(a) For a cause of action arising on or after May 27, 1997, interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, shall be recovered and allowed in any action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, computed from the date that is twenty days after the date of judgment or the date that is ninety days after the date of verdict, whichever is earlier, upon the amount of the judgment.
(b) If any plaintiff in such action files a postverdict or postjudgment motion or an appeal, the recovery of interest by such plaintiff shall be tolled and interest shall not be added to the judgment for the period that such postverdict or postjudgment motion or appeal is pending before the court. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply if the reason for the filing of a postverdict or postjudgment motion or appeal by the plaintiff is to reply to or answer a motion or appeal filed by a defendant.
(P.A. 81-315, S. 2; P.A. 97-58, S. 2, 5.)
History: P.A. 97-58 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a) and amended said Subsec. to make the recovery of interest mandatory, rather than discretionary, for causes of action arising on or after May 27, 1997 and to provide that the interest shall be computed “from the date that is 20 days after the date of judgment or the date that is 90 days after the date of verdict, whichever is earlier, upon the amount of the judgment” rather than “from the date of judgment”, and added Subsec. (b) re the effect on the recovery of interest when the plaintiff files a postverdict or postjudgment motion or an appeal, effective May 27, 1997.
Standard to determine award of interest under Sec. 37-3a is no different from the standard under version of this section in effect before 1997 amendment; interest is authorized when trial court determines, in its discretion, that considerations of fairness and equity warrant such an award; trial court misconstrued standard of Sec. 37-3a as requiring proof of wrongfulness over and above proof of the underlying legal claim, and because trial court did not exercise the discretion contemplated by said section, its decision to deny postjudgment interest under this section was improper. 310 C. 38. 2005 revision authorizes award of postjudgment interest at an annual rate of up to 10 per cent and does not restrict discretion of the trial court to choose any rate within that range or limit the trial court to a consideration of specific factors not enumerated in section; the legal duty to pay postjudgment interest arises when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, awards such postjudgment interest, and not beforehand, and the interest on the award of such postjudgment interest does not lawfully begin to accrue until such date. 316 C. 790.
Cited. 15 CA 381; 31 CA 455; 45 CA 543.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
28
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1988–2026 · leading case:
Hicks v. State, 1 A.3d 39 (Conn. 2010).
Hicks v. State, 1 A.3d 39 (Conn. 2010).
· cites it 20× “2 The state appeals 3 from the judgment of the trial court, which awarded postjudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3b, 4 based on its determination that *800 § 52-556 waives the state’s sovereign immunity not only with respect to damages arising from a state…”
Bower v. D'Onfro, 696 A.2d 1285 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997).
· cites it 6× “” “In determining whether the trial court *551 has abused its discretion, we must make every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.”
Rivera v. Double A Transp., Inc., 727 A.2d 204 (Conn. 1999).
· cites it 2× “, General Statutes § 52-25lb (prevailing party in action “to recover damages for injury to the person” or to real property arising out of violation of General Statutes § 46a-58 [discriminatory practices] may recover attorney’s fees and costs [emphasis added]); General Statutes §…”
Carrano v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 963 A.2d 1117 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
· cites it 9× “4 General Statutes § 37-3b currently provides: “(a) For a cause of action arising on or after May 27, 1997, interest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, shall be recovered and allowed in any action to recover damages for injury to the person, orto real orpersonal…”
Sosin v. Sosin, 14 A.3d 307 (Conn. 2011).
· cites it 2× “Bower , however, which the Appellate Court relied on in support of the proposition that the trial court had no discretion under § 37-3a to award interest other than from the date of judgment, involved the application of General Statutes § 37-3b (a) (“interest at the rate of ten…”
Fraser v. Wyeth, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D. Conn. 2014).
· cites it 4× “Motion for Post-Verdict and Post-Judgment Interest [Doc. # 336] Plaintiffs move for an award of post-verdict interest at rate of ten percent per year running from ninety days after the jury’s verdict to the date of judgment, pursuant to Conn.”
Gurski v. Rosenblum & Filan, LLC, 885 A.2d 163 (Conn. 2005).
· cites it 2× “6 The law firm also claims that the trial court improperly: (1) instructed the jury that it could consider claims of negligence in the complaint for which Gurski had failed to offer any expert testimony; (2) permitted Gurski to present evidence that the default that had entered…”
Emlee Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Waterbury Transmission, Inc., 626 A.2d 307 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
· cites it 2× “The rate of 10 percent is less than the rate prohibited for loans by General Statutes § 37-4 and is equal to the rate recoverable in negligence actions; General Statutes § 37-3b; and as damages.”
Misiurka v. Maple Hill Farms, Inc., 544 A.2d 673 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
· cites it 2× “It provides in pertinent part that “[f]or a cause of action arising on or after October 1,1981, interest at the rate of ten percent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in any action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property,…”
Clinch v. Generali-U.S. Branch, 954 A.2d 223 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
· cites it 2× “The plaintiff claimed that he therefore had a right of action against the defendant to recover the judgment rendered against the defendant’s insured, including costs and statutory interest due thereon pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3b. On February 7, 2006, the plaintiff filed…”
Bruno v. Bruno, 176 A.3d 104 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
· cites it 2× “It also noted that in considering statutes awarding interest, unlike General Statutes § 37-3b, Section 37-3a contains no similar language requiring that interest be computed from the date of judgment or twenty-one days thereafter.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3b(a) — 1 case
Fraser v. Wyeth, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D. Conn. 2014).
“Motion for Post-Verdict and Post-Judgment Interest [Doc. # 336] Plaintiffs move for an award of post-verdict interest at rate of ten percent per year running from ninety days after the jury’s verdict to the date of judgment, pursuant to Conn.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3b(b) — 1 case
Fraser v. Wyeth, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D. Conn. 2014).
“Motion for Post-Verdict and Post-Judgment Interest [Doc. # 336] Plaintiffs move for an award of post-verdict interest at rate of ten percent per year running from ninety days after the jury’s verdict to the date of judgment, pursuant to Conn.”
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