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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 31 — LaborChapter 568 — Workers' Compensation Act

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-315 (2025)

Modification of award or voluntary agreement

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1965–2025 49citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 49 opinions since 1965, 2 of them in the last five years.

Any award of, or voluntary agreement concerning, compensation made under the provisions of this chapter or any transfer of liability for a claim to the Second Injury Fund under the provisions of section 31-349 shall be subject to modification in accordance with the procedure for original determinations, upon the request of either party or, in the case of a transfer under section 31-349, upon request of the custodian of the Second Injury Fund, whenever it appears to the administrative law judge, after notice and hearing thereon, that the incapacity of an injured employee has increased, decreased or ceased, or that the measure of dependence on account of which the compensation is paid has changed, or that changed conditions of fact have arisen which necessitate a change of such agreement, award or transfer in order properly to carry out the spirit of this chapter. The administrative law judge shall also have the same power to open and modify an award as any court of the state has to open and modify a judgment of such court. The administrative law judge shall retain jurisdiction over claims for compensation, awards and voluntary agreements, for any proper action thereon, during the whole compensation period applicable to the injury in question.

(1949 Rev., S. 7434; 1958 Rev., S. 31-166; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 38; P.A. 95-277, S. 11, 19; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)

History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 95-277 amended the section to include any transfer of liability for a claim to the Second Injury Fund and allowed for its modification upon request of the custodian of the fund, effective July 1, 1995; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “compensation commissioner” and “commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.

Power of commissioner to modify award. 94 C. 625; 95 C. 298; 97 C. 83; Id., 335. Modification because disability has ceased may be retroactive to the date when it ceased. 108 C. 36. No bar that the controlling facts were known to claimant and might have been presented in the former hearing. 95 C. 356; 97 C. 76, 84. Aliter in case of long continued negligence of moving party. 100 C. 185. Power to open corresponds to that of a court during the term. 98 C. 741. But this is only as to the change of facts named in section. 100 C. 185; 103 C. 704. Employer may claim revision as well as employee. 97 C. 332. Death of employee after award does not entitle employer to retry the question of liability. 103 C. 705; 105 C. 419. Commissioner may open award because he misunderstood the facts. 106 C. 92. Can open only on the motion of person entitled to claim revision. 101 C. 113. Procedure on petition to open award. 94 C. 626; 106 C. 5. Having opened award, commissioner may try it de novo. 97 C. 84. May determine who shall receive payments after employee's death. 100 C. 419. No right of appeal from denial of motion to reopen and rehear unless commissioner exceeds limits of legal discretion. 112 C. 333. As to power to reopen. 109 C. 601; 128 C. 1; Id., 284; Id., 574. Motion to reopen should follow terminology of statute. 113 C. 747; 126 C. 522. Reopening rests largely within discretion of commissioner. 119 C. 170; Id., 522. No power to reopen to correct mistake of law. 116 C. 1. When it is error in refusing to reopen. 112 C. 333; 113 C. 282. If question of law involved, decision subject to appeal. Id., 262. Cited. 110 C. 285; 111 C. 403; 113 C. 172; 114 C. 395; 116 C. 229; 120 C. 284. Voluntary agreement may be modified if fraud shown. 121 C. 149. Cited. 126 C. 494; 127 C. 297. Powers of commissioner under section. 129 C. 591. Cited. 130 C. 665; 132 C. 172. Power of commissioner to open award. 134 C. 269. Commissioner was justified in treating plaintiff's motion as one for a new trial rather than for a modification of award. 136 C. 340. Denial of a motion to reopen award is proper subject of a separate appeal; motion to reopen on ground of mistake denied. Id., 361. Cited. 137 C. 187; Id., 487. Status of dependent in fact involves three factual elements: (1) Reliance on contributions of decedent for necessary living expenses, (2) a reasonable expectation that the contributions will continue, (3) an absence of sufficient means at hand for meeting these expenses; the first two are fixed at the time of injury and consequently the measure of dependence in section can change from that existing at the time of injury only if there is a subsequent change in the financial resources of claimant. 152 C. 481. Where commissioner found claimant was partial dependent at time of injury but subsequently received sufficient funds from other sources to supply her present necessities, commissioner correctly concluded that, although claimant was dependent in fact at the time of injury, her “measure of dependence” had changed before the time of the hearing and consequently defendants were relieved from paying compensation to her unless and until she showed a further change in circumstances; award to a dependent in fact as well as to a presumptive dependent is award of compensation and subject to modification. Id., 481, 482. Trial court was in error in admitting testimony of draftsman of agreement made under Sec. 31-296 which was clear and unambiguous on its face as only commissioner could open and modify award. 157 C. 538. Cited. 159 C. 302; 177 C. 107; 206 C. 242; 210 C. 423; 212 C. 441; 219 C. 28; 221 C. 905; 226 C. 569; 231 C. 469. Authority to modify otherwise final awards does not authorize modifications based on changes of law. 244 C. 1. A motion to open or modify was not required under section because commissioner and parties considered application for total incapacity benefits to be the equivalent of such a motion, commissioner applied the applicable standard, there was no showing of prejudice to defendants, and it would violate public policy to deny benefits because of a failure to frame application for total incapacity benefits as a motion to open or modify. 294 C. 564. Commissioner did not have authority to void agreement pursuant to section; discovery that police department was not organized under Sec. 7-274 was not a changed condition of fact but mistake of law not within scope of this section. 296 C. 352.

Cited. 26 CA 194; 28 CA 536; 37 CA 648; 45 CA 324. Commissioner lacked authority to modify award because statute does not authorize modifications based on a new interpretation of law and therefore lacked authority to recalculate plaintiff's benefits. 55 CA 789. Commissioner did not have authority to grant Second Injury Fund equitable relief under section to open approved stipulation and schedule approval hearing because there was no evidence that fund was prevented from making a defense by fraud, accident, mistake, surprise or improper management of opposite party. 66 CA 332. Under section, commissioner has same power as a court to open and modify an award. 75 CA 591.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-315 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENMarandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 986 A.2d 1023 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 31-315 68×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“The defendants further claim that because the plaintiff had progressed along the statutory time line to maximum medical improvement and entered into a voluntary agreement to receive permanent partial disability benefits, she was not entitled to temporary total incapacity…”
The case’s holding
A claimant may receive total incapacity benefits for a subsequent disability if the disability is distinct from and caused by a condition not normally incident to the original loss.
Later courts cite it for
“although legislative silence is not always indicative of legislative affirmation, we have routinely considered legislative inaction for a significant period of time to be significant” · 1 citing court
2
GREENMarone v. City of Waterbury, 707 A.2d 725 (Conn. 1998).
cites § 31-315 35×cited by 71 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“The amici curiae, the cities of Bridgeport and Hartford, argue that the plaintiff is not entitled to a recalculation of his benefits because: (1) reopening the original award based on a change of law such as that represented by Szudora would violate General Statutes § 31-315, 7…”
The case’s holding
An administrative agency lacks statutory authority to modify a final award based on a subsequent change in the interpretation of law.
Later courts cite it for
“judgments that are not by their terms limited to prospective application are presumed to apply retroactively” · 5 citing courts
3
GREENJones v. Town of Redding, 995 A.2d 51 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 31-315 23×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“The principal issue in this appeal is whether the workers’ compensation commission (commission) has continuing jurisdiction under General Statutes § 31-315 1 to open and modify an approved voluntary agreement (agreement) for benefits that was premised on a subject matter…”
4
REDMarandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 939 A.2d 591 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
cites § 31-315 12×cited by 19 cases
Reversed in part by Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy (2010): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case ("It is well established that a judgment need not be reversed merely because inadmissible evidence has been…
Where it cites § 31-315
“Second, the defendants argue that even if the plaintiff can demonstrate a medical change sufficient to seek modification of her award, she is not entitled to total incapacity benefits as she has not exercised reasonable diligence in securing employment and, as such, has not…”
The case’s holding
A claimant who enters a voluntary agreement for permanent partial disability benefits cannot request total incapacity benefits without demonstrating a change in medical condition since the agreement.
Later courts cite it for
“because the plaintiff reached maximum medical improvement and entered into a voluntary agreement to receive permanent partial disability benefits, she was unable to request total incapacity benefits without demonstrating a change in medical condition since entering into the agreement.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENDowling v. Slotnik, 712 A.2d 396 (Conn. 1998).
cites § 31-315 4×cited by 169 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“General Statutes § 31-315 authorizes the commissioner to retain jurisdiction over an award of workers’ compensation benefits during the entire disability period and to modify such award in three situations.”
The case’s holding
The federal Immigration Reform and Control Act does not diminish a state's authority to award workers' compensation benefits to undocumented alien workers.
Later courts cite it for
“it is in order to effectuate an underlying public policy, rather than to sanction a party seeking to enforce an 'illegal' contract, that courts refuse to lend assistance to those who have contributed to the illegality that taints the contract.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENRodriguez v. State, 820 A.2d 1097 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
cites § 31-315 11×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“The commissioner concluded that General Statutes § 31-315 9 applied to the present case.”
7
GREENSchiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., 792 A.2d 835 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 31-315 4×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“The plaintiff then made a request for additional compensation, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-315, after an authorized treating physician determined that the plaintiff was totally disabled.”
The case’s holding
The phrase payments due under an award in the Workers’ Compensation Act refers only to payments of compensation and excludes attorney fees.
Later courts cite it for
“in determining the meaning of a statute, however, we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENHunt v. Borough of Naugatuck, 868 A.2d 54 (Conn. 2005).
cites § 31-315 6×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“Since that determination will purportedly require the exercise of discretion and the taking of additional evidence, the plaintiff posits that the board’s decision cannot be a final judgment. We agree with the defendant.”
The case’s holding
A compensation review board decision that conclusively resolves issues of liability and timeliness constitutes a final judgment even if future proceedings are required to determine specific benefit amounts.
Later courts cite it for
“an award of, or voluntary agreement concerning, compensation . . . shall be subject to modification in accordance with the procedure for original determinations, upon the request of either party . . . whenever it appears to the compensation commissioner, after notice and hearing thereon, that the incapacity of an injured employee has increased, decreased or ceased . . . .” · 1 citing court
9
GREENTutsky v. YMCA of Greenwich, 612 A.2d 1222 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
cites § 31-315 9×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“General Statutes § 31-315, 3 which provides statutory authority for opening an award when the disability changes, also permits modification when “changed conditions of fact have arisen which necessitate a change of such agreement or award in order to properly carry out the…”
10
GREENBesade v. Interstate Sec. Servs., 562 A.2d 1086 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 31-315 4×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“Pursuant to General Statutes § 31-315, 3 a workers’ compensation award is always limited to a claimant’s current condition and always subject to later modification upon the request of either party during the entire period of compensation if the complainant’s condition *445…”
The case’s holding
Trial courts must defer to factual findings even when evidence is primarily documentary and does not involve personal appraisal of witness demeanor.
Later courts cite it for
“any workers' compensation award, although a final judgment as to benefits through the date of the hearing, is always subject to further proceedings, such as those ordered in the present case, to determine whether the award should be modified” · 1 citing court
11
GREENO'Neil v. Honeywell, Inc., 784 A.2d 428 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
cites § 31-315 5×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“General Statutes § 31-315 provides: “Any award of, or voluntary agreement concerning, compensation made under the provisions of this chapter or any transfer of liability for a claim to the Second Injury Fund under the provisions of section 31-349 shall be subject to modification…”
Later courts cite it for
“fairness and equity are two-way streets....” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENLiano v. City of Bridgeport, 737 A.2d 983 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
cites § 31-315 12×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“552 , or whether it was a final judgment that was modifiable only in the situations indicated in General Statutes § 31-315. 5 In Szudora , the court held that the 100 percent *82 cap in § 7-433b (b) “required consideration not only of base pay but also of overtime payments to…”
13
GREENGamez-reyes v. Biagi, 44 A.3d 197 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
cites § 31-315 4×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“In her ruling, she denied the defendant’s motion to open because the defendant failed to set forth sufficient reason to open the finding and award pursuant to General Statutes § 31-315. 8 The commissioner also denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.”
The case’s holding
In workers' compensation proceedings, an employee's intoxication is an affirmative defense that the employer must prove, not a jurisdictional fact that the claimant must disprove.
14
GREENRinaldi v. Town of Enfield, 844 A.2d 949 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
cites § 31-315 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“Although not briefed separately, the plaintiff also appears to argue that General Statutes § 31-315 prevents the board from opening the 1995 judgment.”
Later courts cite it for
“jurisprudential considerations require that we address the case before us and refrain from ruling on hypothetical situations” · 1 citing court
15
GREENGraham v. Olson Wood Assocs., Inc., 150 A.3d 1123 (Conn. 2016).
cites § 31-315 13×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 31-315
“reinstated it to the proceedings because: (1) in the absence of a timely appeal to the board, the order dismissing the claim against the association was a final decision entitled to res judicata effect pursuant to General Statutes §§ 31-300 6 and 31-301(a) ; 7 and (2) the…”
16
GREENPelc v. Southington Dental Assocs., P.C., 337 A.3d 50 (Conn. App. Ct. 2025).
cites § 31-315 13×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 31-315
“The clear implication of this nonmodifiability argument appears to be that, even if the appellant cannot seek enforcement of the 2016 fee approval in the Superior Court under § 31- 327 (a), and even if jurisdiction lies with the commission to allocate the escrowed fee, the…”
17
GREENAdzima v. UAC/Norden Div., 411 A.2d 924 (Conn. 1979).
cites § 31-315 2×cited by 80 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“As such, the plaintiff could properly have sought further payments for disability by means of a motion to modify, under the provisions *116 of § 31-315 of the General Statutes. That section provides that "[t]he compensation commissioner shall retain jurisdiction over claims for…”
The case’s holding
A claimant has not reached maximum medical improvement when weighing conflicting medical opinions in the record favors the claimant (finding that deceased claimant had not reached maximum medical improvement).
Later courts cite it for
“the conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” · 7 citing courts
18
GREENWelch v. Arthur A. Fogarty, Inc., 255 A.2d 627 (Conn. 1969).
cites § 31-315 7×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“It is the special function of the workmen’s compensation commissioner to open and modify an award under General Statutes § 31-315 “upon the request of either party and in accordance with the procedure for original determinations.”
Later courts cite it for
“the compensation commissioner shall retain jurisdiction over claims for compensation, awards and voluntary agreements, for any proper action thereon, during the whole compensation period applicable to the injury in question.” · 1 citing court
19
GREENInfante v. Mansfield Constr. Co., 706 A.2d 984 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
cites § 31-315 4×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“The named defendant, Mansfield Construction Company (Mansfield), and the defendant insurance carrier, Zurich-American Insurance Group (Zurich), appeal from a decision rendered by the workers’ compensation review board (board) affirming the commissioner’s decision denying the…”
20
GREENMuldoon v. Homestead Insulation Co., 650 A.2d 1240 (Conn. 1994).
cites § 31-315 2×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 31-315
“See General Statutes § 31-296 (commissioner to approve voluntary agreements where they conform in every regard to provisions of act); General Statutes § 31-315 (commissioner has power to open or modify award).”
The case’s holding
A workers' compensation settlement does not bar a subsequent claim for disability resulting from a new injury caused by exposures occurring after the settlement date.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well settled that a release, being a contract whereby a party abandons a claim to a person against whom that claim exists, is subject to rules governing the construction of contracts. . . .” · 2 citing courts

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Conn. App. Ct.25Conn.22D. Conn.1Md. Ct. Spec. App.1
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