(1) The final order of the panel constitutes the final order of the division. If a person in interest, including Pinnacol Assurance, is dissatisfied with any final order of the division that determines compensability of a claim or liability of any party, that requires any party to pay a penalty or benefits, or that denies a claimant any benefit or penalty, the person may commence an action in the court of appeals against the industrial claim appeals office as defendant to modify or vacate the order on the grounds set forth in section 8- 43-308.
(2) All such actions shall have precedence over any civil cause of a different nature pending in such court, and the court of appeals shall always be deemed open for the trial thereof, and such actions shall be tried and determined by the court of appeals in the manner provided for other civil actions.
(3) (Deleted by amendment, L. 95, p. 235, § 3, effective April 17, 1995.)
(4) In any case before the court of appeals pursuant to this section, the court may apply the sanctions of rule 38 of the Colorado appellate rules if the court finds such application to be appropriate.
Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 511, § 1, effective July 1. L. 91: (1) and (3) amended and (4) added, p. 1324, § 37, effective July 1. L. 95: (1) and (3) amended, p. 235, § 3, effective April 17. L. 2002: (1) amended, p. 1883, § 31, effective July 1. L. 2021: (1) amended, (HB 21-1050), ch. 384, p. 2575, § 12, effective September 7.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 8-53-119 as it existed prior to 1990.
Notes of Decisions
Allison v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of Colorado, 884 P.2d 1113 (Colo. 1994).
· cites it 129× “A petition for review in the Court of Appeals on writ of certiorari as provided in section 8-43-307, C.R.S., is a matter addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court, and such determination shall constitute judicial review.”
Pinnacol Assurance v. Hoff, 2016 CO 53 (Colo. 2016).
· cites it 5× “Section 8-43-307 allows dissatisfied parties to appeal a Panel order to the court of appeals, see § 8-43-307(1), and several subsequent sections circumscribe the nature and scope of that court’s review, see §§ 8-43-308 to -310.”
Leewaye v. Ind. Claim Appeals Off. of State, 178 P.3d 1254 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 4× “1986); § 8-43-307, C.R.S. 2007. The order is set aside, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including consideration of the conflict of interest issue.”
Sheid v. Hewlett Packard, 826 P.2d 396 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 2× “” Because of the claimant’s noncompliance, her psychiatric records were not included in the record for administrative or judicial review under § 8-43-301 and § 8-43-307, C.R.S. (1990 Cum.Supp.). Consequently, there is no evidentiary foundation to support claimant’s contention…”
People v. Collins, 32 P.3d 636 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 4× “1998); see also § 8-43-307, C.R.S.2000 (granting certain priority to appeals in workers' compensation cases).”
Martinez v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 832 P.2d 1060 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 4× “The employer asserts that the amendment to § 8-43-307 was procedural or remedial in nature and should be applied retroactively.”
Duran v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 883 P.2d 477 (Colo. 1994).
· cites it 2× “IV In addition to the equal protection argument raised in these consolidated cases, cer-tiorari was also granted in Duran’s case to address the question of whether “the court of appeals erred in denying a petition for certio-rari under section 8-43-307, 3B C.”
Whiteside v. Smith, 67 P.3d 1240 (Colo. 2003).
“See § 8-43-307. Unlike those claimants who can pay the fee, those who cannot because they are indigent possess no statutory process to challenge the accuracy of the treating physician's determinations by hearing and appeals to the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and the court of…”
v. Icao, 2020 COA 131 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 2× “Although the burden of proof is on the employer to 9 show that the employee made a distinct departure from the scope of employment while on travel status, the burden of proof is on the claimant to show a return to the course and scope of employment.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-43-307(1) — 5 cases
Allison v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of Colorado, 884 P.2d 1113 (Colo. 1994).
“A petition for review in the Court of Appeals on writ of certiorari as provided in section 8-43-307, C.R.S., is a matter addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court, and such determination shall constitute judicial review.”
Pinnacol Assurance v. Hoff, 2016 CO 53 (Colo. 2016).
“Section 8-43-307 allows dissatisfied parties to appeal a Panel order to the court of appeals, see § 8-43-307(1), and several subsequent sections circumscribe the nature and scope of that court’s review, see §§ 8-43-308 to -310.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-43-307(4) — 2 cases
Martinez v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 832 P.2d 1060 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
“The employer asserts that the amendment to § 8-43-307 was procedural or remedial in nature and should be applied retroactively.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-43-307(8) — 1 case
v. Icao, 2020 COA 131 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
“Although the burden of proof is on the employer to 9 show that the employee made a distinct departure from the scope of employment while on travel status, the burden of proof is on the claimant to show a return to the course and scope of employment.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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