Upon hearing the action, the court of appeals
may affirm or set aside such order, but only upon the following grounds: That the findings of
fact are not sufficient to permit appellate review; that conflicts in the evidence are not resolved
in the record; that the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence; that the findings of fact
do not support the order; or that the award or denial of benefits is not supported by applicable
law. If the findings of fact entered by the director or administrative law judge are supported by
substantial evidence, they shall not be altered by the court of appeals.
Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 511, § 1, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 8-53-120 as it existed prior to 1990.
Notes of Decisions
Allison v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of Colorado, 884 P.2d 1113 (Colo. 1994).
· cites it 24× “Any person in interest, including the Colorado compensation insurance authority, being dissatisfied with any final order of the division, may file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the court of appeals against the industrial claim appeals office as defendant to modify or…”
Pinnacol Assurance v. Hoff, 2016 CO 53 (Colo. 2016).
· cites it 2× “Section 8-43-307 allows dissatisfied parties to appeal a Panel order to the court of appeals, see § 8-43-307(1), and several subsequent sections circumscribe the nature and scope of that court’s review, see §§ 8-43-308 to -310. Section 8-43-313, in turn, allows a…”
Indus. Claim Appeals Off. v. Orth, 965 P.2d 1246 (Colo. 1998).
· cites it 6× “Our review of the ICAO's order is conducted pursuant to section 8-43-308, and is substantially similar to the review described by section 8-43-301(8).”
Coates, Reid & Waldron v. Vigil, 856 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1993).
· cites it 6× “)), has in an enumerated fashion set forth the precise grounds upon which the court of appeals may set aside an order by the ALJ: Upon hearing the action, the court of appeals may affirm or set aside such order, but only upon the following grounds: That the findings of fact are…”
City of Brighton v. Rodriguez, 318 P.3d 496 (Colo. 2014).
· cites it 2× “2004); see also § 8-43-308, C.R.S. (20183) (providing that an appellate court may reverse an order of the ICAO if "the award or denial of benefits is not supported by applicable law").”
Martinez v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 176 P.3d 826 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 2× “See § 8-43-308, C.R.S.2006 (reviewing court must uphold the ALJ’s determination if supported by substantial evidence in the record); Brownson-Rausin v.”
Fulton v. Soopers, 823 P.2d 709 (Colo. 1992).
· cites it 8× “[4] Appellate review of the ICAO's order is similarly governed by section 8-43-308, 3B C.R.S. (1991 Supp.) (formerly § 8-53-120, 3B C.”
Martinez v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 832 P.2d 1060 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 4× “This principle is statutorily mandated by § 8-43-308, C.R.S. (1991 Cum.Supp.) and restricts our court to a review of legal errors in workers’ compensation cases.”
Pena v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 117 P.3d 84 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 3× “Section 8-43-308, C.R.S. 2004. We give deference to the Panel’s interpretation of workers’ compensation statutes and will set that interpretation aside only if it is inconsistent with the clear language of the statute or the legislative intent.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.