(a) "Indorsement" means a signature, other than that of a signer as maker, drawer, or acceptor, that alone or accompanied by other words is made on an instrument for the purpose of (i) negotiating the instrument, (ii) restricting payment of the instrument, or (iii) incurring indorser's liability on the instrument, but regardless of the intent of the signer, a signature and its accompanying words is an indorsement unless the accompanying words, terms of the instrument, place of the signature, or other circumstances unambiguously indicate that the signature was made for a purpose other than indorsement. For the purpose of determining whether a signature is made on an instrument, a paper affixed to the instrument is a part of the instrument.
(b) "Indorser" means a person who makes an indorsement.
(c) For the purpose of determining whether the transferee of an instrument is a holder, an indorsement that transfers a security interest in the instrument is effective as an unqualified indorsement of the instrument.
(d) If an instrument is payable to a holder under a name that is not the name of the holder, indorsement may be made by the holder in the name stated in the instrument or in the holder's name or both, but signature in both names may be required by a person paying or taking the instrument for value or collection.
Source: L. 94: Entire article R&RE, p. 851, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former §§ 4-3-201, 4-3-202, and 4-3-203 as they existed prior to 1994.
Notes of Decisions
La Junta State Bank v. Travis, 727 P.2d 48 (Colo. 1986).
· cites it 7× “§ 4-3-204(2). The trial court also concluded that Quick’s addition of “deposit only” below Warnock’s signature did not convert Warnock’s blank in-dorsement into a special indorsement.”
In re Sandrin, 536 B.R. 309 (Bankr.D. Colo. 2015).
· cites it 6× “Colo.Rev.Stat. § 4-3-204(a). The requirement that the signature be “made on” an instrument may be met by affixing a paper “to the instrument as part of the instrument.”
Lamson v. Com. Credit Corp., 531 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1975).
· cites it 2× “Section 4-3-204(1). The problem is whether the special indorsement was correctly and properly affixed to the checks under section 4-3-202(2).”
United States v. Pauling, 60 M.J. 91 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
“” C.R.S. § 4-3-204. Under the section entitled “Signature,” the following is found: “A person is not liable on an instrument unless.”
U.S. Bank v. Roberts (In Re Roberts), 367 B.R. 677 (Bankr.D. Colo. 2007).
· cites it 2× “See, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 4-3-204. It is apparent that the final indorsement on the Note is to the Movant and the Movant is reflected as the owner of the evidence of debt when the Notice of Election and Demand for Sale by Public Trustee was filed with the office of the Public…”
Lewis v. Columbus Investments, 36 P.3d 75 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 3× “Finally, in urging that it became the holder of the promissory note and the deed of trust itself and that lenders no longer had an interest in the real property entitling them to notice, Columbus Investments relies on § 4-3-204(c), C.R.S.2000. That section provides: "For the…”
Travis v. La Junta State Bank, 694 P.2d 350 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 2× “, and the check in its then posture was freely negotiable pursuant to § 4-3-204(2), C.R.S. However, Quick wrote additional words under Warnock’s signature before it was presented to the bank.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-204(1) — 1 case
Lamson v. Com. Credit Corp., 531 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1975).
“Section 4-3-204(1). The problem is whether the special indorsement was correctly and properly affixed to the checks under section 4-3-202(2).”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-204(2) — 2 cases
La Junta State Bank v. Travis, 727 P.2d 48 (Colo. 1986).
“§ 4-3-204(2). The trial court also concluded that Quick’s addition of “deposit only” below Warnock’s signature did not convert Warnock’s blank in-dorsement into a special indorsement.”
Travis v. La Junta State Bank, 694 P.2d 350 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
“, and the check in its then posture was freely negotiable pursuant to § 4-3-204(2), C.R.S. However, Quick wrote additional words under Warnock’s signature before it was presented to the bank.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-204(3) — 1 case
La Junta State Bank v. Travis, 727 P.2d 48 (Colo. 1986).
“§ 4-3-204(2). The trial court also concluded that Quick’s addition of “deposit only” below Warnock’s signature did not convert Warnock’s blank in-dorsement into a special indorsement.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-204(a) — 1 case
In re Sandrin, 536 B.R. 309 (Bankr.D. Colo. 2015).
“Colo.Rev.Stat. § 4-3-204(a). The requirement that the signature be “made on” an instrument may be met by affixing a paper “to the instrument as part of the instrument.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-204(b) — 1 case
In re Sandrin, 536 B.R. 309 (Bankr.D. Colo. 2015).
“Colo.Rev.Stat. § 4-3-204(a). The requirement that the signature be “made on” an instrument may be met by affixing a paper “to the instrument as part of the instrument.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-204(c) — 1 case
Lewis v. Columbus Investments, 36 P.3d 75 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
“Finally, in urging that it became the holder of the promissory note and the deed of trust itself and that lenders no longer had an interest in the real property entitling them to notice, Columbus Investments relies on § 4-3-204(c), C.R.S.2000. That section provides: "For the…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-204(l) — 1 case
La Junta State Bank v. Travis, 727 P.2d 48 (Colo. 1986).
“§ 4-3-204(2). The trial court also concluded that Quick’s addition of “deposit only” below Warnock’s signature did not convert Warnock’s blank in-dorsement into a special indorsement.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.