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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 35 — Trade Regulations, Trademarks and Collective and Certification MarksChapter 624 — Connecticut Antitrust Act

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-31 (2025)

Exceptions

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1975–2019 11citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 11 opinions since 1975. The most litigated part is subsection (b) (3 cases).

(a) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to forbid the existence or operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations instituted for the purpose of mutual help, and not having capital stock and not conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof. Such organizations, or the members thereof, shall not be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies or monopolies in restraint of trade, under the provisions of this chapter.

(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall apply to those activities of any person when said activity is specifically directed or required by a statute of this state, or of the United States.

(c) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to prevent persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers, planters, dairymen or growers from acting together in associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively processing, preparing for market, handling and marketing in interstate and foreign commerce, such products of persons so engaged. Such associations may have marketing agencies in common; and such associations and their members may make the necessary contracts and agreements to effect such purposes; provided, such associations are operated for the mutual benefit of the members thereof, as such producers, and conform to one or both of the following requirements: (i) That no member of the association is allowed more than one vote because of the amount of stock or membership capital he may own therein, or, (ii) that the association does not pay dividends on stock or membership capital in excess of eight per cent per annum, and, (iii) that the association shall not deal in the products of nonmembers to an amount greater in value than such as are handled by it for members.

(1971, P.A. 608, S. 8; P.A. 75-567, S. 4, 80; P.A. 77-604, S. 21, 84.)

History: P.A. 75-567 substituted “chapter” for “part” throughout section; P.A. 77-604 deleted former Subdiv. (c) of Subsec. (a) which had protected existing contracts, agreements, etc. made pursuant to chapter 735 (“Fair Trade Act”), regardless of provisions of this chapter, redesignating former Subdiv. (d) accordingly.

Cited. 179 C. 324.

Cited. 35 CS 136.

Subsec. (b):

Activities relative to interconnection of telephone devices, though regulated by state agencies, are not specifically directed or required by statute, and are therefore not immune from antitrust liability under Subsec. 169 C. 344. Cited. 181 C. 655, overruled, see 335 C. 174; 235 C. 1. Sec. 35-44b was inapplicable in present case concerning a state antitrust statute without federal parallel and did not require court to incorporate federal case law defining state action immunity into its construction of Subsec.; Subsec. has no parallel in federal antitrust statutes and its specific language, which provides qualified state action immunity for anticompetitive conduct that is specifically directed or required by statute, takes precedence over the general language of case law construing generalized provisions of federal statutes covering same subject matter; trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for defendants as there was a genuine issue of material fact as to existence of wholesale water market in southeastern Connecticut and defendants were not specifically directed or required by statute to engage in all of the anticompetitive activities and thus were not immune from antitrust liability under subsection. 273 C. 786. Given the city was acting in a proprietary rather than regulatory capacity when enforcing a project labor agreement in a pre-bid specification that required the successful bidder to perform all project work with union labor, the city was not entitled to qualified immunity for its anticompetitive conduct. 303 C. 402.

The 11 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-31 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENMiller's Pond Co. v. City of New London, 873 A.2d 965 (Conn. 2005).
cites § 35-31 157×subsections: (b) 77×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 35-31
“2d 719 (declining to review transit district's § 35-31[b] state action defense to antitrust action because it was not raised in trial court and record was insufficient for plain error review); see Bortner v.”
The case’s holding
State action antitrust immunity applies only when challenged conduct is specifically directed or required by statute rather than merely approved by regulators or implied by a general mandate.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well settled that in construing statutes, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENMazzola v. S. New England Tel. Co., 363 A.2d 170 (Conn. 1975).
cites § 35-31 29×cited by 52 cases
Where it cites § 35-31
“The Public Service Companies Act, as amended, does not expressly confer on the PUC the power to exempt activities of the defendant, such as those challenged by the plaintiff, from the reach of the act.”
The case’s holding
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a rule of judicial administration used to promote proper relationships between courts and regulatory agencies.
Later courts cite it for
“the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a rule of judicial administration created by court decision in order to promote proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties.” · 3 citing courts
3
GREENElec. Contractors, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 35 A.3d 188 (Conn. 2012).
cites § 35-31 10×subsections: (b) 3×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 35-31
“See General Statutes § 35-31. The trial court's memorandum of decision did not articulate that court's reasons for denying standing on this claim, and ECI's appellate brief does little more than identify the relevant statutes and point to three unilateral acts by the defendant…”
The case’s holding
Unsuccessful bidders have standing to challenge public contract awards if they allege conduct that undermines the integrity of the competitive bidding process.
Later courts cite it for
“claims are also inadequately briefed when they are raised for the first time in a reply brief” · 1 citing court
4
cites § 35-31 7×cited by 148 cases
Where it cites § 35-31
“Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant’s pricing was predatory and that the defendant was liable under the act. Ill The defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendant is not entitled to…”
The case’s holding
State courts follow federal precedent when interpreting antitrust statutes unless the state text or other pertinent law requires a different interpretation.
Later courts cite it for
“we follow federal precedent when we interpret the act unless the text of our antitrust statutes, or other pertinent state law, requires us to interpret it differently.” · 7 citing courts
5
GREENCheryl Terry Enter., Ltd. v. City of Hartford, 854 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 35-31 10×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 35-31
“person who has been held to have violated any of the provisions of this chapter shall forfeit and pay to the state a civil penalty of not more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars"); General Statutes § 35-39 ("[a] corporation, association, firm, partnership, proprietorship,…”
The case’s holding
The Connecticut Antitrust Act's broad definition of person includes municipalities, and it confers standing on unsuccessful bidders in a municipal bidding process to sue for damages.
Later courts cite it for
“the legislature expressly has conferred standing on a broad range of individuals under the connecticut antitrust act (act), including unsuccessful bidders in a municipal bidding process.” · 1 citing court
6
GREENState v. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc., 944 A.2d 315 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 35-31 7×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 35-31
“In that case, we concluded that § 35-44b did not render the state action antitrust immunity provided to municipalities by General Statutes § 35-31 (b) 14 coextensive with the broader grant of immunity available under the line of federal case law starting with Parker v.”
The case’s holding
The state antitrust act authorizes the attorney general to seek parens patriae damages to the state's general economy notwithstanding federal limits, and duplication concerns are matters of proof.
Later courts cite it for
“defendants' arguments with respect to the potentially duplicative nature of the damages and injuries pleaded in the state's complaint implicate potential problems of proof rather than pleading” · 2 citing courts
cites § 35-31 5×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 35-31
“4 The plaintiff claimed in count one of the complaint that this conduct deprived the plaintiff and others of an opportunity to compete for the liaison services contract in violation of the anti- trust act.5 The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that (1)…”
8
GREENHousatonic R.R. v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., 21 A.3d 759 (Conn. 2011).
cites § 35-31 4×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 35-31
“Therefore, § 12-597 cannot be the specific statute applicable to the plaintiff's appeal to the exclusion of § 12-33.”
The case’s holding
A specific statute relating to a particular subject matter displaces a general statute that would otherwise apply.
Later courts cite it for
“well established principle of statutory interpretation that requires courts to apply the more specific statute relating to a particular subject matter in favor of the more general statute that otherwise might apply in the absence of the specific statute.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENProf'l Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Blackstone, 400 A.2d 1031 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978).
cites § 35-31 5×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 35-31
“The defendant contended that the activities in question were authorized in a tariff approved by the public utilities commission and as such were immune from antitrust liability under the exception articulated in General Statutes § 35-31 (b). In finding that the defendant’s…”
Later courts cite it for
“the parties sought to be enjoined from alleged antitrust activities are not the officers of a private company regulated by a state agency, but are the officials of the state and municipal agencies themselves, pursuing emergency medical service functions directed by the statutes.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENNe. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 477 F. Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1978).
cites § 35-31 2×subsections: (b) 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 35-31
“In Mazzola , the state supreme court held that the Connecticut Public Service Companies Act did not impliedly confer upon the Public Utilities Commission (the predecessor to the PUCA) the authority to exempt from the state antitrust laws conduct by SNET included in an effective…”
11
GREENAjello v. Moffie, 426 A.2d 295 (Conn. 1979).
cites § 35-31 1×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 35-31
“The exceptions are set forth in § 35-31 of the General Statutes.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197519972019

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 1978. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.9Conn. Super. Ct.1D. Conn.1
By subsection
(b)3 cases
Miller's Pond Co. v. City of New London, 873 A.2d 965 (Conn. 2005).“2d 719 (declining to review transit district's § 35-31[b] state action defense to antitrust action because it was not raised in trial court and record was insufficient for plain error review); see Bortner v.”
Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 35 A.3d 188 (Conn. 2012).“See General Statutes § 35-31. The trial court's memorandum of decision did not articulate that court's reasons for denying standing on this claim, and ECI's appellate brief does little more than identify the relevant statutes and point to three unilateral acts by the defendant…”
Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 477 F. Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1978).“In Mazzola , the state supreme court held that the Connecticut Public Service Companies Act did not impliedly confer upon the Public Utilities Commission (the predecessor to the PUCA) the authority to exempt from the state antitrust laws conduct by SNET included in an effective…”
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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