acceptance of the truck-unit pursuant to § 4-2-608, C.R.S. We agree. Applying Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.”
Hummel v. Skyline Dodge, Inc., 589 P.2d 73 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
· cites it 3× “" Section 4-2-608(b), C.R.S. 1973. But, we agree with the rule in Lyns, Inc.”
Rose v. Colorado Factory Homes, 10 P.3d 680 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 2× “Significantly, that instruction mirrors the language of § 4-2-608(2), C.R.S.1999, the applicable provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.”
Glen Peck, Ltd. v. Fritsche, 651 P.2d 414 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
· cites it 2× “Finally, the parties stipulated that the buyer notified seller of the breach of the express warranty which is construed to be the revocation of acceptance needed under § 4-2-608, C.R.S. 1973 (Official Comment No.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-2-608(1) — 3 cases
Cissell Mfg. Co. v. Park, 36 P.3d 85 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
“While acknowledging Park's argument that he had "rejected" acceptance under § 4-2-608 of the UCC, the court found that "because the dryers had been accepted in April 1998, [Park] did not provide in September a 'formal notice of rejection' pursuant to C.R.S. § 4-2-608. At most,…”
Graham Hydraulic Power, Inc. v. Stewart & Stevenson Power, Inc., 797 P.2d 835 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
“Thus, under these circumstances, we conclude that plaintiff’s disclaimer extended to the System II components. III. Defendant next contends the trial court erred in denying its claim for revocation of acceptance of the System II motors.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-2-608(1)(a) — 1 case
Ranta Constr., Inc. v. Anderson, 190 P.3d 835 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
“A seller's right to cure when the buyer revokes accep *844 tance under section 4-2-608 is a matter of first impression in Colorado.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-2-608(1)(b) — 1 case
Keen v. Modern Trailer Sales, Inc., 578 P.2d 668 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
“And, in a ruling which is not challenged here, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs' claim for damages.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-2-608(1)(g) — 1 case
Ranta Constr., Inc. v. Anderson, 190 P.3d 835 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
“A seller's right to cure when the buyer revokes accep *844 tance under section 4-2-608 is a matter of first impression in Colorado.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-2-608(2) — 6 cases
Ranta Constr., Inc. v. Anderson, 190 P.3d 835 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
“A seller's right to cure when the buyer revokes accep *844 tance under section 4-2-608 is a matter of first impression in Colorado.”
Graham Hydraulic Power, Inc. v. Stewart & Stevenson Power, Inc., 797 P.2d 835 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
“Thus, under these circumstances, we conclude that plaintiff’s disclaimer extended to the System II components. III. Defendant next contends the trial court erred in denying its claim for revocation of acceptance of the System II motors.”
Rose v. Colorado Factory Homes, 10 P.3d 680 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
“Significantly, that instruction mirrors the language of § 4-2-608(2), C.R.S.1999, the applicable provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.”
Jackson v. Rocky Mountain Datsun, Inc., 693 P.2d 391 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
“Substantial Impairment The dealer argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the buyer had justifiably revoked her acceptance of the car because she failed to establish that the ear’s value was substantially impaired as a result of a nonconformity. We disagree.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-2-608(3) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-2-608(b) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-2-608(l)(a) — 2 cases
Graham Hydraulic Power, Inc. v. Stewart & Stevenson Power, Inc., 797 P.2d 835 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
“Thus, under these circumstances, we conclude that plaintiff’s disclaimer extended to the System II components. III. Defendant next contends the trial court erred in denying its claim for revocation of acceptance of the System II motors.”
Jackson v. Rocky Mountain Datsun, Inc., 693 P.2d 391 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
“Substantial Impairment The dealer argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the buyer had justifiably revoked her acceptance of the car because she failed to establish that the ear’s value was substantially impaired as a result of a nonconformity. We disagree.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.