Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-278 (2026)

Powers and duties of administrative law judges

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section CT-CGAcga.ct.gov (official) JustiaTitle on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
Each administrative law judge shall, for the purposes of this chapter, have power to summon and examine under oath such witnesses, and may direct the production of, and examine or cause to be produced or examined, such books, records, vouchers, memoranda, documents, letters, contracts or other papers in relation to any matter at issue as he may find proper, and shall have the same powers in reference thereto as are vested in magistrates taking depositions and shall have the power to order depositions pursuant to section 52-148. He shall have power to certify to official acts and shall have all powers necessary to enable him to perform the duties imposed upon him by the provisions of this chapter. Each administrative law judge shall hear all claims and questions arising under this chapter in the district to which the administrative law judge is assigned and all such claims shall be filed in the district in which the claim arises, provided, if it is uncertain in which district a claim arises, or if a claim arises out of several injuries or occupational diseases which occurred in one or more districts, the administrative law judge to whom the first request for hearing is made shall hear and determine such claim to the same extent as if it arose solely within his own district. If an administrative law judge is disqualified or temporarily incapacitated from hearing any matter, or if the parties shall so request and the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission finds that it will facilitate a speedier disposition of the claim, he shall designate some other administrative law judge to hear and decide such matter. The Superior Court, on application of an administrative law judge or the chairperson or the Attorney General, may enforce, by appropriate decree or process, any provision of this chapter or any proper order of an administrative law judge or the chairperson rendered pursuant to any such provision. Any administrative law judge, after ceasing to hold office as such administrative law judge, may settle and dispose of all matters relating to appealed cases, including correcting findings and certifying records, as well as any other unfinished matters pertaining to causes theretofore tried by him, to the same extent as if he were still such administrative law judge.

(1949 Rev., S. 7436; 1958 Rev., S. 31-142; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 4; February, 1965, P.A. 577, S. 2; 1969, P.A. 662, S. 4; 1971, P.A. 339; P.A. 73-152; P.A. 76-80, S. 1, 3; P.A. 80-414, S. 4; P.A. 81-472, S. 65, 159; P.A. 82-289, S. 2; P.A. 84-320, S. 4, 6; P.A. 91-339, S. 4, 55; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 7.)

History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1965 act added exceptions to residency requirement, established sixth district office in New Britain and revised list of towns which serve as hearing locations; 1969 act deleted references to “congressional” districts, established seventh district office in Stamford and revised list of towns which serve as hearing locations; 1971 act deleted exceptions to residency requirement which had existed for fourth district commissioner and which had stated that at-large commissioner must reside in a town of the state, added proviso re jurisdiction in cases where there is uncertainty as to district in which claim arises, allowed designation of other than usual commissioner to hear claims if parties request it and commissioner finds it will aid speedy disposition; P.A. 73-152 revised list of towns which serve as hearing locations; P.A. 76-80 empowered commissioners “to order depositions pursuant to section 52-148”; P.A. 80-414 added provision re board chairman's maintenance of an office; P.A. 81-472 made technical changes; P.A. 82-289 referred to Norwich as a town rather than as a city; P.A. 84-320 provided that the commissioner for the eighth district shall maintain an office in Middletown, and that hearings in the district shall be held in Middletown; P.A. 91-339 deleted provisions re commissioners residing in assigned districts and requirements re office locations and changed certain references to “commission” to read “chairman”, effective July 1, 1992; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “compensation commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes, effective May 24, 2022.

See Sec. 31-276 re compensation commissioners' nomination, appointment, terms of office, removal, etc.

Commissioner has jurisdiction only in his own district unless local commissioner is “disqualified or incapacitated”; cannot act by consent of parties. 99 C. 236. Powers of commissioners are purely statutory. 108 C. 33. Contract made in this state, to be performed in another state, governed by our law. 111 C. 696. No jurisdiction to determine rights between employer and two insurance companies. 113 C. 504; 120 C. 503. When acting commissioner is disqualified, commissioner in whose district accident occurred has jurisdiction to name commissioner to act further. 118 C. 29. Cited. 129 C. 594; 132 C. 172; 133 C. 668; 218 C. 46; 232 C. 758. Section does not give commissioner subject matter jurisdiction over insurance coverage issues that require application of laws other than provisions of Workers' Compensation Act. 248 C. 754. Because of the use of “may” instead of “shall”, commissioners are permitted, not required, to continue to hear cases subsequent to their retirement. 251 C. 153.

Cited. 16 CA 138; 21 CA 9; judgment reversed, see 218 C. 46; 22 CA 539; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 439; 24 CA 234; 29 CA 249; 31 CA 819; 34 CA 673; 36 CA 150. The language of the statute does not confer jurisdiction on the commissioner to pierce the corporate veil of a defendant employer. 204 CA 665. Court's award of summary judgment to insurer on basis claims were barred by res judicata was improper; statutory jurisdiction of Workers' Compensation Commission does not include negligence and misrepresentation claims based on conduct after a policy is canceled. 227 CA 314.

Former commissioner who heard the case originally had authority to hear it upon remand after appeal. 14 CS 302. Cited. 39 CS 321.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 48 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1983–2026 · leading case: Cantoni v. Xerox Corp., 740 A.2d 796 (Conn. 1999).
Cantoni v. Xerox Corp., 740 A.2d 796 (Conn. 1999). · cites it 10× “The statute on which the defendants principally rely is General Statutes § 31-278, 9 which *165 allows compensation commissioners, “after ceasing to hold office .”
DeJesus v. R.P.M. Enter., Inc., 204 Conn. App. 665 (Conn. App. Ct. 2021). · cites it 7× “Moreover, at oral argument before this court, the attorney for the fund, after acknowledg- ing that there is no specific statute that permits a com- missioner, as the trier of fact, to pierce the corporate veil, argued that this court should consider General Statutes §§ 31-278…”
Stickney v. Sunlight Constr., Inc., 730 A.2d 630 (Conn. 1999). · cites it 6× “to 1985) §§ 31-278, 31-298 and 31-315 for support.”
Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Allen, 850 A.2d 1047 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). · cites it 2× “In support of that argument, the defendants rely on General Statutes § 31-275, which defines “employee” within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. (act), and General Statutes § 31-278, which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the…”
Hunnihan v. Mattatuck Mfg. Co., 705 A.2d 1012 (Conn. 1997). · cites it 3× “General Statutes § 31-278 sets forth the powers and duties of commissioners.”
Toro v. City of Stamford, 853 A.2d 95 (Conn. 2004). · cites it 3× “General Statutes § 31-278 provides in relevant part: “Each commissioner shall, for the purposes of this chapter, have power to summon and examine under oath such witnesses, and may direct the production of, and examine or cause to be produced or examined, such books, records,…”
Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 828 A.2d 64 (Conn. 2003). “” General Statutes § 31-51m provides: “(a) As used in this section and section 31-278: “(1) ‘Person’ means one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, limited liability companies, business trusts, legal representatives or any organized group of persons;…”
Ryker v. Town of Bethany, 904 A.2d 1227 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 4× “General Statutes § 31-278. 7 Our Supreme Court has held that, in the face of a record that is silent on the grounds for substitution, “we must assume them to have been sufficient.”
Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., 750 A.2d 1098 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000). · cites it 4× “The powers and duties of a commissioner are set forth in General Statutes § 31-278, which provides in part: “Each commissioner shall, for the purposes of this chapter, have power to summon and examine mder oath such witnesses, and may direct the production of, and examine or…”
Gyadu v. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 930 F. Supp. 738 (D. Conn. 1996). · cites it 5× “C.G.S.A. §§ 31-278, 31-297, 31-297a, 31-298.”
DeOliveira v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 870 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2005). · cites it 2× “” General Statutes § 31-278. Specifically, the commissioners have the authority to hear an employee’s claim that, “through the fault or neglect of an employer or insurer, the adjustment or payment of compensation due .”
Enquist v. Gen. Datacom, 587 A.2d 1029 (Conn. 1991). · cites it 2× “Employers could utilize such data to ascertain probable future compensation payments, subject to the approval of the commissioner, who presumably possesses special expertise in matters of valuation.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.