Bissonnette v. Bissonnette, 142 A.2d 527 (Conn. 1958). · Go Syfert
Bissonnette v. Bissonnette, 142 A.2d 527 (Conn. 1958). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
40 citation events across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co. (ca2, 1983-05-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1959 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1959 1992 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co.
2d Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
While it is true that the Connecticut Supreme Court has not addressed the choice of law issue in a tort case resulting from an aviation mishap, as opposed to some other type of transportation accident, nothing in the language-of the Connecticut decisions applying lex loci delicti in accident cases warrants the strained distinction now relied upon, see, e.g., Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407 , 374 A.2d 1061, 1064 (1977); Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563 , 280 A.2d 875, 876 (1971); Bissonnette v. Bissonnette, 145 Conn. 733 , 142 A.2d 527, 528 (1958).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Katherine H. Saloomey, Administratrix, Estate of Willard Vernon Wahlund, Deceased v. Jeppesen & Co., Peter C. Halstead, Administrator, Estate of Erik F. Wahlund, Deceased v. Jeppesen & Co.
2d Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
While it is true that the Connecticut Supreme Court has not addressed the choice of law issue in a tort case resulting from an aviation mishap, as opposed to some other type of transportation accident, nothing in the language of the Connecticut decisions applying lex loci delicti in accident cases warrants the strained distinction now relied upon, see, e.g., Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407 , 374 A.2d 1061, 1064 (1977); Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563 , 280 A.2d 875, 876 (1971); Bissonnette v. Bissonnette, 145 Conn. 733 , 142 A.2d 527, 528 (1958). 37 There is no real uncertainty as to what ch…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Halstead v. United States
D. Conn. · 1982 · confidence medium
Judge Blumenfeld instructed the jury to govern its award by that maximum limitation and the Court of Appeals affirmed by quoting language from Bissonnette v. Bissonnette, 145 Conn. 733, 734 , 142 A.2d 527, 528 (1958) which held that “the creation and extent of liability in tort are fixed by the law of the state in which the tort is committed.” Obviously, Judge Blumenfeld and the Second Circuit panel interpreted the word “extent” to refer to the measure of the damages, including any limitation placed on recovery by the jurisdiction wherein the injury had been sustained.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) K-Mart Corp. v. Midcon Realty Group of Connecticut, Ltd.
D. Conn. · 1980 · confidence medium
In tort actions, Connecticut courts follow the rule of lex loci delicti — i. e., “[t]he creation and extent of liability in tort are fixed by the law of the state in which the tort is committed.” Bissonnette v. Bissonnette, 145 Conn. 733, 734 , 142 A.2d 527, 528 (1958).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Saharceski v. Marcure
Mass. · 1977 · confidence medium
The Connecticut Supreme Court has not been confronted with this question, and one can attempt to answer the question under Connecticut law only by anticipating the Connecticut result from decisions of that court on other conflict of laws questions. 8 In a recent opinion, the *313 Supreme Court of Connecticut has reaffirmed its position that “in motor vehicle cases ‘[t]he creation and extent of liability are fixed by the law of the state in which the tort is committed.’ ” Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407, 411 (1977), quoting from Bissonnette v. Bissonnette, 145 Conn. 733, 734 (1958).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Patch v. Stanley Works
2d Cir. · 1971 · confidence medium
Connecticut holds that “The creation and extent of liability in tort are fixed by the law of the state in which the tort is committed,” Bissonnette v. Bissonnette, 145 Conn. 733, 734 , 142 A.2d 527, 528 (1958) (emphasis supplied).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mildred A. Patch, Administratrix of the Estate of Parker P. Patch, and Cross-Appellant v. The Stanley Works (Stanley Chemical Company Division) and Thomas Keller, and Cross-Appellees. Joseph A. Soucy v. Thomas Keller and the Stanley Works
2d Cir. · 1971 · confidence medium
Connecticut holds that "The creation and extent of liability in tort are fixed by the law of the state in which the tort is committed," Bissonnette v. Bissonnette, 145 Conn. 733, 734 , 142 A.2d 527, 528 (1958) (emphasis supplied).
discussed Cited "see" Parks v. BALDWIN PIANO AND ORGAN COMPANY (2×)
D. Conn. · 1967 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bissonnette v. Bissonnette, 145 Conn. 733, 734 , 142 A.2d 527 (1958). 17 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Eloise Bissonnette
v.
Henry R. Bissonnette
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
May 27, 1958.
142 A.2d 527
Edward J. Daly, Jr., with whom was Richard Levin, for the appellant (plaintiff)., Valentine J. Sacco, with whom was Jerome I. Walsh, for the appellee (defendant).
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published
Per Curiam.

The plaintiff is the wife of the defendant. They are residents of this state. While in Massachusetts on August 29, 1956, an automobile[*734] owned and operated by the defendant was involved in an accident. His wife, a passenger in the car, was injured. She brought suit against her husband in the Superior Court to recover for her injuries. The court sustained a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that under the laws of Massachusetts suits between husband and wife are not authorized and, since no cause of action arose in that state, the suit could not be prosecuted here. Prom the judgment rendered upon her failure to plead over, the plaintiff has appealed.

The creation and. extent of liability in tort are fixed by the law of the state in which the tort is committed. In this case it is the law of Massachusetts. If the wife could not sue her husband in Massachusetts, she could not maintain an action in this state to enforce a right which did not exist there. We are dealing with a substantive right. The Massachusetts law provides that married women may sue and be sued as though single, but suits between husband and wife are not authorized. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 209, § 6 (1955); Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 551, 78 N.E.2d 637. As the plaintiff never had a cause of action in Massachusetts, she has none here. Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 282, 113 A.2d 509, and cases cited therein.

There is no error.