(a) Any docking facility in violation of any requirement or order of the commissioner issued pursuant to section
15-172 shall be deemed a public nuisance. The Attorney General shall, at the request of the commissioner, institute proceedings to enjoin or abate any such nuisance.
(b) Any person owning or operating a docking facility in violation of any requirement or order issued pursuant to section 15-172 or any regulation issued pursuant to section 15-174, or who commits, takes part in or assists in any violation of the terms or conditions of such requirement or order shall forfeit to the state a sum not to exceed ten thousand dollars, to be fixed by the court, for each offense. Each violation shall be a separate and distinct offense, and, in the case of a continuing violation, each day's continuance thereof shall be deemed to be a separate and distinct offense. The Attorney General shall, at the request of the commissioner, institute a civil action to recover such forfeiture.
(c) Any person who wilfully or with criminal negligence violates any provision of section 15-171 or 15-172 shall be fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars per day for each day of violation or be imprisoned not more than one year or both. A subsequent conviction for any such violation shall carry a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars per day for each day of violation or imprisonment for not more than two years or both. For the purposes of this subsection, “person” includes any responsible corporate officer.
(P.A. 90-173, S. 4.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
24
cases (
6 in the last 5 years), 1986–2023 · leading case:
State v. Douglas C., 345 Conn. 421 (Conn. 2022).
State v. Douglas C., 345 Conn. 421 (Conn. 2022).
· cites it 2× “, General Statutes § 15-173’’; because this shows that, ‘‘when the legislature wishes to speak on the issue, one way or the other, it knows how to do so.”
State v. McElrath, 366 S.E.2d 442 (N.C. 1988).
· cites it 2× “C.G.S. § 15-173 (1983). Accordingly, only the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of all of the evidence is before us here.”
State v. Cummings, 372 S.E.2d 541 (N.C. 1988).
· cites it 2× “C.G.S. § 15-173 (1983). We need only address defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence.”
State v. Bonney, 405 S.E.2d 145 (N.C. 1991).
“The defendant next assigns as error the trial court’s denial of his motions to dismiss the first-degree murder charge against him.”
State v. Perry, 340 S.E.2d 450 (N.C. 1986).
“) We particularly note that this section penalizes possession of 4 grams or more of any mixture containing heroin without regard to the percentage of heroin in the mixture.”
State v. Lee, 501 S.E.2d 334 (N.C. 1998).
“Defendant asserts that the State failed to offer any direct evidence linking him to the homicide and therefore raised only a suspicion of guilt. We shall consider only the appeal of the denial of the motion made at the close of all the evidence since defendant introduced…”
State v. Evangelista, 353 S.E.2d 375 (N.C. 1987).
“C.G.S. § 15-173. The defendant’s exception to *160 the denial of his motion to dismiss made at the close of all of the evidence, however, presents the issue of the sufficiency of all of the evidence to go to the jury.”
State v. Rasor, 356 S.E.2d 328 (N.C. 1987).
“C.G.S. § 15-173 (1983); State v. Griffin, 319 N.”
State v. Harris, 371 S.E.2d 689 (N.C. 1988).
“C.G.S. § 15-173 (1983); N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(3).”
State v. Spaugh, 364 S.E.2d 368 (N.C. 1988).
“C.G.S. § 15-173 (1983); App. R. 10(b)(3).”
State v. Jordan, 365 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. 1988).
“He argues that the particular facts of this case show that the evidence is inherently incredible, thus a reasonable jury would not have found that the offense occurred as claimed by the victim. At the outset, we note that defendant did not make a motion to dismiss for…”
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.