Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-315 (2026)

Modification of award or voluntary agreement

✓ current as of May 2026

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Any award of, or voluntary agreement concerning, compensation made under the provisions of this chapter or any transfer of liability for a claim to the Second Injury Fund under the provisions of section 31-349 shall be subject to modification in accordance with the procedure for original determinations, upon the request of either party or, in the case of a transfer under section 31-349, upon request of the custodian of the Second Injury Fund, whenever it appears to the administrative law judge, after notice and hearing thereon, that the incapacity of an injured employee has increased, decreased or ceased, or that the measure of dependence on account of which the compensation is paid has changed, or that changed conditions of fact have arisen which necessitate a change of such agreement, award or transfer in order properly to carry out the spirit of this chapter. The administrative law judge shall also have the same power to open and modify an award as any court of the state has to open and modify a judgment of such court. The administrative law judge shall retain jurisdiction over claims for compensation, awards and voluntary agreements, for any proper action thereon, during the whole compensation period applicable to the injury in question.

(1949 Rev., S. 7434; 1958 Rev., S. 31-166; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 38; P.A. 95-277, S. 11, 19; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)

History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; P.A. 95-277 amended the section to include any transfer of liability for a claim to the Second Injury Fund and allowed for its modification upon request of the custodian of the fund, effective July 1, 1995; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “compensation commissioner” and “commissioner” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge”, effective October 1, 2021.

Power of commissioner to modify award. 94 C. 625; 95 C. 298; 97 C. 83; Id., 335. Modification because disability has ceased may be retroactive to the date when it ceased. 108 C. 36. No bar that the controlling facts were known to claimant and might have been presented in the former hearing. 95 C. 356; 97 C. 76, 84. Aliter in case of long continued negligence of moving party. 100 C. 185. Power to open corresponds to that of a court during the term. 98 C. 741. But this is only as to the change of facts named in section. 100 C. 185; 103 C. 704. Employer may claim revision as well as employee. 97 C. 332. Death of employee after award does not entitle employer to retry the question of liability. 103 C. 705; 105 C. 419. Commissioner may open award because he misunderstood the facts. 106 C. 92. Can open only on the motion of person entitled to claim revision. 101 C. 113. Procedure on petition to open award. 94 C. 626; 106 C. 5. Having opened award, commissioner may try it de novo. 97 C. 84. May determine who shall receive payments after employee's death. 100 C. 419. No right of appeal from denial of motion to reopen and rehear unless commissioner exceeds limits of legal discretion. 112 C. 333. As to power to reopen. 109 C. 601; 128 C. 1; Id., 284; Id., 574. Motion to reopen should follow terminology of statute. 113 C. 747; 126 C. 522. Reopening rests largely within discretion of commissioner. 119 C. 170; Id., 522. No power to reopen to correct mistake of law. 116 C. 1. When it is error in refusing to reopen. 112 C. 333; 113 C. 282. If question of law involved, decision subject to appeal. Id., 262. Cited. 110 C. 285; 111 C. 403; 113 C. 172; 114 C. 395; 116 C. 229; 120 C. 284. Voluntary agreement may be modified if fraud shown. 121 C. 149. Cited. 126 C. 494; 127 C. 297. Powers of commissioner under section. 129 C. 591. Cited. 130 C. 665; 132 C. 172. Power of commissioner to open award. 134 C. 269. Commissioner was justified in treating plaintiff's motion as one for a new trial rather than for a modification of award. 136 C. 340. Denial of a motion to reopen award is proper subject of a separate appeal; motion to reopen on ground of mistake denied. Id., 361. Cited. 137 C. 187; Id., 487. Status of dependent in fact involves three factual elements: (1) Reliance on contributions of decedent for necessary living expenses, (2) a reasonable expectation that the contributions will continue, (3) an absence of sufficient means at hand for meeting these expenses; the first two are fixed at the time of injury and consequently the measure of dependence in section can change from that existing at the time of injury only if there is a subsequent change in the financial resources of claimant. 152 C. 481. Where commissioner found claimant was partial dependent at time of injury but subsequently received sufficient funds from other sources to supply her present necessities, commissioner correctly concluded that, although claimant was dependent in fact at the time of injury, her “measure of dependence” had changed before the time of the hearing and consequently defendants were relieved from paying compensation to her unless and until she showed a further change in circumstances; award to a dependent in fact as well as to a presumptive dependent is award of compensation and subject to modification. Id., 481, 482. Trial court was in error in admitting testimony of draftsman of agreement made under Sec. 31-296 which was clear and unambiguous on its face as only commissioner could open and modify award. 157 C. 538. Cited. 159 C. 302; 177 C. 107; 206 C. 242; 210 C. 423; 212 C. 441; 219 C. 28; 221 C. 905; 226 C. 569; 231 C. 469. Authority to modify otherwise final awards does not authorize modifications based on changes of law. 244 C. 1. A motion to open or modify was not required under section because commissioner and parties considered application for total incapacity benefits to be the equivalent of such a motion, commissioner applied the applicable standard, there was no showing of prejudice to defendants, and it would violate public policy to deny benefits because of a failure to frame application for total incapacity benefits as a motion to open or modify. 294 C. 564. Commissioner did not have authority to void agreement pursuant to section; discovery that police department was not organized under Sec. 7-274 was not a changed condition of fact but mistake of law not within scope of this section. 296 C. 352.

Cited. 26 CA 194; 28 CA 536; 37 CA 648; 45 CA 324. Commissioner lacked authority to modify award because statute does not authorize modifications based on a new interpretation of law and therefore lacked authority to recalculate plaintiff's benefits. 55 CA 789. Commissioner did not have authority to grant Second Injury Fund equitable relief under section to open approved stipulation and schedule approval hearing because there was no evidence that fund was prevented from making a defense by fraud, accident, mistake, surprise or improper management of opposite party. 66 CA 332. Under section, commissioner has same power as a court to open and modify an award. 75 CA 591.

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Notes of Decisions

Cited in 49 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1965–2025 · leading case: Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 986 A.2d 1023 (Conn. 2010).

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Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 986 A.2d 1023 (Conn. 2010). · cites it 68× “The defendants further claim that because the plaintiff had progressed along the statutory time line to maximum medical improvement and entered into a voluntary agreement to receive permanent partial disability benefits, she was not entitled to temporary total incapacity…”

Marone v. City of Waterbury, 707 A.2d 725 (Conn. 1998). · cites it 35× “The amici curiae, the cities of Bridgeport and Hartford, argue that the plaintiff is not entitled to a recalculation of his benefits because: (1) reopening the original award based on a change of law such as that represented by Szudora would violate General Statutes § 31-315, 7…”

Jones v. Town of Redding, 995 A.2d 51 (Conn. 2010). · cites it 23× “The principal issue in this appeal is whether the workers’ compensation commission (commission) has continuing jurisdiction under General Statutes § 31-315 1 to open and modify an approved voluntary agreement (agreement) for benefits that was premised on a subject matter…”

Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 939 A.2d 591 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). · cites it 12× “Second, the defendants argue that even if the plaintiff can demonstrate a medical change sufficient to seek modification of her award, she is not entitled to total incapacity benefits as she has not exercised reasonable diligence in securing employment and, as such, has not…”

Dowling v. Slotnik, 712 A.2d 396 (Conn. 1998). · cites it 4× “General Statutes § 31-315 authorizes the commissioner to retain jurisdiction over an award of workers’ compensation benefits during the entire disability period and to modify such award in three situations.”

Rodriguez v. State, 820 A.2d 1097 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). · cites it 11× “The commissioner concluded that General Statutes § 31-315 9 applied to the present case.”

Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., 792 A.2d 835 (Conn. 2002). · cites it 4× “The plaintiff then made a request for additional compensation, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-315, after an authorized treating physician determined that the plaintiff was totally disabled.”

Hunt v. Borough of Naugatuck, 868 A.2d 54 (Conn. 2005). · cites it 6× “Since that determination will purportedly require the exercise of discretion and the taking of additional evidence, the plaintiff posits that the board’s decision cannot be a final judgment. We agree with the defendant.”

Tutsky v. YMCA of Greenwich, 612 A.2d 1222 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992). · cites it 9× “General Statutes § 31-315, 3 which provides statutory authority for opening an award when the disability changes, also permits modification when “changed conditions of fact have arisen which necessitate a change of such agreement or award in order to properly carry out the…”

Besade v. Interstate Sec. Servs., 562 A.2d 1086 (Conn. 1989). · cites it 4× “Pursuant to General Statutes § 31-315, 3 a workers’ compensation award is always limited to a claimant’s current condition and always subject to later modification upon the request of either party during the entire period of compensation if the complainant’s condition *445…”

O'Neil v. Honeywell, Inc., 784 A.2d 428 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001). · cites it 5× “General Statutes § 31-315 provides: “Any award of, or voluntary agreement concerning, compensation made under the provisions of this chapter or any transfer of liability for a claim to the Second Injury Fund under the provisions of section 31-349 shall be subject to modification…”

Liano v. City of Bridgeport, 737 A.2d 983 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999). · cites it 12× “552 , or whether it was a final judgment that was modifiable only in the situations indicated in General Statutes § 31-315. 5 In Szudora , the court held that the 100 percent *82 cap in § 7-433b (b) “required consideration not only of base pay but also of overtime payments to…”

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