Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-46-101 (2026)

Subsequent injury fund

✓ current as of July 2026

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(1) (a) In a case where an employee has previously sustained permanent partial industrial disability and in a subsequent injury sustains additional permanent partial industrial disability and it is shown that the combined industrial disabilities render the employee permanently and totally incapable of steady gainful employment and incapable of rehabilitation to steady gainful employment, then the employer in whose employ the employee sustained such subsequent injury shall be liable only for that portion of the employee's industrial disability attributable to said subsequent injury, and the balance of compensation due such employee on account of permanent total disability shall be paid from the subsequent injury fund as is provided in this section.

(b) (I) In addition to such compensation and after the completion of the payments therefor, the employee shall continue to receive compensation at said employee's established compensation rate for permanent total disability until death out of a special fund to be known as the subsequent injury fund, hereby created for such purpose. The subsequent injury fund shall be funded pursuant to the provisions of section 8-46-102.

(II) The unrestricted year-end balance of the subsequent injury fund, created pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b), for the 1991-92 fiscal year shall constitute a reserve, as defined in section 24-77-102 (12), C.R.S., and, for purposes of section 24-77-103, C.R.S.:

(A) Any moneys credited to the subsequent injury fund in any subsequent fiscal year shall be included in state fiscal year spending, as defined in section 24-77-102 (17), C.R.S.; and

(B) Any transfers or expenditures from the subsequent injury fund in any subsequent fiscal year shall not be included in state fiscal year spending, as defined in section 24-77-102 (17), C.R.S., for such fiscal year.

(1.5) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, on May 1, 2003, the state treasurer shall deduct twenty million dollars from the subsequent injury fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.

(1.7) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, on March 30, 2009, the state treasurer shall deduct twenty-six million five hundred thousand dollars from the subsequent injury fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.

(2) If an employee entitled to additional benefits, as provided in this section, obtains employment while receiving compensation from the subsequent injury fund, such employee shall be compensated out of said fund at the rate of one-half of said employee's average weekly wage loss, subject to the maximum and minimum provisions of the workers' compensation act, during such period of employment.

(3) In case payment is or has been made under the provisions of this section and dependency later is shown or if payment is made by mistake or inadvertence or under such circumstances that justice requires a refund thereof, the division is authorized to refund such payment to the employer or, if insured, the employer's insurance carrier.

(4) (a) The sums provided for the subsequent injury fund created by this section shall be used to pay the costs related to the administration of the fund and to make such compensation payments as may be required by the provisions of articles 40 to 47 of this title.

(b) Moneys in the subsequent injury fund are continuously appropriated to the division for the payment of benefits as provided in this section and legal fees.

(5) The director shall administer and conduct all matters involving the subsequent injury fund in the name of the division, and, in that name and without any other name, title, or authority, the director may:

(a) (I) Sue and be sued in all the courts of this state, of any other state, or of the United States and in actions arising out of any act, deed, matter, or thing made, omitted, entered into, done, or suffered in connection with the subsequent injury fund and the administration or conduct of matters relating thereto, including the authority to employ counsel to represent the fund in any action.

(II) Nothing in this paragraph (a) shall be construed to waive any provisions of the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act", article 10 of title 24, C.R.S., nor shall it be construed to waive immunity of the state of Colorado from suit in federal court, guaranteed by the eleventh amendment to the constitution of the United States.

(b) Make and enter into contracts or obligations relating to the subsequent injury fund as authorized or permitted under the provisions of articles 40 to 47 of this title, but neither the director nor any officer or employee of the division shall be personally liable in any private capacity for or on account of any act done or omitted or contract or other obligation entered into or undertaken in an official capacity in good faith and without intent to defraud in connection with the administration or conduct of the subsequent injury fund, its business, or other affairs relating thereto.

Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 542, § 1, effective July 1. L. 93: (1)(b) amended, p. 1505, § 2, effective June 6. L. 2003: (1.5) added, p. 455, § 3, effective March 5. L. 2007:

(4)(b) amended, p. 608, § 1, effective April 20. L. 2009: (1.7) added, (SB 09-208), ch. 149, p. 618, § 2, effective April 20.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 8-51-106 as it existed prior to 1990.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 26 cases, 1991–2008 · leading case: Christie v. Coors Transp. Co., 933 P.2d 1330 (Colo. 1997).

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Christie v. Coors Transp. Co., 933 P.2d 1330 (Colo. 1997). · cites it 18× “5)(a) in pari materia with section 8-46-101(1)(a), 3B C.R.S. (1995 Supp.”

Waddell v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 552 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 33× “Claimant first contends that the Panel erred when it determined that the SIF was not responsible for any part of the award.”

Dworkin, Chambers & Williams, P.C. v. Provo, 81 P.3d 1053 (Colo. 2003). · cites it 2× “gment or decree made by any court as provided by said articles shall be subject to such order being reduced to judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction and shall also be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars per day for each such offense, seventy-five…”

Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238 (Colo. 2008). · cites it 3× “(2008); Subsequent Injury Fund, section 8-46-101, CRS. (2008); Supplier Database Cash Fund, section 24-102-202.”

United Airlines, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 993 P.2d 1152 (Colo. 2000). · cites it 5× “(1998), as “the previous disability statute,” section 8-46-101, 3 C.R.S. (1999), as “the SIF statute,” section 8-46-104, 3 C.”

Holliday v. Bestop, Inc., 23 P.3d 700 (Colo. 2001). · cites it 4× “gment or decree made by any court as provided by said articles shall be subject to such order being reduced to judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction and shall also be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars per day for each such offense, seventy-five…”

Moland v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of Colorado, 111 P.3d 507 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 3× “Section 8-46-101(5), C.R.S.2003. Its purpose is to provide aid to workers who are partially disabled by a previous injury, thereby relieving employers of greater potential liability through the pooling of risks and costs of hiring workers who have suffered previous on-the-job…”

McKinney v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of the State of Colorado, 894 P.2d 42 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 4× “Claimant and WCEA also argue that the Panel’s construction is inconsistent with the statute governing the Subsequent Injury Fund, § 8-46-101(l)(a), C.R.S. (1994 Cum. Supp.”

Culver v. Ace Elec., 952 P.2d 1200 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 6× “industrial disability for purposes of § 8-46-101(1)(a). In resolving this issue, we note that the purpose of the SIF was to ameliorate the harsh effects of the full responsibility rule.”

Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Walter, 812 P.2d 1168 (Colo. 1991). · cites it 2× “(1986), was repealed and reenacted as section 8-46-101, 3B C.R.S. (1990 Supp.).”

Christie v. Coors Transp. Co., 919 P.2d 857 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 3× “5)(a) should include the factors set forth in §§ 8-46-101(l)(a) and 8-43-303(3), C.R.S.”

Bowland v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 984 P.2d 660 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 3× “(emphasis supplied) Section 8-46-101, C.R.S.1997, creates a different form of apportionment under which a permanently and totally disabled worker still recovers full compensation for permanent and total disabilities: (l)(a) In a case where an employee has previously sustained…”

Show all 26 citing cases →

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-46-101(1) — 3 cases

Mountain Meadows Nursing Ctr. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of Colorado, 990 P.2d 1090 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

Citadel Mall v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 892 P.2d 419 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).

Electron Corp. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 817 P.2d 576 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-46-101(1)(a) — 4 cases

Christie v. Coors Transp. Co., 933 P.2d 1330 (Colo. 1997). “5)(a) in pari materia with section 8-46-101(1)(a), 3B C.R.S. (1995 Supp.”

Waddell v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 552 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). “Claimant first contends that the Panel erred when it determined that the SIF was not responsible for any part of the award.”

Culver v. Ace Elec., 952 P.2d 1200 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). “industrial disability for purposes of § 8-46-101(1)(a). In resolving this issue, we note that the purpose of the SIF was to ameliorate the harsh effects of the full responsibility rule.”

Safeway, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of the Colorado, 968 P.2d 162 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-46-101(5) — 1 case

Moland v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of Colorado, 111 P.3d 507 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). “Section 8-46-101(5), C.R.S.2003. Its purpose is to provide aid to workers who are partially disabled by a previous injury, thereby relieving employers of greater potential liability through the pooling of risks and costs of hiring workers who have suffered previous on-the-job…”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-46-101(l)(a) — 10 cases

Christie v. Coors Transp. Co., 933 P.2d 1330 (Colo. 1997). “5)(a) in pari materia with section 8-46-101(1)(a), 3B C.R.S. (1995 Supp.”

McKinney v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of the State of Colorado, 894 P.2d 42 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). “Claimant and WCEA also argue that the Panel’s construction is inconsistent with the statute governing the Subsequent Injury Fund, § 8-46-101(l)(a), C.R.S. (1994 Cum. Supp.”

Christie v. Coors Transp. Co., 919 P.2d 857 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). “5)(a) should include the factors set forth in §§ 8-46-101(l)(a) and 8-43-303(3), C.R.S.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-46-101(l)(b)(I) — 1 case

Montezuma Well Serv., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of the State, 928 P.2d 796 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).

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