Connecticut General Statutes homeSearch Connecticut
Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 38a — InsuranceChapter 700 — Property and Casualty Insurance

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-321 (2025)

(Formerly Sec. 38-175). Liability of insurer under liability policy

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) ACTIVE · 20 IN 5Y cited 1992–2026 64citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 64 opinions since 1992, 20 of them in the last five years.

Each insurance company which issues a policy to any person, firm or corporation, insuring against loss or damage on account of the bodily injury or death by accident of any person, or damage to the property of any person, for which loss or damage such person, firm or corporation is legally responsible, shall, whenever a loss occurs under such policy, become absolutely liable, and the payment of such loss shall not depend upon the satisfaction by the assured of a final judgment against him for loss, damage or death occasioned by such casualty. No such contract of insurance shall be cancelled or annulled by any agreement between the insurance company and the assured after the assured has become responsible for such loss or damage, and any such cancellation or annulment shall be void. Upon the recovery of a final judgment against any person, firm or corporation by any person, including administrators or executors, for loss or damage on account of bodily injury or death or damage to property, if the defendant in such action was insured against such loss or damage at the time when the right of action arose and if such judgment is not satisfied within thirty days after the date when it was rendered, such judgment creditor shall be subrogated to all the rights of the defendant and shall have a right of action against the insurer to the same extent that the defendant in such action could have enforced his claim against such insurer had such defendant paid such judgment.

(1949 Rev., S. 6191.)

History: Sec. 38-175 transferred to Sec. 38a-321 in 1991.

Annotations to former section 38-175:

Applies only to contracts made after statute took effect; constitutionality discussed; effect of payment by liability insurance company after judgment on obligation of surety on bond releasing attachment. 97 C. 16. Under former law, where policy indemnified against loss and not liability, insurer need not pay unless assured actually paid over money; bankruptcy of assured before satisfaction of judgment; effect of present statute. 98 C. 452; 119 C. 416. Gives no greater rights except for cancellation and annulment than assured had. 107 C. 651. Breach of covenant by assured is a defense; facts held not to amount to breach by assured of covenant to render insurer “all cooperation and assistance in his power”. Id., 654. Pleading and burden of proof. 108 C. 566. Provision in policy that there should be no coverage if car is driven in violation of law as to age of driver construed; facts held to show violation of provision. Id., 599. Cited. 111 C. 550. Judgment creditor cannot recover from insurer if assured, because of breach of condition of policy, could not. 114 C. 313. Rights of injured persons recovering judgments are to be determined as creditors, not lienors; in interpleader where policy amount inadequate, equity will distribute pro rata. 115 C. 193. Waiver or estoppel may arise where insurer undertakes or continues defense of action with knowledge of breach by assured of cooperation clause. 117 C. 89. Settlement of multiple claims; insurer liable for fraud or bad faith in failing or refusing to settle claims within policy limit. Id., 147. “Absolutely liable” means only that payment is not dependent upon satisfaction by plaintiff of a judgment; claimant has only inchoate right against insurer until judgment. Id., 153. Judgment in original action that person was driving car is not res judicata that he was an assured in action by judgment creditor against insurer; where insurer pleads breach of policy, burden is on one suing on it to prove performance. 118 C. 194. To avoid policy, breach must be substantial and material. Id., 198. Settlement with assured made in good faith in accordance with policy discharges insurer's obligation; creditor thereafter obtaining judgment has no claim against insurer. Cited. 121 C. 514; 122 C. 196; 125 C. 509; 126 C. 87; 127 C. 258; 141 C. 574; 142 C. 251. The owner of a tort judgment has a right of recovery from the insurer of the judgment debtor if plaintiff has recovered a final judgment; the judgment is against a person who is insured by defendant against liability on it, and the judgment remains unsatisfied. Id., 388. Cited. 145 C. 74. Automobile liability policy covered any person using automobile with permission of insured, held “use” not limited to operation of vehicle. 147 C. 713. Phrase “person responsible for the operation of the motor vehicle with the express or implied consent of the insured” construed. 148 C. 15. If express language releasing the debtor is lacking, a person secondarily liable has the defense of accord and satisfaction if actual performance of the composition agreement has been completed as to a given signatory creditor. Id., 115. Cited. 150 C. 211. Insurer is not deprived of any defense it may have under policy, in absence of collusion, against judgment creditor of insured. 152 C. 31. Injunctive relief against insurer to compel payment of judgment against insured ordinarily denied on grounds of adequate remedy at law under statute. Id., 249. Where, in declaratory judgment action to determine insurance company's obligation to defend and pay judgment, another adequate remedy exists, demurrer will be sustained. 153 C. 349, 350. Declaratory judgment may be made by trial court on matters which are litigable under section and becomes res judicata in subsequent action. 158 C. 251. Cited. 161 C. 388; 163 C. 131, 552; 176 C. 676; 178 C. 32. The words “property” and “casualty” as used in section discussed. 187 C. 363. Cited. 199 C. 245; 206 C. 668; 213 C. 696; 220 C. 285.

Cited. 2 CA 282; 10 CA 125; Id., 135.

Statute does not impose absolute liability. 1 CS 81. Cited. 3 CS 364. Injured party becomes subrogated to the rights of the assured against the insurer, without extending such rights in any way, except by prohibiting any termination of the coverage by separate agreement. 5 CS 306. Whether policy classified is one against “loss” or “liability” is resolved by statute; contract beneficiary need not allege insolvency of insured to prove it. 6 CS 468. An insolvent tortfeasor may not by his breach of contract of insurance bar the action granted to an injured person against an insurer where the breach of contract does not prejudice the insurer. 8 CS 469. Cited. 19 CS 396; 20 CS 455. A judgment creditor may be subrogated to the insured's rights. 32 CS 52. When default judgment against car driver, allegedly driving with permission of insured, was unsatisfied within 30 days, insurer cited as codefendant pursuant to omnibus clause of policy. 33 CS 523. Cited. 39 CS 85.

Motorcycle held not an “automobile” within meaning of exclusion clause of policy. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 164.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 217 C. 371; 231 C. 756; 232 C. 559; 234 C. 182; 235 C. 185; 239 C. 144. Default in declaratory judgment action does not bar suit under statute. 247 C. 331.

Cited. 28 CA 145; 35 CA 94; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 185; 42 CA 177; 44 CA 220; 58 CA 39. Collateral estoppel cannot be asserted against an insurer in action brought pursuant to section; court found insurer bound by final judgment against insured that included finding of negligence. 69 CA 507.

Cited. 42 CS 164.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-321 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENTucker v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. Conn. 2013).
cites § 38a-321 40×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“# 126), Tucker has included the following claims: breach of contract; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; a claim to recover as a subrogee of JRE under Connecticut’s direct action statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-321; violation of the Connecticut Unfair…”
The case’s holding
A settlement releasing an insured in exchange for an assignment of rights against the insurer does not satisfy a judgment under the direct action statute.
Later courts cite it for
“whether to grant or deny a motion to strike is vested in the trial court's sound discretion.” · 7 citing courts
2
GREENDacruz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 846 A.2d 849 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 38a-321 16×cited by 62 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“DaCruz, bars the plaintiff, under principles of collateral estoppel, from holding State Farm liable, pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-321, 1 for damages awarded pursuant to *678 a judgment obtained by the plaintiff against the insured.”
The case’s holding
A declaratory judgment finding an insurer has no duty to defend necessarily establishes that the insurer has no duty to indemnify.
Later courts cite it for
“because the duty to defend is significantly broader than the duty to indemnify, where there is no duty to defend, there is no duty to indemnify.” · 10 citing courts
3
GREENHome Ins. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 663 A.2d 1001 (Conn. 1995).
cites § 38a-321 10×cited by 492 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“” General Statutes § 38a-321 provides in relevant part: “Upon the recovery of a final judgment against any person, firm or corporation by any person *190 .”
The case’s holding
A subrogee is not entitled to access a subrogor's confidential psychiatric records under the statutory exception because the subrogee is not the patient.
Later courts cite it for
“only evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment.” · 16 citing courts
4
GREENHeyman Assocs. No. 1 v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 653 A.2d 122 (Conn. 1995).
cites § 38a-321 10×cited by 319 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“ge for property damage claims, and that the defendants have failed to assume their obligation under the policies to defend and indemnify the plaintiff; (2) the defendants waived any defenses to coverage that they may have had because they failed to provide the plaintiff with…”
The case’s holding
Clear and unambiguous insurance policy language must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning.
Later courts cite it for
“and there are no contradictory affidavits, the court properly decides the motion by looking only to the sufficiency of the movant's affidavits and other proof.” · 49 citing courts
5
REDDacruz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 794 A.2d 1117 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
cites § 38a-321 21×cited by 15 cases
Reversed by Dacruz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2004): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 38a-321
“In this action, which was commenced pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-321, 1 the plaintiff, David J.”
6
GREENSamelko v. Kingstone Ins. Co., 184 A.3d 741 (Conn. 2018).
cites § 38a-321 8×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“The plaintiffs were subrogated to the rights of the insured under the policy issued by the defendant pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-321 1 and brought this action directly against the defendant to recover damages.”
The case’s holding
A contract is to be performed in the state under the long arm statute when it contemplates performance there, regardless of whether that performance has actually occurred.
Later courts cite it for
“refers to the performance that the parties contemplated in the contract, without regard to whether it has actually been performed.” · 4 citing courts
7
GREENBlack v. Goodwin, Loomis & Britton, Inc., 681 A.2d 293 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 38a-321 7×cited by 74 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“The plaintiffs *149 amended five count complaint contained three common law claims, breach of contract, negligence and bad faith, and two statutory claims, one for violation of General Statutes § 38a-321 7 and a second for violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act…”
The case’s holding
An insurer that breaches its duty to defend must bear the consequences of its decision, including the payment of any reasonable settlement agreed to by the insured and the plaintiff.
Later courts cite it for
“the appropriate standard of proof for the party who seeks to prevail in a civil fraud action is clear and convincing evidence” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENBuell Indus., Inc. v. Greater New York Mut. Ins., 791 A.2d 489 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 38a-321 3×cited by 159 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“In Verdón, wherein we interpreted Connecticut’s direct action statute, the issue was whether “a decrease in the value of an estate caused by legal malpractice is ‘damage to the property of any person’ for purposes of General Statutes § 38-175 [now § 38a-321] . . . ,” 16 Ver *542…”
The case’s holding
The term sudden in a pollution exclusion requires a temporally abrupt release of pollutants and the insured bears the burden of proving the exception applies.
Later courts cite it for
“a party may not . . . rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENNash Street, LLC v. Main Street Am. Assurance Co., 251 A.3d 600 (Conn. 2020).
cites § 38a-321 7×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“In this case, brought under the direct action statute; see General Statutes § 38a-321; the plaintiff, Nash Street, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, which granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the named defendant, Main Street America Assurance Company.”
The case’s holding
An insurer's duty to defend is triggered if any allegation in a complaint falls even possibly within the scope of coverage, including instances of legal or factual uncertainty.
Later courts cite it for
“because all that is necessary to trigger an insurer's duty to defend is a possibility of coverage, any uncertainty as to whether an alleged injury is covered works in favor of providing a defense to an insured, and uncertainty may be either factual or legal.” · 4 citing courts
10
GREENMunroe v. Great Am. Ins., 661 A.2d 581 (Conn. 1995).
cites § 38a-321 6×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“The defendant is correct that, in statutes other than § 38a-343, the legislature has undertaken, in so many words, to distinguish between cancellation on the one hand and annulment or rescission on the other.”
The case’s holding
Compulsory automobile insurance statutes abrogate an insurer's common law right to rescind a contract ab initio to deny recovery to an innocent third-party victim.
Later courts cite it for
“as a matter of common law, a party to a contract. . . may rescind that contract and avoid liability thereunder if that party's consent to the contract was procured either by the other party's fraudulent misrepresentations, or by the other party's nonfraudulent material misrepresentations.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENCarford v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins., 891 A.2d 55 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
cites § 38a-321 6×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“See General Statutes § 38a-321. 6 Because there was no contractual *47 relationship between the parties, nor any judgment leading to subrogation, the defendant owed no duty of good faith and fair dealing to the plaintiffs.”
Later courts cite it for
“the right to assert a private cause of action for cuipa violations through cutpa does not extend to third parties absent subrogation or a judicial determination of the insured's liability.” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENHilario's Truck Ctr., LLC v. Rinaldi, 193 A.3d 683 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
cites § 38a-321 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“If a towing company renders services after an accident, other avenues exist for the towing company to seek recovery for those services. We may presume that in many instances, the insurance company will pay for the services if the policy provides for such coverage.”
13
GREENTucker v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D. Conn. 2010).
cites § 38a-321 9×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“Whether Plaintiff has standing to sue under Connecticut’s Direct Action Statute Defendants’ first ground for dismissal is that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring her action against them as insurers under Connecticut’s Direct Action Statute, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 38a-321, because she…”
14
REDHome Ins. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 644 A.2d 933 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994).
cites § 38a-321 6×cited by 15 cases
Reversed by Home Insurance v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. (1995): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 38a-321
“General Statutes § 38a-321; see 73 Am. Jur.”
Later courts cite it for
“an insured's intent to commit an act may be negated for purposes of an intentional conduct exclusion clause when the insured did not understand the nature or wrongfulness of his conduct, or was deprived of the capacity to control his actions regardless of his understanding of the nature or wrongfulness of his action.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENClinch v. Generali-U.S. Branch, 954 A.2d 223 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
cites § 38a-321 4×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“In his complaint, the plaintiff claimed that *32 because the judgment had not been satisfied within thirty days after it was rendered, pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-321, 1 he, as a judgment creditor, became subrogated to all the rights of the defendant’s insured.”
Later courts cite it for
“did the appellate court correctly decide that the defendant insurer had no duty to defend any of the plaintiffs allegations of negligence?” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENClinch v. Generali-U.S. Branch, 980 A.2d 313 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 38a-321 5×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“Branch, alleging that, pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-321, 1 he was entitled to recover from *775 the defendant a judgment for damages that had been rendered against the defendant’s insured.”
17
GREENTucker v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 728 F. Supp. 2d 114 (D. Conn. 2010).
cites § 38a-321 5×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“In contrast, in Tucker II, plaintiff now sues her former employer’s alleged insurers for breach of contract; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; damages as a subrogee of the Journal Register Company under Connecticut’s Direct Action Statute, Conn.…”
18
GREENPeck v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins., 114 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D. Conn. 2000).
cites § 38a-321 8×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“Pursuant to Connecticut’s direct action statute, C.G.S.A. § 38a-321, 2 and the written assignment from South Norwalk Redevelopment, plaintiff has asserted the following five counts against Public Service Mutual: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good…”
19
GREENCage v. Litchfield Mut. Ins., 713 A.2d 281 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997).
cites § 38a-321 7×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“This is an action brought by the plaintiff, Buddy Cage, against the defendant, Litchfield Mutual Insurance Company, in which the plaintiff claims damages based on breach of contract with respect to an insurance policy issued by the defendant to the Mystic Valley Hunt Club (Hunt…”
20
GREENBarbarula ex rel. Est. of He v. Canal Ins. Co., 353 F. Supp. 2d 246 (D. Conn. 2004).
cites § 38a-321 6×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 38a-321
“As the insureds have no present right under the policy, the Plaintiffs derivative claim pursuant to C.G.S § 38a-321 must also fail.” 2 Defendant Canal’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Second Summary Judgment, at 3.”

Show all 64 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199220092026

One bar per year. Tallest: 8 cases in 2022. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
D. Conn.26Conn. App. Ct.19Conn.15Conn. Super. Ct.4
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

Show all 64 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

Connecticut General Statutes Home  |  Search Connecticut  |  Search cases for this section  |  syfert.com