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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 35 — Trade Regulations, Trademarks and Collective and Certification MarksChapter 624 — Connecticut Antitrust Act

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-27 (2025)

Monopolization or attempt to monopolize unlawful

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1976–2021 16citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 16 opinions since 1976, 1 of them in the last five years.

Every contract, combination, or conspiracy to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or monopolization of any part of trade or commerce is unlawful.

(1971, P.A. 608, S. 4.)

Cited. 169 C. 344; 180 C. 680; 181 C. 655, overruled, see 335 C. 174; 184 C. 285; 235 C. 11.

An initial contract might not violate the antitrust laws at the time of its formation but arguably could become violative of those same laws when one of the contracting parties later gains unlawful dominance and control over a market as a result of a series of contracts or acquisitions. 104 CA 685.

Cited. 33 CS 220; 35 CS 136.

The 16 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-27 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENMiller's Pond Co. v. City of New London, 873 A.2d 965 (Conn. 2005).
cites § 35-27 8×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 35-27
“In August, 2000, the plaintiffs brought this action for damages and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendants' conduct constituted: (1) restraint of trade in violation of General Statutes § 35-26; [10] (2) monopolization in violation of General Statutes § 35-27; [11] (3)…”
The case’s holding
State action antitrust immunity applies only when challenged conduct is specifically directed or required by statute rather than merely approved by regulators or implied by a general mandate.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well settled that in construing statutes, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.” · 3 citing courts
2
cites § 35-27 6×cited by 148 cases
Where it cites § 35-27
“13 The trial court concluded that the defendant had engaged in both attempted monopolization and actual monopolization in violation of General Statutes § 35-27 of the act. 14 After considering and rejecting the defendant’s special defenses, the trial court concluded that the…”
The case’s holding
State courts follow federal precedent when interpreting antitrust statutes unless the state text or other pertinent law requires a different interpretation.
Later courts cite it for
“we follow federal precedent when we interpret the act unless the text of our antitrust statutes, or other pertinent state law, requires us to interpret it differently.” · 7 citing courts
3
GREENShea v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. of New Haven, 439 A.2d 997 (Conn. 1981).
cites § 35-27 4×cited by 84 cases
Where it cites § 35-27
“General Statutes § 35-27 is patterned after § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.”
The case’s holding
State antitrust laws are not preempted by federal regulations when both sets of laws aim to promote competition and the state law does not conflict with federal objectives.
Later courts cite it for
“the superior court has jurisdiction of all matters expressly committed to it and of all other judicially cognizable matters not within the exclusive jurisdiction of another court.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENMcKeown Distributors, Inc. v. Gyp-Crete Corp., 618 F. Supp. 632 (D. Conn. 1985).
cites § 35-27 4×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 35-27
“The Complaint also states a claim pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat. § 35-27, which declares unlawful any “contract, combination or conspiracy to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or monopolization of any part of trade or commerce.”
5
GREENCDC Tech., Inc. v. Idexx Labs., Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D. Conn. 1998).
cites § 35-27 7×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 35-27
“Similarly, the elements of Conn. Gen.Stat § 35-27 are substantially similar to the elements under § 2 of the Sherman Act, and thus fail with CDC’s federal claim.”
6
GREENWyatt Energy, Inc. v. Motiva Enters., LLC, 936 A.2d 280 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
cites § 35-27 5×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 35-27
“See General Statutes § 35-27. The parties were not in agreement about whether there was a relevant market and whether the Cargill acquisition, in light of Motiva’s control of other similar facilities, gave Motiva monopoly dominance over the relevant market, as the reams of…”
7
GREENUnited States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
cites § 35-27 2×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 35-27
“Code §§ 16720, 16726, 17200 (West 1999); Conn. Gen.Stat. § 35-27 (1999); D.C.Code § 28-4503 (1996); Fla.”
The case’s holding
A firm violates the Sherman Act and analogous state statutes by using exclusionary and predatory conduct to maintain a monopoly and by unlawfully tying products.
Later courts cite it for
“applications barrier to entry.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENWyatt Energy, Inc. v. Motiva Enter., LLC, 19 A.3d 181 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
cites § 35-27 4×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 35-27
“” 10 Additionally, Motiva alleged, and the court agreed, that by failing to assign its agreement obligations to Williams Energy upon sale of the Wyatt terminal, Wyatt committed a material breach of paragraph F of the agreement.”
9
GREENState v. Hossan-Maxwell, Inc., 436 A.2d 284 (Conn. 1980).
cites § 35-27 2×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 35-27
“In a second count the state alleged that the defendants’ arrangement was an attempt to monopolize the market for real estate brokerage services in violation of General Statutes § 35-27. The trial court granted the state’s motion for summary judgment as to the first count against…”
The case’s holding
A tying arrangement is unlawful per se if the seller has sufficient economic power or a not insubstantial amount of commerce is affected.
10
GREENRoncari Dev. Co. v. GMG Enter., Inc., 718 A.2d 1025 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997).
cites § 35-27 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 35-27
“onopolize, restrain trade, prevent competition, and/or control prices in the local valet parking market would, if proved at trial, establish violations of the following substantive provisions of the Connecticut Antitrust Act: General Statutes § 35-26, which provides that…”
11
GREENBlaine v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Conn. 1987).
cites § 35-27 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 35-27
“That such combination or conspiracy violates the Connecticut Antitrust Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 35-27. 5. That such combination or conspiracy to deny plaintiffs an additional license in Windsor Locks violates the Sherman Act, 15 U.”
12
GREENBristol Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 42 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Conn. 1998).
cites § 35-27 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 35-27
“Because the Connecticut Antitrust Statute, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 35-27, mirrors the federal anti-monopoly statute, Shea v.”
13
GREENDouglas v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 371 A.2d 396 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976).
cites § 35-27 1×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 35-27
“Section 35-27 deals with monopolization or attempt to monopolize “any part of trade or commerce.”
14
cites § 35-27 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 35-27
“We note that there was testimony at trial that three such ‘‘floating zone’’ properties were available in Danbury alone, which would seem to militate against the plaintiffs’ theory that the Reserve was uniquely desirable.”
15
NO FLAGHall v. Anheuser-Busch LLC, No. 3:20-cv-01003 (D. Conn. Sept. 14, 2021).
cites § 35-27 3×cited by 0 casesunknown
Where it cites § 35-27
“Counts Three and Seven: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-27 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act Dichello also makes claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Conn.”
16
GREENReserve Realty, LLC v. Windemere Reserve, LLC, No. SC19979, SC19982, SC19981 (Conn. Mar. 24, 2020).
cites § 35-27 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 35-27
“We note that there was testimony at trial that three such ‘‘floating zone’’ properties were available in Danbury alone, which would seem to militate against the plaintiffs’ theory that the Reserve was uniquely desirable.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197619982021

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 1998. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.6D. Conn.5Conn. App. Ct.2Conn. Super. Ct.2D.D.C.1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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