(a) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to forbid the existence or operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations instituted for the purpose of mutual help, and not having capital stock and not conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof. Such organizations, or the members thereof, shall not be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies or monopolies in restraint of trade, under the provisions of this chapter.
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall apply to those activities of any person when said activity is specifically directed or required by a statute of this state, or of the United States.
(c) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to prevent persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers, planters, dairymen or growers from acting together in associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively processing, preparing for market, handling and marketing in interstate and foreign commerce, such products of persons so engaged. Such associations may have marketing agencies in common; and such associations and their members may make the necessary contracts and agreements to effect such purposes; provided, such associations are operated for the mutual benefit of the members thereof, as such producers, and conform to one or both of the following requirements: (i) That no member of the association is allowed more than one vote because of the amount of stock or membership capital he may own therein, or, (ii) that the association does not pay dividends on stock or membership capital in excess of eight per cent per annum, and, (iii) that the association shall not deal in the products of nonmembers to an amount greater in value than such as are handled by it for members.
(1971, P.A. 608, S. 8; P.A. 75-567, S. 4, 80; P.A. 77-604, S. 21, 84.)
History: P.A. 75-567 substituted “chapter” for “part” throughout section; P.A. 77-604 deleted former Subdiv. (c) of Subsec. (a) which had protected existing contracts, agreements, etc. made pursuant to chapter 735 (“Fair Trade Act”), regardless of provisions of this chapter, redesignating former Subdiv. (d) accordingly.
Cited. 179 C. 324.
Cited. 35 CS 136.
Subsec. (b):
Activities relative to interconnection of telephone devices, though regulated by state agencies, are not specifically directed or required by statute, and are therefore not immune from antitrust liability under Subsec. 169 C. 344. Cited. 181 C. 655, overruled, see 335 C. 174; 235 C. 1. Sec. 35-44b was inapplicable in present case concerning a state antitrust statute without federal parallel and did not require court to incorporate federal case law defining state action immunity into its construction of Subsec.; Subsec. has no parallel in federal antitrust statutes and its specific language, which provides qualified state action immunity for anticompetitive conduct that is specifically directed or required by statute, takes precedence over the general language of case law construing generalized provisions of federal statutes covering same subject matter; trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for defendants as there was a genuine issue of material fact as to existence of wholesale water market in southeastern Connecticut and defendants were not specifically directed or required by statute to engage in all of the anticompetitive activities and thus were not immune from antitrust liability under subsection. 273 C. 786. Given the city was acting in a proprietary rather than regulatory capacity when enforcing a project labor agreement in a pre-bid specification that required the successful bidder to perform all project work with union labor, the city was not entitled to qualified immunity for its anticompetitive conduct. 303 C. 402.
Notes of Decisions
Miller's Pond Co., LLC v. City of New London, 873 A.2d 965 (Conn. 2005).
· cites it 157× “2d 719 (declining to review transit district's § 35-31[b] state action defense to antitrust action because it was not raised in trial court and record was insufficient for plain error review); see Bortner v.”
Mazzola v. S. New England Tel. Co., 363 A.2d 170 (Conn. 1975).
· cites it 29× “The Public Service Companies Act, as amended, does not expressly confer on the PUC the power to exempt activities of the defendant, such as those challenged by the plaintiff, from the reach of the act.”
Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 35 A.3d 188 (Conn. 2012).
· cites it 10× “See General Statutes § 35-31. The trial court's memorandum of decision did not articulate that court's reasons for denying standing on this claim, and ECI's appellate brief does little more than identify the relevant statutes and point to three unilateral acts by the defendant…”
Westport Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Westport Transit Dist., 664 A.2d 719 (Conn. 1995).
· cites it 7× “Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant’s pricing was predatory and that the defendant was liable under the act. Ill The defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendant is not entitled to…”
Cheryl Terry Enter., Ltd. v. City of Hartford, 854 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2004).
· cites it 10× “person who has been held to have violated any of the provisions of this chapter shall forfeit and pay to the state a civil penalty of not more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars"); General Statutes § 35-39 ("[a] corporation, association, firm, partnership, proprietorship,…”
State v. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc., 944 A.2d 315 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 7× “In that case, we concluded that § 35-44b did not render the state action antitrust immunity provided to municipalities by General Statutes § 35-31 (b) 14 coextensive with the broader grant of immunity available under the line of federal case law starting with Parker v.”
Tremont Pub. Advisors, LLC v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Auth., 333 Conn. 672 (Conn. 2019).
· cites it 5× “5 The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that (1) under General Statutes § 35-31 (b),6 the antitrust act did not apply to its conduct in entering into the liaison services contract with Brown Rudnick because it was acting pursuant to its statutory obliga-…”
Prof'l Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Blackstone, 400 A.2d 1031 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978).
· cites it 5× “The defendant contended that the activities in question were authorized in a tariff approved by the public utilities commission and as such were immune from antitrust liability under the exception articulated in General Statutes § 35-31 (b). In finding that the defendant’s…”
Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 477 F. Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1978).
· cites it 2× “In Mazzola , the state supreme court held that the Connecticut Public Service Companies Act did not impliedly confer upon the Public Utilities Commission (the predecessor to the PUCA) the authority to exempt from the state antitrust laws conduct by SNET included in an effective…”
Ajello v. Moffie, 426 A.2d 295 (Conn. 1979).
“The exceptions are set forth in § 35-31 of the General Statutes.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-31(b) — 3 cases
Miller's Pond Co., LLC v. City of New London, 873 A.2d 965 (Conn. 2005).
“2d 719 (declining to review transit district's § 35-31[b] state action defense to antitrust action because it was not raised in trial court and record was insufficient for plain error review); see Bortner v.”
Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 35 A.3d 188 (Conn. 2012).
“See General Statutes § 35-31. The trial court's memorandum of decision did not articulate that court's reasons for denying standing on this claim, and ECI's appellate brief does little more than identify the relevant statutes and point to three unilateral acts by the defendant…”
Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 477 F. Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1978).
“In Mazzola , the state supreme court held that the Connecticut Public Service Companies Act did not impliedly confer upon the Public Utilities Commission (the predecessor to the PUCA) the authority to exempt from the state antitrust laws conduct by SNET included in an effective…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.