Conn. Gen. Stat. » Title 01 — PROVISIONS OF GENERAL APPLICATION · Chapter 1 — Construction of Statutes
Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-1d (2026)

“Minor”, “infant”, “infancy”, “age of majority”, defined

✓ current as of May 2026
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Except as otherwise provided by statute, on and after October 1, 1972, the terms “minor”, “infant” and “infancy” shall be deemed to refer to a person under the age of eighteen years and any person eighteen years of age or over shall be an adult for all purposes whatsoever and have the same legal capacity, rights, powers, privileges, duties, liabilities and responsibilities as persons heretofore had at twenty-one years of age, and “age of majority” shall be deemed to be eighteen years.

(1972, P.A. 127, S. 1.)

Cited. 165 C. 251. Court ordered support for a minor child terminates when child reaches eighteen. 168 C. 144. Cited. 171 C. 23. In contempt action for support it is law set forth in statutes rather than contract which imposes obligations for support; no statutory authority to grant support for person over eighteen. 177 C. 47. Cited. Id., 327; 180 C. 252; 184 C. 36; Id., 121; 185 C. 156; 187 C. 6; 190 C. 141. Establishment of age of majority is read to have prospective effect only. 279 C. 207.

Cited. 1 CA 578; 8 CA 76; Id., 607; 10 CA 147; 19 CA 146.

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Notes of Decisions
Cited in 27 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1973–2025 · leading case: Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 901 A.2d 673 (Conn. 2006).
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Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 901 A.2d 673 (Conn. 2006). · cites it 26× “The trial court further concluded that nothing in the language of § 52-577d or General Statutes § 1-1d, 4 which generally defines the age of majority as eighteen years, indicates that the thirty year statute of limitations period should be calculated differently for an…”
Hunter v. Hunter, 416 A.2d 1201 (Conn. 1979). · cites it 8× “In her appeal, the defendant claims the trial court erred in limiting the plaintiff's obligation under the 1969 judgment to support, maintain and educate his daughter until she reached the age of eighteen; in deciding that General Statutes § 1-1d [2] so affected § 46-49 as to…”
Broaca v. Broaca, 435 A.2d 1016 (Conn. 1980). · cites it 4× “" Because the age of majority in this state is now eighteen; General Statutes § 1-1d; we concluded in Kennedy that any order of child support purporting to extend beyond a child's eighteenth birthday is outside the jurisdiction of the court and of "no force and effect.”
Hughes v. Hughes, 895 A.2d 274 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 4× “Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the order must contain a step-down to coincide with each child reaching the age of majority.”
Malpeso v. Malpeso, 138 A.3d 1069 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016). · cites it 3× “General Statutes § 1-1d ; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 177 Conn.”
Slicer v. Quigley, 429 A.2d 855 (Conn. 1980). · cites it 4× “Any permittee who, by himself, his servant or agent, sells or delivers alcoholic liquor to any minor, or to any intoxicated person, or to any habitual drunkard, knowing him to be such an habitual drunkard, and any person, except the parent or guardian of a minor, who delivers or…”
State v. Falby, 444 A.2d 213 (Conn. 1982). · cites it 2× “The defendant's next claim for suppression rests upon the police strategy of promising him psychiatric help in return for a confession. Such promises made to a young man whom the police knew to have a troubled psychiatric history, the defendant argues, fatally weaken the…”
Kennedy v. Kennedy, 411 A.2d 25 (Conn. 1979). · cites it 2× “In 1972, General Statutes § 1-1d was enacted which lowered the age of majority from twenty-one years of age to eighteen years of age.”
Keusch v. Keusch, 195 A.3d 1136 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018). · cites it 2× “7 Specifically, he argues, inter alia, that the court's order improperly precludes reductions based on each child attaining the age of majority. We agree. "As a general matter, [t]he obligation of a parent to support a child terminates when the child attains the age of majority,…”
Loughlin v. Loughlin, 889 A.2d 902 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 2× “2d 1287 (1983) (concluding that disproportionately high child support award was, in reality, disguised alimony for custodial parent, who was supporting her adult daughter in addition to minor child for whom support had been ordered). As a general matter, “[t]he obligation of a…”
Weber v. U.S. Sterling Sec., Inc., 924 A.2d 816 (Conn. 2007). “2d 673 (2006) (“[i]t is beyond dispute that [General Statutes] § 1-1d is substantive in nature because it generally gives persons .”
Crews v. Crews, 945 A.2d 502 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). · cites it 2× “The statutory grant of jurisdiction to the Superior Court in matters relating to child support incident to the dissolution of a marriage likewise expressly circumscribes the court's jurisdiction to orders involving only minor children." (Citations omitted; internal quotation…”
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