(1) This article constitutes the uniform traffic code throughout the state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein.
(2) The provisions of this article relating to the operation of vehicles and the movement of pedestrians refer exclusively to the use of streets and highways except:
(a) Where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section;
(b) For provisions of sections 42-2-128, 42-4-1301 to 42-4-1303, 42-4-1401, 42-4-1402, and 42-4-1413 and part 16 of this article which shall apply upon streets and highways and elsewhere throughout the state.
Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2228, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2007: (1) amended, p. 31, § 6, effective August 3.
Notes of Decisions
State, Motor Veh. Div. v. Dayhoff, 609 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1980).
· cites it 22× “The prosecution asserts that the provisions of section 42-4-103, C.R.S.1973 determine the scope of the implied consent law and require a contrary result.”
Haney v. City Court in & for the City of Empire, 779 P.2d 1312 (Colo. 1989).
· cites it 4× “§ 42-4-103(2). The statute discussed above gives Empire the power to make and publish safety ordinances, and the Model or Uniform code was enacted for the express purpose of providing uniformity in municipal traffic codes.”
Bravo ex rel. Bravo v. Wareham, 605 P.2d 58 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979).
· cites it 4× “The trial court refused the instruction because § 42-4-103, C.R.S.1973, restricts the application of article 4 of title *60 42, C.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-103(2): 3 cases
Haney v. City Court in & for the City of Empire, 779 P.2d 1312 (Colo. 1989).
“§ 42-4-103(2). The statute discussed above gives Empire the power to make and publish safety ordinances, and the Model or Uniform code was enacted for the express purpose of providing uniformity in municipal traffic codes.”
State, Motor Veh. Div. v. Dayhoff, 609 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1980).
“The prosecution asserts that the provisions of section 42-4-103, C.R.S.1973 determine the scope of the implied consent law and require a contrary result.”
Bravo ex rel. Bravo v. Wareham, 605 P.2d 58 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979).
“The trial court refused the instruction because § 42-4-103, C.R.S.1973, restricts the application of article 4 of title *60 42, C.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-103(2)(b): 1 case
State, Motor Veh. Div. v. Dayhoff, 609 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1980).
“The prosecution asserts that the provisions of section 42-4-103, C.R.S.1973 determine the scope of the implied consent law and require a contrary result.”
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