Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-122 (2026)

Limitation of actions

✓ current as of July 2026
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All actions brought pursuant to this article shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues and not after that time; except that all actions brought for a willful violation of this article shall be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues and not after that time.

Source: L. 2003: Entire article amended with relocations, p. 1862, § 1, effective August 6.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 8-4-126 as it existed prior to 2003, and the former § 8-4-122 was relocated to § 8-4-119.

8-4-123. Termination of occupancy pursuant to contract of employment - legislative declaration. (1) The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that many businesses, such as nursing homes or building management companies, either desire or are required by law to have staff on premises at all times. As part of the compensation for such employees, many employers offer housing to employees. However, once that employment relationship ceases, it may become undesirable for such employees to occupy the premises for many reasons, including the safety of the employer's patients, clients, customers, or tenants. Under traditional landlord and tenant law, such employees may have established the technical or legal right to occupy the premises for a fixed term that continues far beyond the cessation of the employment relationship. However, in employment situations, such occupancy is not a tenancy, but a license to occupy the premises pursuant to an employment relationship. The occupancy of the premises by the employee is not entered into by the employer for the purpose of providing housing, but merely as a means to provide services to the employer's patients, clients, customers, or tenants. In certain cases, it may be necessary to curtail the occupancy of former employees in order to protect the rights or safety of an employer's tenants or patients.

(2) (a) Pursuant to a written agreement meeting the requirements of paragraph (b) of this subsection (2), a license to occupy the premises entered into as part of an employee's compensation may be terminated at any time after the employment relationship ceases between an employer and employee. A termination of a license to occupy the premises shall be effective three days after the service of written notice of termination of a license to occupy the premises.

(b) An agreement made pursuant to this section shall be in writing and shall include the following:

(I) The names of the employer and employee;

(II) A statement that the license to occupy the premises is provided to the employee as part of the employee's compensation and is subject to termination at any time after the employment relationship ceases;

(III) The address of the premises; and

(IV) The signature of both the employer and the employee.

(c) The notice of termination of a license to occupy the premises shall describe the premises and shall set forth the time when the license to occupy the premises will terminate. The notice shall be signed by the employer or the employer's agent or attorney.

(3) If an employee fails to vacate the premises within three days after the receipt of the notice of termination of the license to occupy the premises, the employer may contact the county sheriff to have the employee removed from the premises. The county sheriff shall remove the employee and any personal property of the employee from the premises upon the showing to the county sheriff of the notice of termination of the license to occupy the premises and agreement pursuant to which the license to occupy the premises was granted.

Source: L. 2003: Entire article amended with relocations, p. 1862, § 1, effective August 6.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 8-4-127 as it existed prior to 2003, and the former § 8-4-123 was relocated to § 8-4-110 (2).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14 cases (10 in the last 5 years), 2017–2026 · leading case: Samuel Perez v. By the Rockies, LLC, & Duane Layton, 2023 COA 109 (Colo. Ct. App. 2023).
Samuel Perez v. By the Rockies, LLC, & Duane Layton, 2023 COA 109 (Colo. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 13× “The district court applied the statute of limitations in the Colorado Wage Claim Act, section 8-4-122, C.R.S. 2023. Applying the plain language of that statute, the majority of a division of the court of appeals concludes that section 8-4-122 does not apply to claims brought…”
Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms, Inc., 2018 CO 15 (Colo. 2018). · cites it 8× “§ 8-4-109 (1)(a) permit a terminated employee to sue for wages or compensation that went unpaid at any time during the employee's employment, even when the statute of limitations ( Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-122 ) has run on the cause of action the employee could have brought for…”
Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 3d 789 (D. Colo. 2017). · cites it 3× “§ 8-4-109 (l)(a) permit a terminated employee to sue *802 for wages or compensation that went unpaid at any time during the employee’s employment, even when the statute of limitations ( Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-122 ) has run on the cause of action the employee could have brought…”
Balle-Tun v. Zeng & Wong, Inc. (D. Colo. 2022). · cites it 9× “6 Plaintiffs argue that, by its own terms, § 8-4-122 does not apply to claims arising from the CMWA and MWOs/COMPs Orders.”
Roman v. Morconava Grp., LLC (D. Colo. 2023). · cites it 6× “3 In their opening brief, Defendants argued that C.R.S. § 8-4-122, which provides for a two-year statute of limitations, applies.”
Bagoue v. Developmental Pathways, Inc. (D. Colo. 2019). · cites it 2× “Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-122 . “To fall under the three-year limitation, the plaintiff must show that ‘the 17 Plaintiff argues, and defendants do not contest, that the Court “should not embrace [d]efendants’ legal theory,” and that the Court “can enter judgment as to the claim…”
Kulasa v. Wyndham Vacation Rentals North Am., LLC (D. Colo. 2020). · cites it 2× “Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-122 . Mr. Kulasa initiated this lawsuit on February 25, 2019.”
Cordova-Gonzalez v. TW Lath-N-Stucco, Inc (D. Colo. 2021). · cites it 2× “The CWCA is governed by its explicit 2 or 3-year statute of limitations, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-122 , and the MWA, in the absence of an explicit statute of limitations, is governed by the general limitations statutes codified at title 13, article 80 of the Colorado Revised…”
Levine v. Vitamin Cottage Nat. Food Markets, Inc. (D. Colo. 2023). · cites it 2× “2018); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-122 (2016). While Plaintiff did not assert a CWCA claim until his Amended Complaint, filed on April 1, 2020 [#17], this amendment plainly relates back to the date of Plaintiff’s original Complaint as it “asserts a claim or defense that arose out of…”
Valdez v. Universal Logistics of Virginia, LLC (D. Colo. 2024). · cites it 2× “Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-122 . The filing of the class action in Faine suspended the statute of limitations for plaintiffs’ individual claims between January 14, 2021 and February 7, 2023.”
Hodgden v. Mountain West Ins. & Fin. Servs. LLC (D. Colo. 2025). · cites it 2× “See §8-4-122, C.R.S.; 7 Colo. Code Regs. § 1103-8.”
Topa v. Frechin (Colo. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 2× “See § 8-4-122, C.R.S. 2025. To the extent that the claim was based on a theory of unjust enrichment, it was subject to a three-year limitations period.”
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