(a) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (d) or (e) of this section, if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of ten years.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to an unaccepted draft to pay the draft must be commenced within three years after dishonor of the draft or ten years after the date of the draft, whichever period expires first.
(d) An action to enforce the obligation of the acceptor of a certified check or the issuer of a teller's check, cashier's check, or traveler's check must be commenced within three years after demand for payment is made to the acceptor or issuer, as the case may be.
(e) An action to enforce the obligation of a party to a certificate of deposit to pay the instrument must be commenced within six years after demand for payment is made to the maker, but if the instrument states a due date and the maker is not required to pay before that date, the six-year period begins when a demand for payment is in effect and the due date has passed.
(f) An action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay an accepted draft, other than a certified check, must be commenced (i) within six years after the due date or dates stated in the draft or acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable at a definite time, or (ii) within six years after the date of the acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable on demand.
(g) Unless governed by other law regarding claims for indemnity or contribution, an action (i) for conversion of an instrument, for money had and received, or like action based on conversion, (ii) for breach of warranty, or (iii) to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising under this article and not governed by this section must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.
Source: L. 94: Entire article R&RE, p. 848, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.
Notes of Decisions
n v. Weidner Holdings, LLC, 2019 COA 186 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 18× “3 Colorado’s UCC, section 4-3-118, C.R.S. 2019, applies to the notes.”
Boyles Bros. Drilling Co. v. Orion Indus., Ltd., 761 P.2d 278 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 12× “Indeed, the official comment to § 4-3-118, C.R.S., states that the rules of construction "preclude a resort to parol evidence for any purpose except reformation of the instrument.”
Hassler v. Account Brokers of Larimer Cnty., Inc., 274 P.3d 547 (Colo. 2012).
· cites it 2× “(2011) (stating that a cause of action on a "debt, obligation, money owed, or performance" shall "accrue on the date such debt, obligation, money owed, or performance becomes due"); see also § 4-3-118, C.R.S. (2011). I further agree that the debt for each installment becomes due…”
Igou v. Bank of Am., N.A, 2020 COA 15 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 3× “To trigger the acceleration clause, the creditor “must 1 Neither the parties nor the district court raised whether the proper statute of limitations is that found at section 4-3-118(a), C.R.S. 2019. We therefore do not address this issue.”
Moss v. McDonald, 772 P.2d 626 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 3× “Section 4-3-118(b), C.R.S. Therefore, prior to maturity of the note, it was necessary for the Mc-Donalds to obtain consent of all sureties to any extensions given.”
Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Haag Ltd. P'ship, 929 P.2d 42 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 2× “Borrowers also contend that § 4-3-118(f), C.R.S. (1982 RepLVol. 2) applies to their obligation under the note.”
Bank of New York v. Peterson, 2018 COA 174 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 2× “8 Hassler, ¶ 22 (emphasis added); see also § 4-3-118(a), C.R.S. 2018 (If a due date is accelerated, an action must be brought “within six years after the accelerated due date.”
Fin. Mgmt. Task Force, Inc. v. Altberger, 807 P.2d 1230 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 2× “2d 632 (1966); § 4-3-118(d), C.R.S. The note also provided that defendant would “pay all reasonable costs of collection, including_for attorney’s fees.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-118(a) — 2 cases
Igou v. Bank of Am., N.A, 2020 COA 15 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
“To trigger the acceleration clause, the creditor “must 1 Neither the parties nor the district court raised whether the proper statute of limitations is that found at section 4-3-118(a), C.R.S. 2019. We therefore do not address this issue.”
Bank of New York v. Peterson, 2018 COA 174 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
“8 Hassler, ¶ 22 (emphasis added); see also § 4-3-118(a), C.R.S. 2018 (If a due date is accelerated, an action must be brought “within six years after the accelerated due date.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-118(b) — 2 cases
n v. Weidner Holdings, LLC, 2019 COA 186 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
“3 Colorado’s UCC, section 4-3-118, C.R.S. 2019, applies to the notes.”
Moss v. McDonald, 772 P.2d 626 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
“Section 4-3-118(b), C.R.S. Therefore, prior to maturity of the note, it was necessary for the Mc-Donalds to obtain consent of all sureties to any extensions given.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-118(d) — 1 case
Fin. Mgmt. Task Force, Inc. v. Altberger, 807 P.2d 1230 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
“2d 632 (1966); § 4-3-118(d), C.R.S. The note also provided that defendant would “pay all reasonable costs of collection, including_for attorney’s fees.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-118(f) — 1 case
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