Colorado Revised Statutes
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-306 (2026)
Claims to an instrument
✓ current as of July 2026
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A person taking an instrument, other than a person having rights of a holder in due course, is subject to a claim of a property or possessory right in the instrument or its proceeds, including a claim to rescind a negotiation and to recover the instrument or its proceeds. A person having rights of a holder in due course takes free of the claim to the instrument.
Source: L. 94: Entire article R&RE, p. 857, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7
cases, 1975–2008 · leading case: Lamson v. Com. Credit Corp., 531 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1975).
Lamson v. Com. Credit Corp., 531 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1975). “It concluded the defense of payment was unavailable under the Uniform Commercial Code, section 4-3-306, C.R.S. 1973. Judgment was entered for Lamson for the face amount of the checks plus the legal interest.”
Flatiron Linen, Inc. v. First Am. State Bank, 23 P.3d 1209 (Colo. 2001). “r value, (ii) in good faith, (iif) without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect to payment of another instrument issued as part of the same series, (iv) without notice that the instrument contains an…”
Georg v. Metro Fixtures Contractors, Inc., 178 P.3d 1209 (Colo. 2008). “If Freestyle is a holder in due course under section 4-3-306, it takes free of Metro’s claims.”
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 714 F. Supp. 451 (D. Colo. 1989). “Dick asserts these defenses under § 4-3-306(b), C.R.S. which provides, in pertinent part: Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes the instruments subject to: .”
Guardian Title Agency, LLC v. Matrix Capital Bank, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (D. Colo. 2001). “104 and C.R.S. § 4-3-306; (2) Equitable Decree for Reformation of Deed of Trust; (3) Unjust Enrichment; (4) Negligent Misrepresentation; and (5) Breach of Contract/Third Party Beneficiary Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs Complaint pursuant to Fed.”
Salter v. Vanotti, 599 P.2d 962 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979). “The trial court further found that plaintiffs had notice of defendants' defenses, and, therefore, were not holders in due course, and took the note subject to the defenses described in § 4-3-306, C.R.S.1973. The primary issue on appeal is whether plaintiffs are holders in due…”
Cole v. Farner, 749 P.2d 970 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). “Section 4-3-306, C.R.S. One such possible defense arises from § 4-3-606, C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-306(b) — 1 case
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 714 F. Supp. 451 (D. Colo. 1989). “Dick asserts these defenses under § 4-3-306(b), C.R.S. which provides, in pertinent part: Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes the instruments subject to: .”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-306(c) — 1 case
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 714 F. Supp. 451 (D. Colo. 1989). “Dick asserts these defenses under § 4-3-306(b), C.R.S. which provides, in pertinent part: Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes the instruments subject to: .”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-306(d) — 1 case
Lamson v. Com. Credit Corp., 531 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1975). “It concluded the defense of payment was unavailable under the Uniform Commercial Code, section 4-3-306, C.R.S. 1973. Judgment was entered for Lamson for the face amount of the checks plus the legal interest.”
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