If any person fails or refuses to comply with an
order of the director, or to obey any subpoena issued by the director or agents of the division, or
to furnish the statistics, data, and information required to be furnished to the division by the
provisions of articles 40 to 47 of this title, or refuses to permit an inspection as provided in said
articles, or being in attendance refuses to be sworn or examined, or to answer a question, or to
produce a book or paper when ordered to do so by the director or any of the deputies, agents, or
referees of the division, the director may apply to the district court, upon proof by affidavit of the
facts, for an order, returnable in not less than three days nor more than five days, directing such
person to show cause before the district court which made the order why such person should not
be committed to jail. Upon the return of such order, the district court shall examine under oath
such person and give the person an opportunity to be heard. If the court determines that the
person has refused without legal excuse in any one of the foregoing matters, it may commit the
offender to jail forthwith by warrant, there to remain until the person submits to do the act which
said person was required to do or until said person is discharged according to law.
Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 552, § 1, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 8-46-103 as it existed prior to 1990.
Notes of Decisions
Coates, Reid & Waldron v. Vigil, 856 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1993).
· cites it 14× “) Presumably, the ALJ's basis for employing the amount of Vigil's weekly earnings at the time of her second injury for the purpose of computing Vigil's permanent and total disability compensation was section 8-47-102(1), 3B C.R.S. (1986) (now codified with changes at section…”
Askew v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 927 P.2d 1333 (Colo. 1996).
· cites it 2× “Section 8^(2-104(2) is virtually identical to section 8-47-102, 3B C.R.S. (1986), as it existed prior to the 1990 repeal and reenactment of the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado.”
Vigil v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of Colorado, 841 P.2d 335 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 2× “In reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful of § 8-47-102(1), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 3B) (now codified with changes at § 8-42-104(1), C.”
Subsequent Injury Fund v. Gallegos, 746 P.2d 71 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 2× “To the contrary, however, § 8-47-102(2), C.R.S. (1986 RepLVol. 3B), concerning apportionment of disabilities, provides: “[Ejxcept that, in the event the provisions of section 8-51-106 are applicable, such apportionment [using the prior permanent partial disability rating] shall…”
Platte Valley Lumber, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 870 P.2d 634 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 3× “*636 Vigil was predicated upon the fact that § 8-47-102(1), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 3B) allowed the ALJ to exercise discretion to compute the average weekly wage of the employee in such other manner and by such other method as will fairly determine such employee’s average weekly…”
Higgs v. W. Landscaping & Sprinkler Sys., Inc., 789 P.2d 431 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 3× “” In my view under Petrafeck all employees must be treated the same as to the computation of “wages” under § 8-47-102(2), and therefore it is impermissible to treat employees differently in determining their “wages” based on the source of the wages (e.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-47-102(1) — 3 cases
Coates, Reid & Waldron v. Vigil, 856 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1993).
“) Presumably, the ALJ's basis for employing the amount of Vigil's weekly earnings at the time of her second injury for the purpose of computing Vigil's permanent and total disability compensation was section 8-47-102(1), 3B C.R.S. (1986) (now codified with changes at section…”
Platte Valley Lumber, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 870 P.2d 634 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
“*636 Vigil was predicated upon the fact that § 8-47-102(1), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 3B) allowed the ALJ to exercise discretion to compute the average weekly wage of the employee in such other manner and by such other method as will fairly determine such employee’s average weekly…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-47-102(2) — 2 cases
Subsequent Injury Fund v. Gallegos, 746 P.2d 71 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
“To the contrary, however, § 8-47-102(2), C.R.S. (1986 RepLVol. 3B), concerning apportionment of disabilities, provides: “[Ejxcept that, in the event the provisions of section 8-51-106 are applicable, such apportionment [using the prior permanent partial disability rating] shall…”
Higgs v. W. Landscaping & Sprinkler Sys., Inc., 789 P.2d 431 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
“” In my view under Petrafeck all employees must be treated the same as to the computation of “wages” under § 8-47-102(2), and therefore it is impermissible to treat employees differently in determining their “wages” based on the source of the wages (e.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.