Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-173 (2025)

Docking facility in violation of requirement or order deemed public nuisance. Civil and criminal penalties for violations

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(a) Any docking facility in violation of any requirement or order of the commissioner issued pursuant to section 15-172 shall be deemed a public nuisance. The Attorney General shall, at the request of the commissioner, institute proceedings to enjoin or abate any such nuisance.

(b) Any person owning or operating a docking facility in violation of any requirement or order issued pursuant to section 15-172 or any regulation issued pursuant to section 15-174, or who commits, takes part in or assists in any violation of the terms or conditions of such requirement or order shall forfeit to the state a sum not to exceed ten thousand dollars, to be fixed by the court, for each offense. Each violation shall be a separate and distinct offense, and, in the case of a continuing violation, each day's continuance thereof shall be deemed to be a separate and distinct offense. The Attorney General shall, at the request of the commissioner, institute a civil action to recover such forfeiture.

(c) Any person who wilfully or with criminal negligence violates any provision of section 15-171 or 15-172 shall be fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars per day for each day of violation or be imprisoned not more than one year or both. A subsequent conviction for any such violation shall carry a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars per day for each day of violation or imprisonment for not more than two years or both. For the purposes of this subsection, “person” includes any responsible corporate officer.

(P.A. 90-173, S. 4.)

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1986–2023 · leading case: State v. Douglas C., 285 A.3d 1067 (Conn. 2022).
State v. Douglas C., 285 A.3d 1067 (Conn. 2022). · cites it 2× “’’ These statutes do show that, when the legislature explicitly intends to allow a charge to be based only on a continuous course of conduct or a single act, it knows how to do so.”
State v. McElrath, 366 S.E.2d 442 (N.C. 1988). · cites it 2× “C.G.S. § 15-173 (1983). Accordingly, only the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of all of the evidence is before us here.”
Jean-Baptiste Bado v. US (en banc), 186 A.3d 1243 (D.C. 2018). · cites it 2× “A. § 15-173. Similarly, in Virginia, a ―criminal defendant .”
State v. Cummings, 372 S.E.2d 541 (N.C. 1988). · cites it 2× “C.G.S. § 15-173 (1983). We need only address defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence.”
State v. Bonney, 405 S.E.2d 145 (N.C. 1991). “The defendant next assigns as error the trial court’s denial of his motions to dismiss the first-degree murder charge against him.”
State v. Franklin, 393 S.E.2d 781 (N.C. 1990). “C.G.S. § 15-173 (1983). Accordingly, only the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of all of the evidence is before us here.”
State v. Perry, 340 S.E.2d 450 (N.C. 1986). “) We particularly note that this section penalizes possession of 4 grams or more of any mixture containing heroin without regard to the percentage of heroin in the mixture.”
State v. Lee, 501 S.E.2d 334 (N.C. 1998). “Defendant asserts that the State failed to offer any direct evidence linking him to the homicide and therefore raised only a suspicion of guilt. We shall consider only the appeal of the denial of the motion made at the close of all the evidence since defendant introduced…”
State v. Evangelista, 353 S.E.2d 375 (N.C. 1987). “C.G.S. § 15-173. The defendant’s exception to *160 the denial of his motion to dismiss made at the close of all of the evidence, however, presents the issue of the sufficiency of all of the evidence to go to the jury.”
State v. Smith, 358 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 1987). “We find no error in the guilt phase but remand for a new sentencing hearing. Guilt Phase We first consider whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss all charges, at the close of the State’s evidence and of all the evidence, for insufficient evidence.”
State v. Rasor, 356 S.E.2d 328 (N.C. 1987). “C.G.S. § 15-173 (1983); State v. Griffin, 319 N.”
State v. Harris, 371 S.E.2d 689 (N.C. 1988). “C.G.S. § 15-173 (1983); N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(3).”
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