(1) The provisions of this article applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways shall apply to the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by the United States, this state, or any county, city, town, district, or other political subdivision of the state, subject to such specific exceptions as are set forth in this article with reference to authorized emergency vehicles.
(2) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, or when in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions stated in this article. The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may:
(a) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this title;
(b) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation;
(c) Exceed the lawful speeds set forth in section 42-4-1101 (2) or exceed the maximum lawful speed limits set forth in section 42-4-1101 (8) so long as said driver does not endanger life or property;
(d) Disregard regulations governing directions of movement or turning in specified directions.
(3) The exemptions and conditions provided in paragraphs (b) to (d), in their entirety, of subsection (2) of this section for an authorized emergency vehicle shall continue to apply to section 24-10-106 (1)(a), C.R.S., only when such vehicle is making use of audible or visual signals meeting the requirements of section 42-4-213, and the exemption granted in paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section shall apply only when such vehicle is making use of visual signals meeting the requirements of section 42-4-213 unless using such visual signals would cause an obstruction to the normal flow of traffic; except that an authorized emergency vehicle being operated as a police vehicle while in actual pursuit of a suspected violator of any provision of this title need not display or make use of audible or visual signals so long as such pursuit is being made to obtain verification of or evidence of the guilt of the suspected violator. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require an emergency vehicle to make use of audible signals when such vehicle is not moving, whether or not the vehicle is occupied.
(4) The provisions of this section shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of such driver's reckless disregard for the safety of others.
(5) The state motor vehicle licensing agency shall designate any particular vehicle as an authorized emergency vehicle upon a finding that the designation of that vehicle is necessary to the preservation of life or property or to the execution of emergency governmental functions. Such designation shall be in writing, and the written designation shall be carried in the vehicle at all times, but failure to carry the written designation shall not affect the status of the vehicle as an authorized emergency vehicle.
Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2231, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 96: (3) amended, p. 958, § 4, effective July 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
31
cases (
9 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case:
Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).
Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).
· cites it 79× “" § 24-10-106(1)(a) 4 Section 24-10-106(1)(a) then creates an exception to the immunity waiver for "emer-geney vehicles operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108(2) and (8), C.R.S. 5 5 That is, if an emergency vehicle operates within section 42-4-108(2) and (8), 11 C.”
Tidwell v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).
· cites it 26× “There is an exception to this exception for emergency vehicles falling under the ambit of section 42-4-108. Id. Under section 24-10-106(l)(a), a public entity is immune from any tort suit if the emergency vehicle is “operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108(2) and (3).”
Quintana v. City of Westminster, 56 P.3d 1193 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 13× “Quintana, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging negligence by defendants, the City of Westminster and police officer Timothy Torres, on grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Colorado Governmental Immunity *1196 Act (GIA), § 24-10-106, and § 42-4-108,…”
Quintana v. City of Westminster, 8 P.3d 527 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 10× “" Section 42-4-108(2), C.R.S.1999. However, this emergency exception to the waiver of immunity is limited in that an emergency vehicle may: Exceed the lawful speeds .”
ck v. McNabb, 2020 COA 133 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 26× “Thus, the issue in dispute was whether the vehicle was operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108(2) and (3), so as to come within the exception to the otherwise applicable waiver of immunity.”
Smith v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2025 COA 70 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
· cites it 40× “In his response to the motion, Smith contended that the Denver Defendants had waived sovereign immunity because Jenkinson violated section 42-4-108(2) and (3), C.R.S. 2024.”
Tunget v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 992 P.2d 650 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 9× “1995) stands for the proposition that the reference in § 24-10-106(1) to § 42-4-108(2) and § 42 — 4-108(3) is simply for the purposes of determining when an emergency vehicle is responding to an “emergency” (as defined in § 42-4-108(2)), and requiring the emergency vehicle to…”
City of Greenwood Vill. Ex Rel. State v. Fleming, 643 P.2d 511 (Colo. 1982).
· cites it 8× “), and the statutory grant of authority to municipalities to enforce their traffic ordinances independently of the penalty provisions applicable to state misdemeanor traffic offenses, section 42-4-108(2), C.R.S.1973. We are not persuaded by the city’s contention.”
Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001).
· cites it 2× “2000) (holding that the trial court erred by not making a finding as to whether officer endangered life or property pursuant to section 42-4-108(2)(c) 11 C.R.S. (1999) and that therefore, expert's opinion that officer was reckless was not relevant to the issue to be decided to…”
Dempsey v. Denver Police Dep't, 353 P.3d 928 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 9× “Denver asserted that Officer Jossi's actions in driving the police vehicle fell within an exception for emergency vehicles operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108(2) and (8), T7 As pertinent here, section 42-4-108(2)(c) allows the driver of an authorized emergency…”
People v. Pinyan, 546 P.2d 488 (Colo. 1976).
· cites it 5× “Section 42-4-108(1 )(a), (b) and (2), C.R.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-108(1) — 5 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-108(2) — 22 cases
Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).
“" § 24-10-106(1)(a) 4 Section 24-10-106(1)(a) then creates an exception to the immunity waiver for "emer-geney vehicles operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108(2) and (8), C.R.S. 5 5 That is, if an emergency vehicle operates within section 42-4-108(2) and (8), 11 C.”
Quintana v. City of Westminster, 56 P.3d 1193 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
“Quintana, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging negligence by defendants, the City of Westminster and police officer Timothy Torres, on grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Colorado Governmental Immunity *1196 Act (GIA), § 24-10-106, and § 42-4-108,…”
Quintana v. City of Westminster, 8 P.3d 527 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
“" Section 42-4-108(2), C.R.S.1999. However, this emergency exception to the waiver of immunity is limited in that an emergency vehicle may: Exceed the lawful speeds .”
Tidwell v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).
“There is an exception to this exception for emergency vehicles falling under the ambit of section 42-4-108. Id. Under section 24-10-106(l)(a), a public entity is immune from any tort suit if the emergency vehicle is “operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108(2) and (3).”
City of Greenwood Vill. Ex Rel. State v. Fleming, 643 P.2d 511 (Colo. 1982).
“), and the statutory grant of authority to municipalities to enforce their traffic ordinances independently of the penalty provisions applicable to state misdemeanor traffic offenses, section 42-4-108(2), C.R.S.1973. We are not persuaded by the city’s contention.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-108(2)(a) — 4 cases
Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).
“" § 24-10-106(1)(a) 4 Section 24-10-106(1)(a) then creates an exception to the immunity waiver for "emer-geney vehicles operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108(2) and (8), C.R.S. 5 5 That is, if an emergency vehicle operates within section 42-4-108(2) and (8), 11 C.”
Smith v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2025 COA 70 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
“In his response to the motion, Smith contended that the Denver Defendants had waived sovereign immunity because Jenkinson violated section 42-4-108(2) and (3), C.R.S. 2024.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-108(2)(a)(d) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-108(2)(b) — 5 cases
ck v. McNabb, 2020 COA 133 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
“Thus, the issue in dispute was whether the vehicle was operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108(2) and (3), so as to come within the exception to the otherwise applicable waiver of immunity.”
Smith v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2025 COA 70 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
“In his response to the motion, Smith contended that the Denver Defendants had waived sovereign immunity because Jenkinson violated section 42-4-108(2) and (3), C.R.S. 2024.”
Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).
“" § 24-10-106(1)(a) 4 Section 24-10-106(1)(a) then creates an exception to the immunity waiver for "emer-geney vehicles operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108(2) and (8), C.R.S. 5 5 That is, if an emergency vehicle operates within section 42-4-108(2) and (8), 11 C.”
Tunget v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 992 P.2d 650 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
“1995) stands for the proposition that the reference in § 24-10-106(1) to § 42-4-108(2) and § 42 — 4-108(3) is simply for the purposes of determining when an emergency vehicle is responding to an “emergency” (as defined in § 42-4-108(2)), and requiring the emergency vehicle to…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-108(2)(c) — 7 cases
Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).
“" § 24-10-106(1)(a) 4 Section 24-10-106(1)(a) then creates an exception to the immunity waiver for "emer-geney vehicles operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108(2) and (8), C.R.S. 5 5 That is, if an emergency vehicle operates within section 42-4-108(2) and (8), 11 C.”
Quintana v. City of Westminster, 56 P.3d 1193 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
“Quintana, appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging negligence by defendants, the City of Westminster and police officer Timothy Torres, on grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Colorado Governmental Immunity *1196 Act (GIA), § 24-10-106, and § 42-4-108,…”
Quintana v. City of Westminster, 8 P.3d 527 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
“" Section 42-4-108(2), C.R.S.1999. However, this emergency exception to the waiver of immunity is limited in that an emergency vehicle may: Exceed the lawful speeds .”
Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001).
“2000) (holding that the trial court erred by not making a finding as to whether officer endangered life or property pursuant to section 42-4-108(2)(c) 11 C.R.S. (1999) and that therefore, expert's opinion that officer was reckless was not relevant to the issue to be decided to…”
Dempsey v. Denver Police Dep't, 353 P.3d 928 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).
“Denver asserted that Officer Jossi's actions in driving the police vehicle fell within an exception for emergency vehicles operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108(2) and (8), T7 As pertinent here, section 42-4-108(2)(c) allows the driver of an authorized emergency…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-108(3) — 12 cases
Tidwell v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003).
“There is an exception to this exception for emergency vehicles falling under the ambit of section 42-4-108. Id. Under section 24-10-106(l)(a), a public entity is immune from any tort suit if the emergency vehicle is “operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108(2) and (3).”
ck v. McNabb, 2020 COA 133 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
“Thus, the issue in dispute was whether the vehicle was operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108(2) and (3), so as to come within the exception to the otherwise applicable waiver of immunity.”
People v. Pinyan, 546 P.2d 488 (Colo. 1976).
“Section 42-4-108(1 )(a), (b) and (2), C.R.”
Tunget v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 992 P.2d 650 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
“1995) stands for the proposition that the reference in § 24-10-106(1) to § 42-4-108(2) and § 42 — 4-108(3) is simply for the purposes of determining when an emergency vehicle is responding to an “emergency” (as defined in § 42-4-108(2)), and requiring the emergency vehicle to…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-108(4) — 5 cases
Quintana v. City of Westminster, 8 P.3d 527 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
“" Section 42-4-108(2), C.R.S.1999. However, this emergency exception to the waiver of immunity is limited in that an emergency vehicle may: Exceed the lawful speeds .”
ck v. McNabb, 2020 COA 133 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
“Thus, the issue in dispute was whether the vehicle was operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108(2) and (3), so as to come within the exception to the otherwise applicable waiver of immunity.”
Smith v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2025 COA 70 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
“In his response to the motion, Smith contended that the Denver Defendants had waived sovereign immunity because Jenkinson violated section 42-4-108(2) and (3), C.R.S. 2024.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-108(5) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-108(8) — 1 case
Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082 (Colo. 2000).
“" § 24-10-106(1)(a) 4 Section 24-10-106(1)(a) then creates an exception to the immunity waiver for "emer-geney vehicles operating within the provisions of section 42-4-108(2) and (8), C.R.S. 5 5 That is, if an emergency vehicle operates within section 42-4-108(2) and (8), 11 C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-108(l)(a) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-108(l)(b) — 1 case
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